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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of the 2009 Terrorism Threat Assessment is to convey potential terrorism threats affecting the Commonwealth of Virginia. Terrorism, for the purpose of this report, is defined as politically motivated violence or threat of violence designed to coerce action or to prevent others from taking intended actions. While there is no intelligence that indicates terrorists are currently planning attacks in Virginia, the presence of extremists, evidence of trends linked to terrorism, and the abundance of potential targets, suggests that the potential for Virginia to be targeted remains significant.

As with previous years, the threat from terrorist and extremist groups can be categorized as international or domestic threats. Each of these groups holds particular values and political goals and thus represents a different type of threat to Virginia and the U.S. The international terrorism threat to Virginia and the nation as a whole stems from several radical Islamic militant groups. The domestic terrorist threat is comprised of a wide variety of groups, to include special interest groups, anarchists, race-based groups, including black separatists and white supremacists, militias and sovereign citizens, and homegrown extremists.

In Virginia, identified activities have been limited primarily to non-violent acts and crimes committed to raise funds to finance group activities. Some activities also relate to criminal endeavors generally used by extremists to further operational planning. The Virginia Fusion Center monitors international, national, and regional trends relating to terrorism and criminal extremism for indicators of emerging activity in the Commonwealth. Terrorism trends of greatest concern in 2009 include terrorism tradecraft, recruitment, and radicalization, terrorist use of technology, and terrorism financing.

As terrorists adapt and evolve to offset existing counterterrorism measures, they have successfully exploited available technology and modified their tactics to ensure successful operations. While several of the trends noted are applicable to all terrorist and extremist groups, increasing linkages are noted to specific critical infrastructure and key resources. As such, this product highlights, where possible, connections noted between groups, their behaviors, and potentially targeted infrastructure.

Based on the information gathered, the Commonwealth of Virginia could be potentially targeted for terrorist attack due to its location and proximity to Washington, D.C., its concentration of critical infrastructure, and the amount of extremist activity documented in Virginia. In order to detect and deter terrorist attacks, it is essential that information regarding suspected terrorists and suspicious activity in Virginia be closely monitored and reported in a timely manner. Additionally, it remains important to determine the extent of existing trends and to collect, analyze, and disseminate this information to law enforcement partners in Virginia.
OVERVIEW

The 2009 Terrorism Threat Assessment, in keeping with the Virginia Fusion Center (VFC) mission of integrating threat information from public and private sector agencies to prevent terrorist attacks, is designed to afford law enforcement, homeland security, and policy making officials terrorism threat intelligence of relevance to Virginia. Included in this assessment is an overview of identified groups, individuals, or activities; known or suspected trends; and critical infrastructure or key resources with significant U.S. or Virginia reporting within the past five years. While there is no intelligence that indicates terrorists are planning attacks in Virginia, the abundance of potential targets provides terrorists with many possibilities and opportunities throughout the Commonwealth. Information contained in this Threat Assessment is current as of February 2009 and will be reviewed and updated on an annual basis.

In addressing the terrorism threat to Virginia, it is important to define terrorism and the scope of activities included. Terrorism can be defined as politically motivated violence or threat of violence designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake or to refrain from actions they desired to take. Terrorism is generally directed against civilian targets and is intended to produce effects beyond immediate physical damage, to produce long-term psychological repercussions, especially fear, on a particular target audience. For the purposes of this Threat Assessment, terrorism is divided into two categories: international and domestic terrorism. International terrorism involves threats emanating primarily from the international jihad movement, foreign terrorist organizations, and state sponsors of terrorism. Domestic terrorism includes threats from special interest groups, white supremacists, black separatists, and anti-government groups. Terrorism trends included in this assessment are activities, such as recruitment, financing, training, and planning, conducted in furtherance of terrorism.

Terrorism remains a threat to Virginia, not only because of its proximity to the nation’s capitol, but also due to the volume of significant infrastructure. Such infrastructure includes military installations such as the Pentagon; two nuclear power plants; and a major East Coast seaport. Virginia is also home to a wide range of transportation sector targets of interest, including interstate highways with high-traffic bridges and tunnels; railways and subways; and aviation and port facilities. While other infrastructure sectors, such as water, energy, and information technology could be targeted, it is also possible that terrorist attention could be directed toward law enforcement at the local, state, and federal levels.

Spanning 39,598 square miles, Virginia has a population of almost 7.5 million residents. Roughly half of these residents are concentrated in the northern Virginia, central Virginia, and Hampton Roads regions. All three of these regions feature ethnically diverse populations with cultural ties to the Middle East, the horn of Africa, Southeast Asia, and other areas heavily impacted by terrorist activities. While the vast majority of these individuals are law-abiding, this ethnic diversity also affords terrorist operatives the opportunity to assimilate easily into society, without arousing suspicion. Virginia’s network of colleges and universities also represent a potential avenue of entry.
for terrorist operatives and a possible forum for recruitment of sympathizers. Additionally, Virginia’s correctional system remains an attractive venue for recruitment and radicalization relating to terror organizations and hate groups.

The VFC has compiled information from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, as well as open sources to create this Threat Assessment. In addition to reviewing information directly reported to the VFC, surveys were sent to all Virginia local law enforcement agencies to determine the extent of terrorism activities throughout the state. Information of interest included not only event-specific data, but also suspicious traffic stops or activities consistent with pre-operational attack planning. Assessments of the overall threat posed by specific terror and extremist groups or movements were completed utilizing the Project Sleipnir: Revised Long Matrix for Criminal Extremism utilized by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Although the primary objective of this report is to share valuable terrorism intelligence with public safety agencies in Virginia, a secondary goal is to highlight the types of data needed from local, state, and federal partners of the VFC. While every effort was made to ensure accurate, thorough reporting of the terrorist threat, it is expected that not every incident of possible terrorist activity will be reported or forwarded to the VFC.
VSP Division Map

**Division 1**
Ashland, Amelia, Caroline, Charles City, Chesterfield, Colonial Heights, Dinwiddie, Essex, Goochland, Hanover, Henrico, Hopewell, King and Queen, King George, King William, Lancaster, Louisa, New Kent, Northumberland, Nottoway, Petersburg, Powhatan, Prince George, Richmond City, Richmond County, and Westmoreland

**Division 2**
Clarke, Culpeper, Frederick, Fauquier, Fredericksburg, Harrisonburg, Madison, Orange, Page, Rappahannock, Rockingham, Shenandoah, Spotsylvania, Stafford, Warren, and Winchester

**Division 3**
Albemarle, Amherst, Appomattox, Augusta, Buckingham, Campbell, Charlotte, Charlottesville, Cumberland, Fluvanna, Greene, Halifax, Lunenburg, Lynchburg, Mecklenburg, Nelson, Prince Edward, Staunton, and Waynesboro

**Division 4**

**Division 5**
Accomack, Brunswick, Chesapeake, Gloucester, Greensville, Hampton, Isle of Wight, James City, Mathews, Middlesex, Newport News, Norfolk, Northampton, Portsmouth, Southampton, Suffolk, Surry, Sussex, Virginia Beach, and York

**Division 6**
Alleghany, Bath, Bedford, Botetourt, Craig, Floyd, Franklin, Henry, Highland, Montgomery, Patrick, Pittsylvania, Roanoke City, Roanoke County, Rockbridge, and Salem

**Division 7**
Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax City, Fairfax County, Falls Church, Loudoun, Manassas, Manassas Park, and Prince William
2009 Terrorism Survey Participation

Participating Agencies
Caroline Fire-Rescue; Caroline Sheriff's Office; Chesterfield Emergency Management; Chesterfield Police; Colonial Beach Police; Colonial Heights Police; Fort Lee; Fort Pickett; Goochland Fire-Rescue; Hanover Fire/EMS; Hanover Sheriff's Office; Henrico Police; Henrico Emergency Management; Henrico Fire; King George Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Services; King William Emergency Services; Lancaster Emergency Services; Louisa Emergency Services; New Kent Sheriff's Office; Petersburg Fire, Rescue & EM; Petersburg Sheriff's Office; Powhatan Emergency Management; Powhatan Sheriff's Office; Prince George Fire, EMS, & Emergency Management; Virginia Commonwealth University; Division of Capitol Police; Richmond City Office of Emergency Management; Richmond Police; Virginia State Police–Bureau of Criminal Investigation

Legend
- No Response
- Fire/EMS/EM Only
- Law Enforcement Only
- Multiple Public Safety
Overview

Division 1 encompasses roughly 6,409 square miles divided into twenty-four major cities and counties representing a mixture of urban, suburban, and rural areas. Major transportation corridors include Interstates 95, 64, and 85 and associated connectors, in addition to Routes 60, 360, 5, and 33. The 2005 population estimate for this Division is 1,222,381; this figure does not include seasonal or temporary residents such as college students, incarcerated individuals, or migrant workers. In Division 1, the beginning of the college year creates a population surge of at least 44,000 people.

Terrorist/Extremist Group Presence

A wide variety of terror or extremist groups have links to Division 1. Richmond’s history as the capital city of the Confederacy, combined with the city’s current demographic concentration of African-American residents, contributes to the continued presence of race-based extremist groups. This area is also the site of several community colleges and urban universities that attract a diverse range of domestic and international students and professors; two area universities are designated as Historically Black Colleges and Universities. While the majority of individuals associated with educational institutions do not engage in activities of interest to the VFC, it is important to note that University-based students groups are recognized as a radicalization node for almost every type of extremist group. A small number of Division 1 area college students also align themselves with anarchist or animal and/or environmental groups.

Terrorism/Extremism Trends Summary

Groups in Division 1 have been linked to recruitment efforts and possible fundraising activities. Recruitment activities have included Internet, print-based, and personal outreach efforts in colleges and universities, religious institutions, and correctional facilities. Some of the area’s special interest extremist groups have been investigated for property crimes against targeted businesses. As with most of the other areas of the state, possible surveillance incidents consistent with terrorism tradecraft tactics, techniques, and procedures have been reported.

Critical Infrastructure Summary

As the state capital, Richmond has a strong concentration of government and private sector critical infrastructure. The City of Richmond has a significant number of Banking and Finance assets, including a branch of the Federal Reserve Bank. Division 1 also has a strong transportation sector, with major interstates and bridges, railways, a port, and an expanding aviation presence. Energy sector assets of interest include coal and nuclear power generation facilities, multiple chemical plants along the James River, and a significant presence of farms and food processing facilities. Richmond is also home to several large commercial facilities, including a major NASCAR track.

Terrorism Screening Center Data

According to 2008 TSC data, 12 law enforcement encounters were reported in seven of Division 1 jurisdictions. The bulk of the encounters occurred within the city of Richmond (four), Petersburg (two) and Dinwiddie (two).
Division 2

2009 Terrorism Survey Participation

Legend
- No Response
- Fire/EMS/EM Only
- Law Enforcement Only
- Multiple Public Safety

Participating Agencies
- Berryville Police; Bridgewater College Police; Clarke Sheriff's Office; Culpeper Emergency Services; Culpeper Police; Dumfries-Triangle Rescue Squad; Fauquier Fire and Emergency Services; Fauquier Sheriff's Office; Frederick Fire & Rescue; Frederick Sheriff's Office; Fredericksburg Police; Gordonsville Police; Harrisonburg Fire Department; Orange Sheriff's Office; Page Fire–EMS; Page Office of Emergency Management; Page Sheriff's Office; Luray Police; Rockingham Fire/Rescue/Emergency Management; Rockingham Sheriff's Office; Shenandoah Fire and Rescue; Spotsylvania Fire, Rescue & Emergency Management; Spotsylvania Sheriff's Office; Stafford County Fire and Rescue; Strasburg Police; Warren Sheriff's Office; Warrenton Police; Winchester Fire & Rescue; Virginia State Police – All Area Offices plus Bureau of Criminal Investigation
Overview

Division 2 encompasses roughly 5,674 square miles divided into fifteen major cities and counties. This division is comprised of urban, suburban, and rural areas, with many of the area's residents commuting to the greater Washington, D.C. area for work. Major transportation corridors include Interstates 66, 95 and 81, in addition to Routes 15, 17, 29, 33, and 50. The 2005 population estimate for this division is 732,580; this figure does not include seasonal or temporary residents such as college students, incarcerated individuals, illegal aliens, or migrant workers. In Division 2, the beginning of the college year creates a population surge of at least 27,000 people.

Terrorist/Extremist Group Presence

Division 2 has a diverse population largely comprised of D.C. commuters. While the white nationalist extremist groups and anarchists in Division 2 generally tend towards public activities to garner support for or raise awareness of their agendas, internationally-affiliated individuals have attempted to avoid detection. Although additional international groups likely have a presence in this region, reporting indicates that Jama’at al-Tabligh has conducted meetings and other activities in this region within the past few years.

Terrorism/Extremism Trends Summary

Groups in Division 2 have been linked to recruitment efforts and possible fundraising activities. Recruitment activities have included Internet, print-based, and personal outreach efforts in colleges and universities, religious institutions, and correctional facilities. As with most of the other areas of the state, possible surveillance incidents consistent with terrorism tradecraft tactics, techniques, and procedures have been reported.

Critical Infrastructure Summary

Division 2 has several commercial facilities of interest including power generation stations, a DuPont chemical plant, and a major Merck pharmaceutical location. Also of note in Division 2 is the Virginia Inland Port, an intermodal container transfer facility between truck and rail for the transport of ocean-going containers to and from the Port of Virginia. Division 2 is also the home to one of the two major sites for the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). Agriculture and Food assets also have a strong presence in Division 2.

Terrorism Screening Center Data

According to 2008 TSC data, 5 law enforcement encounters were reported in five of Division 2 jurisdictions. The bulk of the encounters occurred within Harrisonburg.
Division 3

2009 Terrorism Survey Participation

Participating Agencies
Albemarle Fire/Rescue; Albemarle Police; Amherst Police; Amherst Public Safety; Amherst Sheriff's Office; Augusta Fire-Rescue; Buckingham Sheriff's Office; Campbell Public Safety; Cumberland Emergency Services; Liberty University Police; Lynchburg Police; Mecklenburg Sheriff's Office; Nelson Sheriff's Office; North Garden Volunteer Fire (Albemarle); Piedmont Virginia Community College; Prince Edward Emergency Management; Seminole Trail Volunteer Fire (Albemarle); Waynesboro Sheriff's Office; Western Albemarle Rescue; Virginia State Police – All Area Offices

Legend
- No Response
- Fire/EMS/EM Only
- Law Enforcement Only
- Multiple Public Safety
Overview

Division 3 encompasses roughly 7,770 square miles divided into nineteen major cities and counties representing a mixture of urban, suburban, and rural areas. Major transportation corridors include Interstates 64, 81, and 85, in addition to Routes 15, 29, 58, 60, and 360. The 2005 population estimate for this Division is 617,198; this figure does not include seasonal or temporary residents such as college students, incarcerated individuals, illegal aliens, or migrant workers. In Division 3, the beginning of the college year creates a population surge of at least 45,700 people.

Terrorist/Extremist Group Presence

The primary group of note in Division 3 is the Muslims of America (MOA), a known front group for Jama’at ul Fuqra. MOA has two isolationist compounds that feature community and residential trailers that help to insulate members from contact with the influences of Western society. In addition to MOA, Division 3 has reported a presence of anarchists and group-affiliated activity. A number of environmental extremist groups have developed in and around the Blue Ridge Mountains, including Earth First affiliates and sympathizers.

Terrorism/Extremism Trends Summary

Groups in Division 3 have been linked to recruitment efforts and possible fundraising activities. Recruitment activities have included Internet, print-based, and personal outreach efforts in colleges and universities, religious institutions, and correctional facilities. As with most of the other areas of the state, possible surveillance incidents consistent with terrorism tradecraft tactics, techniques, and procedures have been reported.

Critical Infrastructure Summary

Agriculture/Food sector assets represent a majority of critical infrastructure and key resources in Division 3. Numerous Virginia Department of Corrections facilities and local or regional jails are located in this area, as well as a number of Virginia National Guard assets. Also of significance is the National Ground Intelligence Center, a military facility located in Charlottesville and Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, which manufactures nuclear fuel for naval submarines in Lynchburg. Division 3 is also home to several colleges and universities; the University of Virginia, in Charlottesville, is home the 16,000-seat capacity John Paul Jones arena utilized for entertainment and sporting events.

Terrorism Screening Center Data

According to 2008 TSC data, one law enforcement encounter was reported in Charlotte County in calendar year 2008.
Division 4

2009 Terrorism Survey Participation

Legend
- No Response
- Fire/EMS/EM Only
- Law Enforcement Only
- Multiple Public Safety

Participating Agencies
Bluefield Police; Bristol Police; Galax Police; New River Community College Police; Marion Police; Pulaski Emergency Management; Town of Pulaski Police; Richlands Police; Russell County Emergency Management; Smyth Emergency Management; Smyth Sheriff's Office; Tazewell Emergency Coordinator; Virginia Highlands Community College Police; Wise Emergency Operations; Wythe Emergency Management; Wythe Sheriff's Office; Virginia State Police–Bureau of Criminal Investigation
Overview

Division 4 encompasses roughly 6,700 square miles divided into seventeen major cities and counties representing a mixture of rural, suburban, and urban areas. Major transportation corridors include Interstates 77 and 81, in addition to Routes 21, 23, 58, and 460. The 2005 population estimate for this Division is 452,561; this figure does not include seasonal or temporary residents such as college students, incarcerated individuals, or migrant workers. In Division 4, the beginning of the college year creates a population surge of approximately 4,000 people.

Terrorist/Extremist Group Presence

Environmental extremist groups represent the largest and most active groups of concern in Division 4. Groups such as Earth First not only conduct actions against energy sector assets, but they also hold annual "training camps" for activists in or near this area of the state. Most other reporting of terrorist or extremist group presence relates to isolated or poorly organized functions scheduled by white nationalist extremists. These include racist skinhead groups, such as the Vinlanders Social Club and white supremacist groups, including the Ku Klux Klan, Creativity Movement, and the Aryan Nations.

Terrorism/Extremism Trends Summary

Groups in Division 4 have been linked to recruitment efforts and possible fundraising activities, including the purchasing of pre-paid cell phones and operating front businesses. Recruitment activities have included Internet, print-based, and personal outreach efforts in colleges and universities, religious institutions, and correctional facilities. As with most of the other areas of the state, possible surveillance incidents consistent with terrorism tradecraft tactics, techniques, and procedures have been reported.

Critical Infrastructure Summary

Division 4 is the location of numerous Energy sector resources, including the southwest and valley coalfields, as well as all of Virginia’s natural gas and petroleum producing localities. Significant railroad and natural gas pipeline infrastructure is in place to transport these resources. In addition to the natural energy resources in Division 4, this area also contains a number of hydroelectric and coal-fired power generation facilities. Agriculture and Food sector assets, including both crops and livestock, are also strongly represented in various areas of this division, but vary widely based on topographic and meteorological factors. Several counties in Division 4 are also a part of the Virginia Technology Corridor that links Roanoke and Virginia Tech.

Terrorism Screening Center Data

According to 2008 TSC data, two law enforcement encounters were reported in of Division 4 jurisdictions. These encounters were reported in Bristol and Wytheville.
Division 5

2009 Terrorism Survey Participation

Legend
- No Response
- Fire/EMS/EM Only
- Law Enforcement Only
- Multiple Public Safety

Participating Agencies
Accomack Fire; Brunswick Sheriff's Office; Camp Allen; City of Chesapeake Fire/OEMS; Chesapeake Fire; Chesapeake Police; Emporia Emergency Services; City of Poquoson Emergency Management; College of William and Mary Police; Franklin Police; Gloucester Sheriff's Office; Hampton Fire; Hampton Police; Isle of Wight Emergency Services; James City County Fire; Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek; Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence; Langley Air Force Base; Newport News Police; Newport News Shipyard Security & Fire Prevention; Norfolk Fire-Rescue; Norfolk Police; Northampton Emergency Services; Portsmouth Sheriff's Office; Southampton Sheriff's Office; Suffolk Emergency Management; Suffolk Police; Sussex Fire; Virginia Beach Fire; Williamsburg Fire; York Fire and Life Safety; York Poquoson Sheriffs Office; Virginia Beach Police; Virginia Port Authority; Police Virginia State Police-Area Offices 32, 33, 34, 37, 46, 47 and Bureau of Criminal Investigation
Overview

Division 5 encompasses roughly 5,125 square miles divided into twenty-four major cities and counties representing a mixture of urban, suburban, and rural areas. Major transportation corridors include Interstates 64, 95, and 85, in addition to Routes 5, 58, 60, and 360. The 2005 population estimate for this division is 1,789,929; this figure does not include seasonal or temporary residents such as college students, incarcerated individuals, or migrant workers. In Division 5, the beginning of the college year creates a population surge of at least 47,000 people.

Terrorist/Extremist Group Presence

A wide variety of terror or extremist groups have links to Division 5. This area not only has a diverse population due to the strong military presence, but it is also the site of several universities. While most of these universities are considered urban, two are designated as a Historically Black Colleges and Universities, while Regent University is a private, evangelical Christian institution. While the majority of individuals associated with educational institutions do not engage in activities of interest to the VFC, it is important to note that University-based students groups are recognized as a radicalization node for almost every type of extremist group. In addition to recent activity by race-based extremist groups, an identified anti-abortion extremist group has maintained an active presence. Although activities by these groups have been non-violent, all are linked to individuals or ideologies that have endorsed violence as a legitimate tactic.

Terrorism/Extremism Trends Summary

Groups in Division 5 have been linked to recruitment efforts and possible fundraising activities. Recruitment activities have included Internet, print-based, and personal outreach efforts. Division 5 also has the highest reporting level of potential surveillance activity, mostly due to incidents involving photography and videotaping of the area’s bridges and tunnels. In addition, incidents of passport and visa fraud suggest concerns regarding illicit entry to the U.S.

Critical Infrastructure Summary

Division 5 contains a high concentration of critical infrastructure relating to Navy, Coast Guard, and Army installations. Due to the number of populous locations within Division 5 and the access to multiple navigable waterways, the transportation sector is far more complex than average. In addition to a number of unique bridge and tunnel systems, this area also has ports that serve both cargo and cruise ships, with smaller waterfront areas served by local ferry service. Also of note is the location of the Surry Nuclear Power Plant, one of two such facilities currently operating in Virginia. It is also important to note, however, that despite the large amount of urban and industrial areas, Division 5 also has sizeable areas in which farming is prevalent.

Terrorism Screening Center Data

According to 2008 TSC data, 15 law enforcement encounters were reported in six of Division 5 jurisdictions. The bulk of the encounters occurred in Virginia Beach (seven), with two more occurring in Williamsburg.
Division 6

2009 Terrorism Survey Participation

Legend
- No Response
- Fire/EMS/EM Only
- Law Enforcement Only
- Multiple Public Safety

Participating Agencies
- Bath Sheriff's Office; Bedford Police; Buena Vista Police; Blacksburg Emergency Management; Botetourt Emergency Services; Craig Sheriff's Office; Covington Fire; Danville Police; Henry Fire; Henry Sheriff's Office; Highland; Lexington Police; Martinsville Fire & EMS; Martinsville Police; Montgomery Sheriff's Office; Patrick sheriff's Office; Radford Army Ammunition Plant; Radford Fire & Rescue; Radford Police; Roanoke County Fire and Rescue; Roanoke Police; Rockbridge Emergency Management; Salem Fire & EMS Department; Salem Police; Vinton Police; Virginia Military Institute Police; Virginia Tech Police; Virginia Western Community College Police; Virginia State Police–Bureau of Criminal Investigation

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
Overview
Division 6 encompasses roughly 7,373 square miles divided into twenty-three major cities and counties representing a mixture of urban, suburban, and rural areas. Major transportation corridors include Interstates 64 and 81, in addition to Routes 29, 58, 60, 220, and 460. The 2005 population estimate for this Division is 748,249; this figure does not include seasonal or temporary residents such as college students, incarcerated individuals, illegal aliens, or migrant workers. In Division 6, the beginning of the college year creates a population surge of at least 47,000 people.

Terrorist/Extremist Group Presence
In Division 6, the primary threat groups resolve from domestic extremists. White nationalists, environmental groups, and militias have a presence in the area. The Ku Klux Klan and the American National Socialist Workers Party have been involved in numerous efforts to recruit additional members through propaganda distribution and rallies. Environmental groups such as Blue Ridge Earth First have established a foothold in the area and have engaged in demonstrations and planned training events. Militia groups have been more active in prior years; however, they have kept a low profile more recently. Renewed debate on immigration and fears of terrorism may spark an increase in militia group activity.

The size, courses of study, and significant population of international students at Virginia Tech represents a potential concern. While the majority of individuals associated with educational institutions, do not engage in activities of interest to the VFC, it is important to note that University-based students groups are recognized as a radicalization node for almost every type of extremist group.

Terrorism/Extremism Trends Summary
Groups and movements in Division 6 have been linked to extremist recruitment and training efforts. Much of the reported activity for Division 6 pertains to planned or actual training of militia members. Other reported activities include the efforts of local white supremacists to recruit new members or retain existing members.

Critical Infrastructure Summary
Division 6 has a mixture of critical infrastructure and key resource assets ranging from agricultural and food production to significant sports and entertainment facilities. This division not only includes energy resources such as natural gas pipelines and petroleum product storage facilities, but also includes dams and two significant pumped power storage facilities. Several counties in Division 6 are also a part of the Virginia Technology Corridor that links Roanoke and Virginia Tech. Also of note in Division 6 are two major sports and entertainment venues— the Martinsville Speedway and Roanoke Convention Center.

Terrorism Screening Center Data
According to 2008 TSC data, 8 law enforcement encounters were reported in three of Division 6 jurisdictions. The bulk of the encounters occurred within Blacksburg and Christiansburg.
2009 Terrorism Survey Participation

Legend
- No Response
- Fire/EMS/EM Only
- Law Enforcement Only
- Multiple Public Safety

Participating Agencies
Alexandria Office of Emergency Management; Alexandria Police; Arlington County Fire; Arlington County Police; Fairfax City Fire Department; Fairfax City-Office of Emergency Management; Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department; Fairfax County Office of Emergency Management; Fairfax County Police; Falls Church Emergency Management; Falls Church Police; Fort Belvoir; George Mason University Police; Loudoun County Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Management; Manassas City Police; Manassas City Emergency Management; Manassas Park Police; Manassas Volunteer Fire; Metro Washington Airport Authority Police; Northern Virginia Community College Police; U.S. Marshals Service; Virginia State Police–Bureau of Criminal Investigation and Field Operations
Overview

Division 7 encompasses roughly 1,339 square miles divided into nine major cities and counties representing a mixture of urban, suburban, and rural areas. Major transportation corridors include Interstates 66, 95, 395, and 495, in addition to Routes 15 and 50. The 2005 population estimate for this Division is 2,067,358; this figure does not include seasonal or temporary residents such as college students, incarcerated individuals, illegal aliens, or migrant workers. In Division 7, the beginning of the college year creates a population surge of at least 34,000 people.

Terrorist/Extremist Group Presence

Division 7 faces numerous threats from both international and domestic groups due to its expansive critical infrastructure as well as its proximity to Washington, D.C. HAMAS and the Muslim Brotherhood have an identified presence in the area and have been linked with suspicious fundraising efforts to include front businesses and charities. On the other end of the spectrum is the threat posed from White nationalist extremists. A majority of their activities have consisted of demonstrations and conferences. The most active white nationalists in Division 7 include the American Renaissance and the National Socialist Movement.

Terrorism/Extremism Trends Summary

Groups in Division 7 have been linked to recruitment efforts and possible fundraising activities. Terrorism financing investigations following the September 2001 attacks have shown multiple links to now defunct organizations in Division 7. It is highly likely, however, that front businesses and charities in this area are supporting extremist groups. Recruitment activities have included Internet, print-based, and personal outreach efforts at colleges and universities, religious institutions, and correctional facilities. In addition, incidents of passport and visa fraud suggest concerns regarding illicit entry to the U.S.

Critical Infrastructure Summary

Division 7 critical infrastructure includes a heavy concentration of government and military facilities located in proximity to the national capital. This area also has significant transportation assets, including highways and bridges, rail and light rail, and multiple international airports. Due to the population density and the high-tech demands of the government and military sectors, segments of Division 7 are also considered a technology corridor with significant information and telecommunications technology assets.

Terrorism Screening Center Data

According to 2008 TSC data, 148 law enforcement encounters were reported in Division 7 jurisdictions. 77% of encounters in Division 7 occurred in Arlington, Alexandria, Fairfax City, and Fairfax County. Division 7 encounters accounted for roughly 75% of all encounters in Virginia.
Overview of Terrorist and Extremist Data in Virginia

A wide range of international and domestic terror and extremist groups has been identified in Virginia. While the focus of this product is on the groups, movements, and individuals known or suspected to be involved in Virginia-based activities, it is important to note that Virginia has a number of large, international airports that serve foreign and out-of-state extremists. The Virginia Fusion Center receives periodic reporting from the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) highlighting encounters of interest.¹

2008 reporting from the TSC focused exclusively on Virginia data, and excluded all travel encounters at Dulles or Reagan airports.¹ The 2008 TSC data for Virginia shows 202 reported ground encounters from a total of 139 individuals.² Northern Virginia continues to be one of the busiest areas in the U.S. for positive physical ground encounters of watchlisted individuals.³

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¹ (OS) The TSC maintains a consolidated database of the names and other identifying information for all known or suspected terrorists, known as the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). Pursuant to HSPD-6, a known or suspected terrorist is an individual known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.
Although TSC reporting provides valuable information, it does not represent the total picture of potentially nefarious activity in Virginia. It is important to note that the number of encounters tracked by the TSC includes only incidents involving individuals believed to be on the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). As such, the TSC reporting includes incidents in which a person or a vehicle could be identified and the official handling the incident checked the subject’s information through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This also includes incidents involving queries against any of the other systems for which the TSC exports information. As such, TSC encounter data can only include known individuals whose activities and affiliations meet federal thresholds.

**Encounter Types**

Law enforcement encounters monitored by the TSC in 2008 could be grouped into five main categories, including:

- Traffic Stops
- Plate Checks, in which a license plate is queried but the TSC cannot confirm that an officer actually encountered a watchlisted subject
- Calls for Service, which includes law enforcement response not initiated by a traffic stop
- Investigations, which include incident investigation not deemed traffic related
- Jail/Prison Related, in which a watchlisted individual is either processed for incarceration or is attempting to visit an inmate

![2008 TSC Ground Encounters](chart)
Encounters by City

According to 2008 data, the top 5 encounter locations, Alexandria, Arlington, Falls Church, Fairfax, and Springfield accounted for 51.5% of all positive encounters in Virginia. The TSC received locality information in all but 6 ground encounters in 2008.

Law enforcement encounters were reported in the following jurisdictions in 2008:

- Arlington
- Alexandria
- Ashburn
- Barhamsville (New Kent)
- Blacksburg
- Bristol
- Burke
- Centreville
- Chesterfield
- Church Road (Dinwiddie)
- Christiansburg
- Claiborne
- Dinwiddie
- Dumfries
- Emporia
- Fairfax City
- Fairfax County
- Falmouth
- Fort Belvoir
- Franconia
- Front Royal
- Glen Allen (Henrico)
- Grafton
- Great Falls
- Harrisonburg
- Herndon
- Hampton
- Leesburg
- Linden
- Lorton
- Manassas
- McLean
- Norfolk
- Petersburg
- Prince William
- Red House
- Reston
- Richmond
- Salem
- Sterling
- Triangle
- Tyson’s Corner
- Warrenton
- Woodstock
- Wytheville
- Vienna
- Virginia Beach
- Williamsburg
- Woodbridge
### Encounters by Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calling Agency</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairfax County Police</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arlington County Police</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia State Police / Virginia Fusion Center</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria Police</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Beach Police</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falls Church Police</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loudoun County Police</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince William Police</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria Sheriff’s Office</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christiansburg Police</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of Probation and Pretrial Services – Manassas</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk Police</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrisonburg Rockingham Emergency Communications Center</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrico Police</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James City County Police</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manassas City Police</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Tech Police</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following agencies each reported one ground encounter during 2008:

- Arlington County Sheriff’s Office
- Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office
- DEA–Washington
- FCI-Beckley
- Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority
- Metropolitan Police
- Richmond Police
- TSA-Threat Assessments and Credentialing
- U.S. Probation – Alexandria and Boston
- Virginia Department of Corrections
- Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
- Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
- ATF
- Chesterfield Police
- Dinwiddie Sheriff’s Office
- Leesburg Police
- Louisa Sheriff’s Office
- Petersburg Police
- Shenandoah Sheriff’s Office
- Special Stops Group (IAFIS)
- U.S. Marshals
- Virginia State Police–Salem
- Warren Sheriff’s Office
- Wytheville Police
International Terrorism Threat

International terrorism, defined as foreign-based groups that engage in attacks and criminal acts which transcend national boundaries, remains a concern within the Commonwealth. Although international terrorist groups routinely espouse their intent to launch large-scale attacks within the U.S., the majority of activities found in the U.S., and Virginia in particular, comes from criminal activities that raise funds for attacks overseas. It is important to note, however, that the presence of supporters of such groups could be leveraged to support operatives preparing for an attack within the U.S.

Virginia’s population is increasingly diverse, with numerous cultures and ethnicities represented in most of the metropolitan areas. Although the vast majority of refugees and immigrants who enter Virginia do so legally and with the intention to create a new life, Virginia has received reporting of potential instances of fraudulent entry that might be linked to international terror groups. Also of concern is the potential for exploitation within some ethnic communities that may have strong emotional or familial ties to areas of conflict; while the potential for radicalization and recruitment for actual attacks is assessed as low, the possibility of money raised at rallies or other demonstrations of solidarity could be diverted to benefit terrorist entities. Significant developments in the Middle East, the horn of Africa, or Eastern Europe could inspire action on the part of individuals sympathetic to internationally linked groups.

Based on collection requirements established in 2008, al-Qa’ida, Al-Shabaab, HAMAS, Hizballah, Jama’at ul Fuqra, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, and the Muslim Brotherhood were assessed as potential international terrorism threats to Virginia. While most of these groups are known to have individuals that currently live, work, or frequently travel through Virginia, some groups were included in this threat assessment based more on historic data or emerging significance based on world events. These assessments were largely corroborated by recently released data from the Terrorism Screening Center. According to 2008 ground encounter data, the most frequently encountered groups were al-Qa’ida, HAMAS, and Hizballah. Occasionally encountered groups and movements included Sunni Extremists, Jama’at Tabligh, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Islamic Jihad Union, Muslim Brotherhood, and the Taliban.

\[b\] (OS) The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was formed in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s by a branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. In 2003, University of South Florida professor Dr. Sami Al-Arian was arrested after being indicted on 50 terrorism related charges; Dr. Al-Arian was also accused of serving as the North American head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Acquitted on 8 of the 17 charges with the jury deadlocked on the remaining charges, he pled guilty to conspiracy charges to help members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in nonviolent activities in March 2006. Meg Laughlin, In his plea deal, what did Sami Al-Arian admit to?, St. Petersburg Times, April 23, 2006.

\[c\] (OS) The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), also known as Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), is a splinter group from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and has conducted several attacks in Uzbekistan. In 2007 three individuals directly affiliated with the Islamic Jihad Group were arrested in Germany for plotting to attack the Frankfurt International airport and U.S. military installations such as Ramstein Air Base. Germany Indicts "Home Grown" Islamists for Terrorist Bomb Plot, September 2, 2008.
Al-Qa’ida

Al-Qa’ida was founded in 1989 by Usama bin Laden to finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for global jihad. The group seeks to establish a global Islamic empire by forcefully expelling Westerners, specifically Americans, from historically Muslim lands, such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and North Africa. Al Qaeda has long considered American influence and power to be one of the largest impediments to the establishment of a pan-Islamic nation, as they believe it is propping up “apostate,” or non-Islamic, governments in the region.

Al-Qa’ida cells are located worldwide, especially in South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and are reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks. Al-Qa’ida’s membership, estimated at several thousand members worldwide, has attempted to extend its influence through formal affiliations and informal ‘inspirational efforts.’ Al-Qa’ida also supports Muslim fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Kosovo.

Domestic Activities

Possible activities by al-Qa’ida members or sympathizers within the U.S. include fundraising through hawalas (moneylenders), front businesses, and narcotics sales, as well as recruitment and radicalization. Group members or sympathizers may have established a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. and may be attempting to exploit minority communities that perceive themselves as marginalized. Past intelligence indicates group operatives may be entering or attempting to enter the U.S. through Mexico and Latin America.

According to 2008 Terrorism Screening Center ground encounter data, al-Qa’ida was one of the three most frequently encountered groups in Virginia. In 2007, at least 414 encounters between suspected al-Qa’ida members and law enforcement or government officials were documented in the Commonwealth. Although the vast majority of encounters involved automatic database checks for air travel, a number of subjects were encountered by law enforcement officers.

While reports of encounters with known members or sympathizers are important to note, the potential for encountering unidentified al-Qa’ida members or sympathizers within existing Salafist populations in Virginia are also cause for concern. Enclaves of Salafist ideology adherents have been identified in Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads areas. Al-Qa’ida may also have a

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\( (\text{LES}) \) Encounters include air travel, traffic stops, arrests, firearms purchases, employment checks, and visa applications (Terrorism Screening Center: Virginia Encounters January 1, 2007 – December 31, 2007).

\( (\text{OS}) \) Salafism is a generic term referring to a Sunni Islamic school of thought that imitates the practices of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions in the 7th century. It stresses a return to fundamentals in pursuit of pure or authentic Islam; the commitment to the Salafi movement, and its aims to purify Islam, is the foundation on which Usama bin Laden and other jihadist leaders have built their platforms. Salafism has been the common factor that has bound together radicalized American Muslims, with various ethnic, national, and linguistic backgrounds.
presence in Central Virginia due to the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood.\(^{11}\) College campuses\(^{12}\) and correctional centers within Virginia also represent potential recruitment and radicalization venues.\(^{1}\) According to 2009 public safety survey data, the counties of Fairfax and Spotsylvania reported awareness of individuals potentially linked to al-Qa’ida living, working, or otherwise linked to their jurisdictions.\(^{13}\)

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. Does al-Qa’ida currently have the ability to launch a successful attack in Virginia?
2. What are the rank or status, capabilities, and intentions of al-Qa’ida affiliated individuals currently in Virginia?
3. 
4. Does al-Qa’ida have criminal capabilities in Virginia? If so, how sophisticated are they?
5. Is al-Qa’ida in contact with any other international or domestic terrorist organizations in Virginia?
6. Is al-Qa’ida actively recruiting from within gangs? Are gangs actively seeking out al-Qa’ida membership or affiliation? Have any gang members in Virginia been identified as acting on behalf of al-Qa’ida (i.e. drug trafficking, identity theft, fraudulent document mills, human smuggling)?

**Projections**

Although al-Qa’ida has not launched an attack in the U.S. since 2001, it is assessed to have high intent to cause violence against U.S. persons and property. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps concerning membership, support activity, or pre-incident operations make it impossible to assess the group’s capability to launch an attack in Virginia within the next three years with confidence.

**Membership/Influence:** Likely to Increase - Although military operations have weakened al-Qa’ida’s operational capabilities and financial measures have negatively affected the flow of funds to the group, al-Qa’ida’s skills in attracting and influencing their target audience through the Internet appears to be increasing.\(^{14}\)

**Fundraising Activities:** Likely to Increase - The group raises funds by operating front businesses, illegal gold trading, currency smuggling, drug smuggling, donations, and the siphoning of funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of criminal activity, if any, by al-Qa’ida-linked individuals in Virginia.

Given the prevalence of government, military, and other assets repeatedly suggested as targets of interest to this group, continued intelligence collection and analysis efforts are required.

\(^{1}\) (LES) The VA Department of Corrections identified an inmate belonging to the Salafi sect of Islam espousing radical values to other inmates in a possible attempt to recruit others (TIPS C070307).
Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab is a violent extremist group with a number of individual members linked to al-Qa’ida. Many of its senior leaders are believed to have trained and fought with al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. The group, linked to individuals engaging in piracy, is also experiencing military victories in various Somali cities. Al-Shabaab also appears to be growing in popularity in the U.S. among some members of the U.S. Somali community. According to a January 29, 2009 report, the Somaliland government arrested 11 U.S. residents who were smuggling anti-aircraft missiles. According to Somaliland government officials, these 11 people allegedly received training from Al-Shabaab in the use of these weapons in the Galgudud region of Somalia.

Domestic Activities

Law enforcement and open source reports suggest that some members of the Somali community in the United States may be leaving to join the jihad in Somalia. The Al-Shabaab movement appears to be using al-Qa’ida Internet tactics to target both Somali and English speaking members of the Somali community. Al-Shabaab members or sympathizers may be engaging in radicalization in areas that have large Somali populations like Minneapolis, Minnesota, Columbus, Ohio, and Seattle, Washington.

Although limited, several previous cases of Americans travelling to Somalia to support extremist efforts include:

- Daniel Moldanado, an American Muslim convert travelled to Somalia in December 2006 and attended training camps. Moldanado was captured in January 2007 by Kenyan forces and returned to the U.S., where he was convicted of receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization.
- Ruben Shumpert, an American Muslim convert from Seattle, fled the U.S. shortly before a sentencing hearing and advised an FBI agent that he was in Somalia. An al-Shabaab web posting indicates that Shumpert was killed in northeastern Somalia.
- Shirwa Ahmed, a Somali-American, is alleged to have been killed in Northern Somalia as a suicide bomber in Northern Somalia in late October 2008.

According to 2000 U.S. Census data, the National Capitol Region has the highest concentration of Somali population in the Commonwealth, representing a potential pool of sympathizers or recruits for Al-Shabaab. While Virginia does not have Somali communities as sizable as those in the Mid-West or Pacific Northwest, Virginia does have religious institutions that work with the federal

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9 (OS) Somaliland is an autonomous region in the Somali republic. Having declared its own local government in Somalia in 1991, the Republic of Somaliland claims to be the successor state of the former British Somaliland protectorate, however it remains unrecognized internationally.
government to settle recent Somali refugees in the Greater Richmond, Hampton Roads, and Roanoke Valley\textsuperscript{22} areas of Virginia.\textsuperscript{23} In Virginia, the Office of Refugee & Immigration Services of the Catholic Diocese of Richmond resettles 600 refugees, including Somali families annually and is one of ten U.S. dioceses involved in the "Unaccompanied Minor" program.\textsuperscript{24}

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. Does Al-Shabaab currently have the intent or ability to launch a successful attack in Virginia?
2. Are there any Al-Shabaab cells identified in Virginia? If yes, where are they located?
3. What is the rank or status, capabilities, and intentions of Al-Shabaab affiliated individuals currently in Virginia?
4. Are Al-Shabaab members or sympathizers utilizing unregistered hawalas to remit funds to Somalia?
5. How many active investigations are there involving Al-Shabaab in Virginia?
6. Does Al-Shabaab have criminal capabilities in Virginia? If so, how sophisticated are they?
7. Is Al-Shabaab in contact with any other international or domestic terrorist organizations in Virginia?
8. Is Al-Shabaab actively recruiting in Virginia?

**Projections**

It is expected that as Al-Shabaab continues to gain military and political strength in Somalia, it will become more popular with some in the U.S. Somali communities. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps concerning membership, support activity, or pre-incident operations make it impossible to assess the group’s capability to launch an attack in Virginia within the next three years with confidence.

**Membership/Influence:** Likely to increase – Recent military successes, including the takeover of the Somali Parliament building, improve the credibility and visibility of Al-Shabaab. Cursory internet searches show a growing number of videos, blogs, and social network activity endorsing Al-Shabaab.

**Fundraising Activities:** Unknown – Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the current level of Virginia-based financial support for Al-Shabaab.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of criminal activity, if any, by Al-Shabaab-linked individuals in Virginia.

As Al-Shabaab continues to experience operational success and financial support, the most likely impact for Virginia is the possible radicalization and foreign training of Somali-born subjects for attacks in the horn of Africa. The primary attack threat to Virginia is the potential for Al-Shabaab to inspire homegrown plots in Virginia. A secondary concern is illicit entry through visa fraud by extremists posing as refugees fleeing persecution.
HAMAS was created in 1987 by leaders of the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. Widely recognized as a terrorist organization, HAMAS has governed the Gaza portion of the Palestinian Territories since July 2007 and utilizes political power and social programs as well as violent terrorist tactics to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. HAMAS, also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, has also been involved in increasingly sophisticated methods of targeting children with their propaganda efforts.

**Domestic Activities**

HAMAS has the largest U.S. presence of any Palestinian group, and maintains a complex fundraising, propaganda, and recruitment infrastructure. According to 2008 Terrorism Screening Center ground encounter data, HAMAS was one of the three most frequently encountered groups in Virginia. In 2007, the TSC reported 189 total Virginia encounters with subjects tied to HAMAS in Virginia. Current estimates suggest that numerous members, supporters, and sympathizers may reside in and near Virginia; these estimates appear to gain credibility from reports that several thousand protestors from the National Capitol area demonstrated in Washington, D.C. as a result of the most recent Gaza conflict.

While no potential threats have been identified from HAMAS against targets in the U.S., members residing in Virginia have participated in fundraising and political activities to support the group. Subjects identified as defendants in the Holy Land Foundation trial have been tied to Arlington and Fairfax Counties. Additional subjects with ties to HAMAS have been identified in Norfolk, Newport News, Chesterfield County, and Falls Church.

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. How many members or active supporters of HAMAS live, work, or frequently travel in Virginia?
2. Does HAMAS recruit in Virginia?
3. To what extent are HAMAS sympathizers or operatives involved in criminal financial activity in Virginia?
4. Does HAMAS have an organized or compartmentalized criminal enterprise in Virginia? What is the current level of sophistication for any such enterprise?
5. Is there a specific entity that guides political, ideological, and spiritual support for HAMAS in Virginia, or is it a loose affiliation of organizations that provides support?
6. Who are the current key leaders and what contact do they have with HAMAS?

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h (LES) FBI IIR 4 201 3303 07; Numerous family-owned markets within Newport News have been identified as funneling money back to HAMAS and Hizballah (VFC 2008 and 2009 Threat Assessment Surveys); TIPS C070594
a. If it is a loose affiliation, which organizations are the key players?
b. What are the capabilities and intentions of HAMAS members and supporters in Virginia?
c. How closely associated are HAMAS activities and Muslim Brotherhood activities in Virginia?

Projections

While the general threat of attack by HAMAS will remain constant or be degraded due to the recent conflict with Israel, the threat from HAMAS-inspired lone wolf actors may increase. Conventional wisdom indicates HAMAS refrains from attacks within the U.S. to preserve its ability to raise funds in the U.S. and avoid U.S. military action. As noted by FBI Director Robert Mueller:

> It is the FBI's assessment, at this time, that there is a limited threat of a coordinated terrorist attack in the U.S. from Palestinian terrorist organizations, such as HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. These groups have maintained a longstanding policy of focusing their attacks on Israeli targets in Israel and the Palestinian territories. We believe that the primary interest of Palestinian terrorist groups in the U.S. remains the raising of funds to support their regional goals. Although it would be a major strategic shift for HAMAS, its U.S. network is theoretically capable of facilitating acts of terrorism in the U.S.32

The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Low – Resources for operational activity are directed towards and will likely remain in the Palestinian territories.

**Membership/Influence:** Likely to Increase – The stature of this group is likely to grow in the short term as a result of the Israeli offensive in Gaza.

**Fundraising Activities:** Likely to Increase – The need for additional financial resources will grow in the short term as a result of the Israeli offensive in Gaza; many who may have been hesitant to give previously may feel obligated to contribute to ‘rebuilding’ efforts.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Possibly Increase - May become more widespread due to an increased need for funds in Gaza by HAMAS.

The primary HAMAS threat to Virginia stems from their demonstrated willingness to commit criminal acts in support of their cause; however, their intentions to execute large-scale attacks are assessed as low.
Hizballah

Hizballah is a Lebanese Shia Islamist organization, who until the attacks of September 11, 2001, had killed more Americans in attacks overseas than any other terrorist organization. Iran has been a major supporter of Hizballah, which has caused increased concern of attacks against Western targets, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan, due to increased tensions between the U.S. and Iran. Intelligence indicates that the organization has approximately 200,000 members worldwide, which include approximately 20,000 fighters and 5000 security personnel.

Domestic Activities

Hizballah has been successful over the years in raising funds in the U.S. through charities, illegal activity, as well as through legitimate businesses. According to DHS reporting, Hizballah may be engaged in fundraising, possible intelligence gathering, criminal enterprise - smuggling, drug trafficking, fraud, and extortion.

According to 2008 Terrorism Screening Center ground encounter data, Hizballah was one of the three most frequently encountered groups in Virginia. In 2007, the TSC reported 189 total Virginia encounters with subjects tied to Hizballah in Virginia. According to 2009 public safety survey data, the counties of Fairfax and Chesterfield reported awareness of individuals and/or activities potentially linked to Hizballah in their jurisdictions. The City of Falls Church noted that internet references to the jurisdiction with potential links to Hizballah had been observed.

Intelligence Gaps

1. How many members or active supporters of Hizballah live, work, or frequently travel in Virginia? What are the ranks, capabilities, and intentions of Hizballah affiliated individuals currently in Virginia?
2. Are there organizations or facilities that support and extol Hizballah ideology in Virginia? Is there an area where a significant number of these are located?
3. To what extent are Hizballah sympathizers or operatives involved in criminal financial activity in Virginia?
4. Does Hizballah have an organized criminal enterprise in Virginia or is it compartmentalized? How sophisticated or unsophisticated is it/are they?
5. Has the Hizballah organization in Lebanon deployed operatives to the U.S. and specifically Virginia?
6. Does Hizballah currently have the ability or intention to launch a successful attack in Virginia?
7. Is Hizballah in contact with any other international or domestic terrorist organizations in Virginia?
8. Is Hizballah actively recruiting from gangs, colleges, or other population groups?
Projections

Hizballah’s overall threat capability is assessed as high; however, their intent to commit large-scale attacks in Virginia is assessed as low. Increased U.S. conflict with Iran could lead to retaliatory actions by Hizballah supporters in the U.S. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Moderate - Hizballah is more likely to attack U.S. interests outside the U.S. and will only strike inside the U.S. if directed to do so by Iran and/or the group perceives an existential threat from the U.S. Similarly Hizballah may attack the U.S. if the United States military launches attacks against Iranian territory.

**Membership/Influence:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of membership and influence, if any, by Hizballah-linked individuals in Virginia.

**Fundraising Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of fundraising activity, if any, by Hizballah-linked individuals in Virginia.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Unknown – Current information suggests that most criminal activities are conducted for the purpose of financial gain rather than for destructive purposes.

The primary Hizballah threat to Virginia stems from their demonstrated willingness to commit criminal acts in support of their cause; however, their intentions to execute large-scale attacks are assessed as low.
Jama’at al-Tabligh

Jama’at al-Tabligh (JT), also known as Tablighi Jama’at, seeks to spread Islam to Muslims by preaching a return to Islamic values. Although members claim their movement is a quietist, apolitical movement of spiritual guidance and renewal, the group is suspected to be providing ideological support to terrorists. The organization has been affiliated with al-Qa’ida as well as a number of apprehended terrorists. In January 2008, 14 JT members were arrested in Spain for allegedly planning to carry out suicide bomb attacks in Barcelona and other European cities.

Domestic Activities

2005 data suggests that over 15,000 Tablighi missionaries are reportedly active in the U.S., and approximately 50,000 members active in major mosques in at least 10 U.S. cities. The “Lackawanna Six,” who pled guilty to providing support to al-Qa’ida, travelled to an Afghani training camp in 2001 under the cover of JT. A U.S. convert arrested for plotting an attack inside the U.S. and having ties to al-Qa’ida was an attendee of a JT-affiliated mosque in Florida.

According to the 2008 TSC ground encounter report, Jama’at al-Tabligh linked individuals had occasional documented law enforcement contacts in Virginia. In 2007, the TSC reported 22 total Virginia encounters with subjects tied to JT in Virginia. 2008 survey data showed that a JT presence is still suspected in Spotsylvania. Possible Jama’at al-Tabligh affiliate presence has been previously reported in the Richmond area, Spotsylvania, and northern Virginia. Prior reported activity has consisted of possible recruitment efforts targeting military members in Prince George County, suspicious activities in Spotsylvania related to an Islamic center with possible terrorism links, and at a Richmond gun show.

Intelligence Gaps

1. Is the JT masjid al-Falah in Corona, New York affiliated with any organizations in Virginia?
2. Are JT members in Virginia traveling to other countries to visit with overseas terrorist organizations?
3. Is JT involved in any fundraising activities or receive charity donations in Virginia?
4. What is the organizational structure of JT in Virginia? Who are the Amirs for JT in Virginia?
5. What is the JT’s recruitment process?
6. Are JT members in Virginia involved in militancy?

\(^{1}\) (OS) John Walker Lindh, the American Talibian combatant, and Richard Reid, the British shoe bomber have been associated with Jama’at al-Tabligh.
7. Is the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam affiliated with or a cover for JT?

_Projections_

DHS reporting on JT highlights a lack of current, available information on the group’s financial needs and funding sources. While some data appears to suggest that little fundraising occurs due to modest expenses, other sources hint that the group has access to significant financial resources and global real estate holdings.

Due to JT members’ criminal histories and an ideology that appears to foster extremism and the possibility that JT adherents could be motivated to form homegrown cells or commit lone wolf attacks, their threat to Virginia is assessed as medium. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

- **Attack Capability:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of criminal activity, if any, by JT-linked individuals in Virginia.
- **Membership/Influence:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of criminal activity, if any, by JT-linked individuals in Virginia.
- **Fundraising Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of fundraising if any, by JT-linked individuals in Virginia.
- **Other Criminal Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of criminal activity, if any, by JT-linked individuals in Virginia.
Jama’at ul Fuqra

Jama’at ul Fuqra, also known as Muslims of America (MOA), was founded in 1980 in Brooklyn, New York by Pakistani cleric Sheikh Gilani. Previously listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State until 1999, MOA continues to be banned in Pakistan. Current estimates of active membership range from 3,000-5,000 members, with some living in rural compounds. Originally claimed as a way to create seclusion from so-called bad influences, the isolationist nature of the compounds has also generated concern from localities and law enforcement. MOA has a long history of endorsing violence; however, it has released contradictory information to the public media. In 2004, Sheikh Gilani is alleged to have issued a five-year timetable for a jihad within the U.S.\(^2\)

**Domestic Activities**

Activities by MOA members in Virginia include narcotics trafficking, surveillance and counter-surveillance efforts, attempted government infiltration, fraud, trafficking in counterfeit goods, and fundraising.\(^3\) In the past, there have been paramilitary drills involving MOA members using firearms. Member owned businesses and member-linked charities are believed to be generating and/or laundering funds for Sheikh Gilani. Current presence of MOA is found nationwide, including a large presence in Virginia. Compounds are located in Charlotte and Prince Edward Counties, and there is an MOA presence in urban areas including Lynchburg, Richmond and Roanoke.\(^4\)

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. What is the active membership of MOA in Virginia and North America?
2. Are feasible plans for reinstating weapons or other tactical training in place?
3. Is there current travel of Virginia MOA members to Pakistan as cash couriers?
4. What are the rank or status, capabilities, and intentions of MOA members individuals currently in Virginia?
5. Have MOA members been able to replace the disrupted income streams generated from the sale of counterfeit goods with other low-level criminal activity?

1 (OS) The Christian Action Network, a Lynchburg-area citizens group, has conducted protests against MOA in Virginia, hired a private aircraft to drop literature over an MOA compound, and produced a 31-page pamphlet about the group entitled “Homegrown Islamic Terrorism: Enemy Camps Surround U.S.” Although some of the content of these materials is based in fact, many inaccurate conclusions are drawn based on outdated information and speculation, with the apparent attempt to recruit members for their “Paul Revere Brigade.” CAN encourages citizens to contact federal, state, and local government officials to demand answers and law enforcement action.
6. Have MOA members re-established individual or organizational ties with members of IM?

**Projections**

The threat from MOA to Virginia stems from the group's prior expertise with weapons, the scope of activities, and their links to other external terrorist groups. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Low - Current intelligence suggests that MOA attack capabilities have declined and members lack the training resources to mount a serious attack.

**Membership/Influence:** Likely to Decrease – Current intelligence suggest that the group is not recruiting members due to fear of infiltration.

**Fundraising Activities:** Likely to Increase – The subjects currently incarcerated for trafficking in counterfeit goods did not receive long sentences and at least one has suggested that he would continue his efforts upon release. The ailing health of the group’s spiritual leader could be used to urge members to enhance their financial support, creating a need for new funding mechanisms.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of criminal activity, if any, by MOA-linked individuals in Virginia.

Despite claims by citizen groups such as the CAN, very little data from the past five years suggest that this group possesses the material or human resources needed to commit an attack in Virginia or the U.S. It is possible, however, that individuals affiliated with this group could engage in homegrown plots.
Lashkar-e Tayyiba

Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT), the militant wing of a Pakistani-based Sunni religious organization, has been involved in numerous conflicts with India regarding the disputed Kashmir region. Although LT was once an ally of the Pakistani government against India, it is currently banned and designated a terrorist organization. LT adheres to a strict fundamentalist version of Islam and is a partner in Usama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front for Jihad against the U.S. and Israel.\textsuperscript{55} LT is believed to have several thousand members in cells located in Australia, the U.S., Canada, U.K., India, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{56} According to Ajmal Amir Kasab, the only terrorist who was captured alive following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, disclosed that the attackers were members of LT.

**Domestic Activities**

Open source reporting on LT in the U.S. following the Mumbai attacks of 2009 suggests that U.S. LT cells are comprised of U.S.-born Muslims as well as young Muslims from areas such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, Yemen, and Somalia.\textsuperscript{57} These jihadi agents enter the U.S. and embed themselves in low-income communities where people keep to themselves and do not ask questions.\textsuperscript{58}

In 2003, the “Virginia Jihad Network,” an LT-affiliated cell, was broken up in northern Virginia; the cell members participated in paintball training activities in Fredericksburg and were planning to travel to Pakistan for further training at LT camps.\textsuperscript{59} Group affiliates are also suspected to have taken video footage of infrastructure in the Washington, D.C. and northern Virginia areas.\textsuperscript{k} Information on preparing for and committing a terrorist attack, as well as the surveillance footage map of the Washington, D.C. area were recovered from the cell.\textsuperscript{60} Although several high profile cases involving LT members with ties to Virginia have been reported, little current reporting has been received.

\textsuperscript{k} (OS) The possible LT connection was uncovered during a Canadian terrorism trial. LT affiliates reportedly took video recordings of the nation's capitol, the headquarters building of the World Bank, the Masonic Temple in Alexandria, and large fuel tanks in northern Virginia, in April 2005 (Associated Press: Terror Suspects Indicted in Atlanta, July 19, 2006).
Intelligence Gaps

1. How extensively and for what purposes are LT members utilizing the internet?
2. What is the nature of training of U.S. persons and their contact with LT-linked extremists? Is there current travel of U.S. persons to or from Pakistan to support LT?
3. Does LT currently have the ability or intent to launch a successful attack in Virginia?
4. Are there any LT cells identified in Virginia? If yes, where are they located?
5. What is the rank or status, capabilities, and intentions of LT affiliated individuals currently in Virginia?
6. Does LT have criminal capabilities in Virginia? If so, how sophisticated are they?
7. Is LT in contact with any other international or domestic terrorist organizations in Virginia?
8. Is LT actively recruiting from gangs, colleges, or other potentially susceptible population groups?

Projections

Although the VFC does not have any recent intelligence regarding LT in Virginia, the past presence of LT and the recent, dramatic attacks by this group in Mumbai warrant inclusion and continued intelligence collection. According to comments made by Outgoing Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Michael Hayden, Pakistan-based LT will be among 2009’s top ten security challenges for the agency. While he noted that al Qa’ida still tops the list, “There was a migration in Lashkar-e-Taiba thinking over the past six, 12, 18 months, in which they began to identify the United States and Israel as much as being the main enemy as they have historically identified India.” Hayden added “That is a troubling development … and now suggests that this migration of Lashkar-e Tayyiba to a merge point (with Al Qaeda) is probably taking place.”61 The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

Attack Capability: Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of operational resources, if any, by LT-linked individuals in Virginia
Membership/Influence: Possibly Increase – The success of the Mumbai attacks could generate new or renewed interest in this group in Virginia.
Fundraising Activities: Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of fundraising, if any, by LT-linked individuals in Virginia.
Other Criminal Activities: Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of criminal activity, if any, by LT-linked individuals in Virginia.

As there is no known intent by the group to commit any terrorist or criminal acts in Virginia, the overall threat from Lashkar-e Tayyiba is assessed as low.
Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was created in response to the secularization of Middle East governments. Although the MB was largely ideological and stressed activism, over time it has influenced various groups such as al-Qa‘ida and HAMAS. Most MB activity in the U.S. has been to support HAMAS, including their support of suspected HAMAS financiers in the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) trial in Texas. Muslim Brotherhood organizations often cross populate into different Islamic organizations and MB members often attempt to obtain leadership roles.

Domestic Activities

Leadership of the national Muslim Brotherhood movement appears to be in the National Capital Region, which is supported by a large general MB presence in northern Virginia. Several non-profit organizations and student groups have been suspected of associations with the MB including the Muslim American Society and the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR).

According to the 2008 TSC ground encounter report, MB linked individuals had occasional documented law enforcement contacts in Virginia. Recently reported MB activity includes recruitment, fundraising, and subversive political pursuits. Public safety surveys indicated a potential MB presence in the counties of Amherst, Chesterfield, Fairfax, and the city of Martinsville; additionally, Liberty University, in Lynchburg, reported internet postings of interest to their organization by MB. In 2007, Fairfax County, the National Capital Region, Richmond City, Chesterfield County, Henrico County, Henry County, and the Virginia Department of Corrections reported an MB presence.

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1 (OS) The U.S. Justice Department obtained an indictment against HLF in 2004 accusing the charity and its top leaders of a conspiracy to provide aid to a terrorist organization, charging HLF provided more than $12 million to individuals and organizations linked to HAMAS between 1995 and 2001 (NEFA Foundation: The 1993 Philadelphia Meeting: A Roadmap for Future Muslim Brotherhood Actions in the U.S., November 15, 2007).

m (OS) The Council on American-Islamic Relations, a major non-profit, non-governmental organization is headquartered in Washington, D.C., has a number of top officials who have been found guilty of giving aid to terrorist groups like Hizballah and HAMAS (Anti-Defamation League: Backgrounder: The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, November 15, 2007).

n (LES) There are indications the Virginia Commonwealth University chapter of the Muslim Student Association is a front organization for the MB and is possibly involved with terrorism financing and recruitment (TIPS C070920).

o (LES) Suspected terrorism fundraising activity by an Islamic cultural center in Richmond (TIPS C070930).

p (OS) Subject with ties to MB and the Muslim Student Association, appointed to a state immigration committee, subsequently resigned after public accusation of terrorism ties (TIPS C070773); The Muslim American Society, a group linked to the MB, used Boy and Girl Scout troops in 2006 as part of a massive get-out-the-vote campaign targeting Muslim voters in Virginia and elsewhere (Investigative Project on Terrorism).
Intelligence Gaps

1. Are there specific goals-political, financial, or others-that MB members are attempting to achieve in Virginia?
2. How many members of Muslim Brotherhood or active supporters reside in Virginia?
3. To what extent does the Egyptian-based MB leadership guide MB activity in Virginia?
4. Does the Muslim Brotherhood have an organized criminal enterprise in Virginia or is it compartmentalized? If so, how sophisticated is it?
5. Has the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood deployed operatives to the U.S. and specifically Virginia? Does the group have operatives in Virginia who can conduct intelligence and counter surveillance operations consistently?
6. Which organizations in Virginia are considered Muslim Brotherhood controlled and/or support and extol MB ideology in Virginia? Is there an area where a significant number of these are located or are they dispersed?
7. Is there a specific entity that guides political, ideological and spiritual support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Virginia, or is it a loose affiliation of organizations that provides support?
8. Who are the current key leaders and what contact do they have with external MB leadership and members?
9. What roles do Muslim Brotherhood linked political action committees (PACs) play in MB activities? Is it strictly legal activity or could it be another illicit funding mechanism?
10. How closely associated are Muslim Brotherhood activities and HAMAS activities in Virginia?
11. To what extent are the Muslim Student Associations, Muslim American Society, and CAIR chapters in Virginia (or other groups) involved in MB activities? What, if any specific roles do they play?

Projections

While the direct threat from Muslim Brotherhood activity is assessed as low, the indirect threat from their sponsorship and influence of other groups is assessed as medium. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Low - Current intelligence suggests that the threat for a direct attack is minimal as this is not a violent organization. However, radical elements may originate from MB entities and become homegrown terrorist cells.

**Membership/Influence:** Possible increase – May continue to grow if conflicts between Israel and Palestinian-based organizations or Hizballah expand

**Fundraising Activities:** Increase - MB fundraising activities were negatively affected with the guilty verdicts in the HLF trial, but alternative income streams have maintained monetary flows

**Other Criminal Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence suggests that MB criminal activity is conducted almost exclusively to support fundraising activities.
Domestic Terrorism Threat

Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals who are based and operate within the U.S. and its territories, and who commit acts directed at elements of the U.S. government, critical infrastructure, or population, without foreign influence. Although often overshadowed by the threat of international extremism, domestic threat groups are viewed as a more significant threat to the Commonwealth due to the increased number of threat groups and the elevated number of incidents. The domestic terrorism threat in Virginia is exemplified in the Commonwealth’s myriad of:

- Anarchists,
- Militias,
- Sovereign citizen movements,
- Special interest groups,
- Homegrown Islamic extremist groups,
- Lone wolf extremists,
- Black separatists, and
- White nationalist extremists

2008 TSC reporting noted that only 3 of 202, or 1.49% of ground encounters in Virginia involved individuals linked to domestic terrorist and extremist groups. These encounters were limited to white supremacist or militia members. This appears to be consistent with 2007 TSC reporting noting 4, or 1.08% of ground encounters in Virginia linked to domestic terrorist and extremist groups. As the bulk of TSC encounters involve air travel and administrative requests pertaining to passports and travel visas, this finding should not be construed in a way that minimizes the presence or activity levels of domestic groups in Virginia. In 2008, it is likely that the disparity between TSC and VFC data is due not only to inherent differences in travel activities by extremists linked to domestic groups, but also to the fact that the behavior of many domestic extremists has not risen to the level of inclusion in the TSDB.

Unlike international terrorism threat analysis, the VFC has received significantly more local than federal reporting of interest. VFC survey data collected in 2009 show significant locality-based reporting for individuals, meetings or activities, law enforcement encounters, or internet activity of interest by potential domestic terror and extremist groups in Virginia. 2008 was an active year for the environmental extremists protesting against energy companies in Virginia. The presidential campaign also generated increased chatter among militia and right wing extremists and resulted in a National Socialist Magazine cover mock-up suggesting the assassination of then Senator Obama.
Anarchist Extremists

Anarchist extremists adhere to the anti-government movement which rejects governmental rule and police authority and advocates violent means to overthrow social, political, and economic hierarchies. The most current reporting includes known individuals, meetings and activities, internet reference, and law enforcement encounters in Chesterfield, Henrico, Richmond, Fredericksburg, Strasburg, Williamsburg, Arlington County, Nelson, Smyth, Wythe, and Montgomery counties, as well as around Virginia Military Institute and William and Mary. Past anarchist activity or presence has been reported in Chesterfield, Christiansburg, Harrisonburg, Henrico, Norfolk, Prince Edward, and Prince William County, as well as by the Blue Ridge Regional Jail Authority. Reported activities have included public disturbances, conferences, and protests. In the past, Virginia’s primary anarchist figure of note was Peter Gelderloos, who is currently awaiting trial in Spain.

Many of the individuals who comprise this movement in Virginia are college age youth or college students, mostly located in the Richmond and Harrisonburg areas. These extremists have created their own training manuals and use list-serves and blogs to communicate, although the Virginia Anarchist Federation (VAF) webpage shows that attempts to organize on a large scale have been unsuccessful. Anarchists have been known to cooperate with environmental and animal rights groups and have engaged in hostile confrontations with white supremacist groups. Although the anarchist threat to Virginia is assessed as low, these individuals view the government as unnecessary, which could lead to threats or attacks against government figures or establishments.

q (LES) 2008 VFC Threat Assessment Survey: Virginia Anarchist Gathering: Rising Up Collective Hosted the Virginia Anarchist Gathering from October 20-23, 2005 in Harrisonburg. Part of the conference was held on the James Madison University campus; TIPS C070771, C070636, and C070188.

r (LES) The Virginia Federation of Anarchists has held two conferences in Richmond in November 2007 and January 2008 (TIPS C070732 and C080294; Richmond Indy Media: Virginia Anarchist Federation Second Conference, December 30, 2007); Anarchist protesters at the International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C. spilled over into Prince William County (TIPS C070188).

s (LES) Members of an anarchist movement confronted suspected white supremacists creating a public disturbance in Harrisonburg. Shortly thereafter, white supremacist Internet forums discussed possible retaliation against the anarchists, although the likelihood of retaliatory acts was deemed low (TIPS C070984).
Green Anarchism Movement

Anarchists sometimes cross paths with or also take part in environmental or animal rights movements. The Green Anarchism movement blends the eco-anarchist lines. The Garbage Liberation Front (GLF) is an ecological direct action group that demonstrates the joining of anarchism and environmental movements. GLF activities include dumpster diving, squatting and train hopping.\(^77\) GLF presence was reported in Chesterfield when several suspicious subjects were discovered trespassing on a train.\(^78\) There is evidence the group may be affiliated or have ties to CrimethInc\(^1\) as well as environmental extremist groups.\(^u,v\)

Anonymous

A "loose coalition of Internet denizens", Anonymous consists largely of users from multiple internet sites such as 4chan, 711chan, 420chan, Something Awful, Fark, Encyclopedia Dramatica, Slashdot, IRC channels, and YouTube. Other social networking sites are also utilized to mobilize physical protests. Anonymous has no leader and is reliant on the collective power of individuals acting in such a way that benefits the movement. Actions attributed to Anonymous include:

- Habbo raids - Unwanted and prohibited behaviors in the Habbo online community
- Internet vigilantism reports – Self-identified Anonymous members tracked down and helped authorities capture an online sexual predator
- Epilepsy Foundation forum invasion – Hackers changed the coding of the website to random flashing patterns in an apparent attempt to induce headaches and seizure. Anonymous denies responsibility for this and has claimed that the Church of Scientology actually staged the attack as Anonymous in an effort to discredit the movement.
- Project Chanology – an ongoing electronic and physical protest campaign against the Church of Scientology

\(^1\) (OS) CrimethInc specializes in publishing anarchist propaganda and has promoted direct action, including physical harm to informants. Affiliates have been tied to arsons, computer hacking activities, and planned protests and disruption activities surrounding the Republican and Democratic National Conventions.

\(^u\) (OS) (CrimethInc; Wired: Hackers Take Aim at GOP, August 17, 2004; (LES) FBI IIR 4 201 1789 07; CrimethInc: CrimethInc Groups Endorse RNC Strategy, December 15, 2007). Reported activity in Virginia has been limited to Halifax County. In July 2005, two South Boston PD vehicles were vandalized with the group logo. In September 2005, a CrimethInc handprint was painted on a highway sign in Halifax County (South Boston PD).

\(^v\) (OS) The group publishes a number of Internet links to such groups on its website.
In October 2008, an 18-year-old New Jersey man was arrested for his role in a January 2008 attack on a Church of Scientology website that rendered the website unavailable. Dmitriy Guzner pled guilty to computer hacking for his role in the distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack against the Scientology websites. Guzner allegedly participated in the attack because he considered himself a member of Anonymous, an underground movement that has led protests against the Church of Scientology at various locations across the U.S.\(^7\)

Anonymous is of interest not only because of the sentiments expressed by affiliates and their potential for physical protest, but because they have innovated the use of e-protests and mobilization. Given the lack of a unifying creed, this movement has the potential to inspire lone wolf behavior in the cyber realms.

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. Has there been an increase of nuisance crimes which would demonstrate potential escalation of anarchist activities in any areas of the state?
2. What is the current status of Rise Up Collective and CrimethInc? Are they still active groups, or have they morphed into the Virginia Anarchist Federation?
3. What was the content, training, and attendance in recent anarchist workshops?
4. Harrisonburg is mentioned as a key location for most of the past reporting - what is the current status of this sub-culture there?
5. Is the Anonymous movement gaining strength in Virginia?
6. What are the ties between the Virginia Anarchist Movement and the ALF/ELF movements? Do they seem to have individual linkages/cross over membership?
**Projections**

The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Remain Constant - Anarchists have trained for direct actions in Virginia, but anarchists generally target political and economic meetings of a scale not normally hosted in Virginia.

**Membership/Influence:** Remain Constant - From the data available for review, it appears that the membership levels of the movement have remained consistent, despite several documented "organizing" meetings. If a true leader should emerge or return, then this could change.

**Fundraising Activities:** Remain Constant - Group websites solicit donations, but illicit activity to obtain money has not been recorded at this time.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Remain Constant - There has been little reported criminal activity linked to the movement at this time, but many prior incidents appear to be petty vandalism and graffiti crime. It does not follow, however, that those who espouse anarchist beliefs are likely to change current behaviors.

The Virginia anarchist community, either organized or individualized, typically displays a higher degree of technical sophistication than other groups. While Virginia has not yet experienced a significant physical event, the potential for movements like Anonymous to launch a cyber attack exists. Recent hacking instances involving the manipulation of electronic highway signs highlights the potential for disruption or physical danger that could result from such groups.
Black Separatist Extremists

Virginia has a documented presence of several established black separatist groups. The Black Separatist ideology advocates a separate nation or state for the Black race as the only solution to white oppression in mainstream America. The Southern Poverty Law Center defines Black Separatists as typically opposing integration and racial intermarriage, and desirous of separate institutions or even a separate nation for blacks. Most forms of Black Separatism are strongly anti-White and anti-Semitic, and a number of religious versions assert blacks are the Biblical "chosen people" of God. Often these groups adhere to a religious ideology to support their activities, which can include terrorist and criminal behavior.

Due to their shared animosity towards Jews and perceived oppression by Western governments, some groups within the Black Separatist movement have openly supported transnational Islamic extremist organizations, including al-Qa'ida. Black Separatist groups also incorporate what they claim to be Islamic religious ideologies, promoting a sense of higher purpose that functions as a powerful recruitment and radicalization tool. These groups often have a considerable presence in the prison system or are involved in prison outreach, thus making them a threat to correctional institutions. The threat from black separatists is assessed as low to medium, although additional information on the groups’ funding, active membership, technical expertise and their alleged solidarity with other anti-Semitic groups is needed to determine their true capabilities.

Five Percent Nation

The Five Percent Nation (FPN), also known as the Nation of Gods and Earths, is a splinter group of the Nation of Islam. The FPN embraces a black supremacist ideology and adheres to a radical brand of Islam that believes the black man as a whole is God. The FPN has a large following among popular hip hop artists, black activists, and within the prison system.

Past reporting indicates FPN presence in Virginia in Bland County, Chesapeake, Henrico, Newport News, Norfolk, and within the Department of Corrections. 2009 surveys indicated possible additional presence in Albemarle, Falls Church, Williamsburg, and Gloucester. According to the group’s website, FPN chapters hold regular meetings in Richmond and the Tidewater area. Activities in the Commonwealth include prison outreach and conferences.

w (OS) Several locations in the Tidewater area have been deemed God Cities: Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Chesapeake, Suffolk, Hampton, and Newport News (5% Network: Gods and Earth in Your Area).

7 (LES) The VA Department of Corrections has indicated the FPN is attempting to recruit members of the Bloods and Crips street gangs. Additional intelligence indicates some area Bloods and Five Percenters have formed an alliance to protect themselves while incarcerated. This alliance appears to extend outside of prison (TIPS C080544).
Nation of Islam

The Nation of Islam (NOI) calls for blacks to separate from mainstream U.S. culture. While the group purports adherence to a radical interpretation of Islam, members do not follow basic tenets of the religion. NOI has promoted racism and anti-Semitism under the guise of African-American empowerment. The group operates mosques and several businesses in dozens of cities.\(^8^4\) NOI has influenced several Black Separatist movements, including the New Black Panther Party and the Five Percent Nation.

In Virginia, NOI activities have included literature distribution, recruiting from prison and gang populations,\(^z\) and alignment with the militant New Black Panther Party. The most current survey data shows NOI affiliated individuals and activities in Albemarle, Wythe (internet), and Virginia Commonwealth University.\(^8^5\) Prior reporting on Nation of Islam included a presence in Chesapeake, Norfolk, and the Virginia Department of Corrections.\(^8^6\)

New Black Panther Party

The New Black Panther Party (NBPP) is the largest organized anti-Semitic black militant group in the U.S. The group currently organizes demonstrations across the nation that calls for black empowerment and civil rights but include inflammatory, racist commentary. The Nation of Islam and NBPP have reached out to each other and other black activist organizations with similar ideologies,\(^8^7\) as well as members of the prison and street gang populations.\(^a^a\)

The NBPP is actively attempting to recruit college students,\(^8^8\) has been conducting military style drills,\(^8^9\) and is increasingly involved in surveillance and counter-surveillance efforts against law enforcement.\(^9^0\) The New Black Panther Party has a significant presence in Virginia, particularly in the Tidewater area and within the Virginia Department of Corrections.\(^9^1\) 2009 survey responses included reports from Brunswick, Buckingham, Fairfax, Richmond, Rockingham, Smyth, Southampton, and York-Poquoson. Additionally, the state coordinator of the NBPP is incarcerated in southwest Virginia. The NBPP has held meetings\(^9^2\) and

\(^7\) (OS) FPN held its Fifth Annual Region #4 Conference on April 20-22, 2007, in Richmond, VA (Nation of Gods and Earth Conference Flyer).

\(^z\) (LES) Suspicious documents synonymous with Black Separatist groups such as Nation of Islam, the New Black Panther Party and Five Percent Nation were confiscated from an inmate at the South Hampton Correctional Center (TIPS C070697).

\(^a^a\) (LES) NBPP met with members of the Bloods and Crips in New York in December 2006 (FBI IIR 4 201 2342 07).
activities, including a large protest at the Jamestown 2007 celebration. bb Individuals affiliated with NBPP have been encountered by law enforcement in various parts of the Commonwealth.93

New African Black Panther Party
The New African Black Panther Party-Prison Chapter (NABPP-PC), started in a Virginia prison in 2004, desires to continue the mission of the original Black Panthers. The NABPP-PC acknowledges the presence of the New Black Panther Party, but claims ideological differences with the group.94

The NABPP-PC has a reported presence within Virginia Department of Corrections with a prison chapter run by a Wise County inmate.95 This inmate, a charismatic leader whose influence extends outside the prison walls, is a prolific creator and distributor of propaganda. This inmate is the co-founder of a newsletter titled “Fed-Up,” which attempts to perpetrate “the brotherhood of the oppressed” philosophy endemic to prison radical actors. cc Disseminated inside and outside the prison system in Virginia, it catalogues a broad spectrum of alleged prisoner abuses and allegations of prison system corruption and features inflammatory rhetoric to rally prisoners and their associates on the outside to unite against law enforcement and the correctional system.

Intelligence Gaps
1. Are there any known links between Black Separatist organizations and radical Islamic organizations in Virginia?
2. Are there any known links between Black Separatist organizations and criminal street gangs in Virginia?
3. Are there any individuals who are associated or affiliated with Black Separatist organizations who have been involved in any known illegal activity in the Commonwealth?
4. How are these groups generating financial support? How much financial support is needed to achieve their short-term goals?
5. Has the activity level of Black Separatists in the Commonwealth been less, equal, or surpassed other states in the US?

bb (LES) Virginia State Trooper stopped five individuals believed to be NBPP members on their way to Louisiana to assist with some race related issues, presumably related to the Jena Six case (TIPS C070721).
cc (OS) Information contained within the newsletter indicates additional NABPP-PC presence may extend to Buchanan County, Roanoke, and Virginia Beach (Thomas Merton Center: Newsletter of the Fed Up!, July 12, 2005).
Projections

The threat of a large-scale attack by Black Separatist Groups in Virginia is assessed as low. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Low – Recent events, including the Jamestown 2007 festivities, suggest that members of these groups appear to be more likely to antagonize than attack.

**Membership/Influence:** Possible Increase – The election of an African-American President, the potential reemergence of right wing groups in the U.S., and/or the emboldened nature of Black Separatist groups may lead to an increase in membership.

**Fundraising Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of fundraising activities, if any, by Black Separatist groups in Virginia.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Possible Increase - Any increase in membership or publicity may lead to an actual increase in criminal activities or increased recognition of crimes by members of such groups.
Homegrown Islamic Extremism

Autonomous, homegrown cells that derive their motivation primarily from radical interpretations of Islam have emerged in the U.S. and have demonstrated that a few committed individuals can inflict large numbers of casualties with no structured training and minimal resources. Prison radicalization, as well as the presence of potentially extremist mosques that may be promoting nefarious activities, underscores the potential danger of homegrown extremism. These clusters of radicalized local Muslims present a significant threat for future terror attacks in the U.S. DHS projects that the pool of radicalized Islamists inside the United States likely will evolve during the next five years as extremists increasingly exploit the Internet to inspire a wave of young, self-identified Muslim “terrorist wannabes” who aspire to carry out violent acts.

While conventional wisdom suggests that this threat may be more prevalent in areas such as northern Virginia, it is important to note that Internet access can bring this threat to any part of the Commonwealth. The Islamic Saudi Academy in Fairfax County, run by the Saudi royal family, has been scrutinized as a possible venue for radicalization. In 2008, its teachings were called into question over violent language in its textbooks. The Islamic Saudi Academy’s 1999 valedictorian joined al-Qa’ida and was subsequently convicted in 2005 of plotting to kill President Bush.

Other unresolved suspicious incidents and those involving radicalized individuals with the potential for such extremism have been reported in the Commonwealth. Homegrown extremist presence has been reported in Chesapeake, Christiansburg, Farmville, Norfolk, Smithfield, Smyth, and Wise. In addition, at least two homegrown-type groups rooted in Islamic fundamentalism have been linked to Virginia. The homegrown extremist threat to the Commonwealth can be difficult to assess as these individuals or groups do not typically have ties to international terrorist groups and may not attract law enforcement attention.

dd (LES) There have been reported instances of suspicious activity that would appear to suggest possible terrorist pre-operational planning in Virginia (i.e. subjects seen surveying, photographing, or videotaping critical infrastructure to include bridges and tunnels, military and government facilities, and airports); however, none have currently been linked to terrorist activity.

ee (LES) In 2003, a Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) affiliated terrorist cell, referred to as the “Virginia Jihad Network,” was broken up in Northern Virginia. Those arrested belonged to a paintball group near Fredericksburg, which was allegedly used for paramilitary training purposes (OS) CRA Terrorism Assessment Center: Lashkar-e-Tolba - al-Qaeda Affiliate, February 2, 2006). (LES) TIPS C070212, C060779.
As-Sabiqun

The As-Sabiqun (AS) Islamic Movement is a Washington, D.C. based organization that has several branches in California and one in Pennsylvania. Comprised of African-American converts, AS stresses unity between various Islamic organizations with the ultimate goal of establishing a modern Islamic state. Although the AS is a Sunni movement, members have publicly voiced support for Shia movements and organizations, including Hizballah and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Recent As-Sabiqun activities have included anti-war rallies, prison outreach, and fundraising.

Recent survey data shows the potential presence of individual members in Mecklenburg and possible internet interest in Nelson County. AS presence was reported in Smithfield and Alexandria in 2007. Although the group has shied away from criminal activities, AS has promoted radical movements, expressed anti-Semitic views, and may be a conduit for Islamic extremists to pass through on their way to more militant groups. There are also unconfirmed reports that some AS members were previously affiliated with the Black Separatist group Nation of Islam.

Although many threat attributes are unknown, the AS threat is assessed as low. Additional information on the group such as the severity of violence advocated by group leaders and their funding sources is needed to determine their true threat level.

Intelligence Gaps

1. Where are recruitment and radicalization activities being conducted in Virginia?
2. How many charismatic leaders currently have influence in Virginia?
3. Are new groups and cells emerging, or are newly radicalized individuals joining established groups?
4. Is recruiting in Virginia being led by subjects overseas or from local radicalized groups?
5. Does AS have a robust prison Dawah program in Virginia?

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(OS) A California AS leader praised radical Muslim protestors who committed acts of violence and destruction while protesting the printing of cartoons featuring the Prophet Muhammad (Oakland Tribune: Oakland Muslim Leader Applauds Demonstrations, February 11, 2006).

(OSS) Dawah is the concept of outreach or proselytization of Islam in various settings, including prisons.
Projections

The following projections concerning homegrown Islamic extremism are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Likely to Increase - The threat of attack is legitimate but unpredictable; many homegrown Islamists act as lone wolves and may not be a part of an organized group. Homegrown extremists generally limit their violence to less complex attacks on property or individuals and have used IEDs in the past to further their objectives; they desire cyber attacks but lack the capability.

**Membership/Influence:** Likely to Increase – Increasing availability and sophistication of internet propaganda will make it easier for individuals intrigued by jihadi concepts to participate in radicalization activities.

**Fundraising Activities:** Likely to Increase - Recent events in Gaza, and other emerging events of interest in the Muslim world are likely to provide incentive for increased Zakat (contributions).

**Other Criminal Activities:** Remain Constant – Criminal activity is projected to remain at a constant level by individual members rather than as a planned group strategy.
Iqaamatiddeen Movement

The Iqaamatiddeen Movement (IM) is a splinter group of the U.S. branch of the Dar ul-Islam Movement (DM), a radical Islamic group originating in Indonesia. The group identifies itself as an Islamic revival movement; however, the philosophy appears to be a mix of African-American nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. IM was founded as a result of a 2002 meeting between Al-Amin Abdul Latif and a Saudi Islamic scholar who inspired and instructed him to establish IM. By early 2005, IM was discussing its goal to establish an autonomous Muslim state in the US and was coordinating with like-minded U.S. groups to form a coalition focused on this Islamic state creation.

The IM is linked to several individuals in the U.S. and abroad who have been identified as having possible ties with terrorism, including two Saudis who are allegedly supporters of Usama bin Laden. These subjects are alleged to have provided religious justification for al-Qa’ida, legitimized suicide bombings, and terrorist attacks, and have expressed anti-American sentiments. Intelligence has indicated the movement is also linked to National Ummah, a Black Separatist group with links to Virginia and possibly the Muslims of America (MOA). IM has had an active presence in a number of U.S. cities on the east and west coast, as well as Canada. Fundraising and recruitment on the west coast, Europe, and in the Caribbean suggest the movement is attempting to expand its operations.

Major Iqaamatiddeen Movement activity in Virginia has been limited to the IM Annual Family Retreat in Prince William Forest Park in August 2005, 2006, and 2007. Several IM associates have links to the Richmond area, and the group has possible links to two Richmond mosques. 2009 survey data also includes possible IM meetings and activities in Falls Church. The IM threat is assessed as low, although many attributes are unknown that may contribute to a possible higher threat level.

hh (LES) The US branch of DM was started approximately 30 years ago in New York. While MOA and IM are both offshoots of the DM movement in New York, IM leadership does not appear to collaborate with MOA and in general does not have a high regard for MOA.

ii (LES) The IM leader has been associated with at least two Saudi Arabia Islamic scholars who are allegedly supporters of Usama bin Laden, have provided religious justification for al-Qa’ida, legitimized suicide bombings and terrorist attacks, and have expressed anti-American sentiments (FBI IIR 4 201 3171 06).

jj (OS) The National Ummah may have ties to charities linked to terrorism financing. One of National Ummah’s 36 U.S. mosques is located in Emporia and appears to attract both Middle Eastern and African American members, as well as members within the prison systems. Activity has been limited to several suspicious incidents noted at the Emporia mosque (Investigative Project on Terrorism: Paper of CAIR: Glossing Over HAMAS Ties, February 8, 2008; LES) TIPS C070501 and C070450).
Intelligence Gaps

1. What are the goals for the group in the U.S. and in Virginia?
2. What types of individuals are being targeted for recruitment by IM, and what are their qualifications?
   a. What percentage of members espouses extremist ideology (i.e. ideological support for violence against persons and/or property)?
   b. Which mosques/jamaats in Virginia are affiliated with the group?
3. How successful has the group been at attempts to promote activities or recruit others on websites associated with Islamic extremism?
4. What extent of fundraising activities or charitable donations is associated with the group globally, nationwide and in Virginia?
5. Are group affiliates in contact with known members of terrorist groups abroad?
   a. Are group members traveling overseas to meet with terrorist affiliates?
   b. Are group affiliates in contact with state sponsors of terrorism?
6. What is the extent of travel abroad by group members who have expressed Islamic extremist views? What were their destinations, frequency, and nature of the travel (i.e. family connections, academic training, and humanitarian work)?
7. What is the organizational structure of the group? What positions do affiliates in Virginia hold?
8. What is the extent and nature of active investigations of the group and group members nationwide and in Virginia?
9. What types of criminal acts have group members previously committed nationwide and in Virginia, including conspiracies, attempts, and incidents for which no charges have been filed?
10. Do members who have been associated with Islamic extremism have access or have expressed an interest in procuring materials that could be used in targeting the U.S. or U.S. interests?
**Projections**

Although the threat of attack from IM is currently assessed as low; however, significant intelligence gaps regarding the active evolution of the group and possible foreign and domestic linkages remain. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps concerning current intentions and capability in Virginia make it impossible to assess the group’s capability to launch an attack within the next three years with confidence.

**Membership/Influence:** Likely to Increase – IM reorganized in February 2007 and has coordinated efforts to recruit more members, especially those under 45, internationally and domestically.

**Fundraising Activities:** Likely to Increase – IM appears to have formulated detailed financial plans, including potential foreign support and obtaining non-profit charitable status in the U.S. Retreats appear to be successful fundraisers.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Likely to Increase – IM members are often convicted felons and related movements (i.e. Dar ul-Islam, MOA) have been active in US prisons for several decades. IM leadership has provided radical anti-U.S. teachings to members that may inspire additional criminal activity.
Lone Wolf Extremists

Lone wolf actors are motivated for a variety of reasons including for social, political, and religious causes. Although several different movements have seen the deployment of lone wolf actors in successful attacks, including environmental and animal rights, the movements that appear to encourage lone wolf activity the most are white supremacist and anti-abortion extremists ideologies.\textsuperscript{110}

Lone wolf extremists may belong to a known group or may have prior affiliations; however, they often conduct their operations independently.\textsuperscript{kk} Extremist groups that encourage adherents to take matters into their own hands, including anti-abortionists and white nationalists; and those that appear to be especially violent or advocate violent views, may be the most susceptible to lone wolf activities.\textsuperscript{111} Extremists not formally affiliated with a radical group may be inspired through the Internet, which has become a medium for radical groups to disseminate information.\textsuperscript{ll}

Incidents involving potential lone wolf activities reported in the Commonwealth have bomb making in Lynchburg\textsuperscript{mm}, stockpiling weapons or hazardous materials in Farmville\textsuperscript{mm}, and a traffic stop of an individual with suspected prior links found to have potential precursor explosives.\textsuperscript{112} Other reported incidents that suggest potential lone wolf activity included suspicious subjects with weapons or attempts to possess weapons, threatening behavior, and paramilitary training activities.\textsuperscript{113}

2009 survey data included potential lone wolf presence in Colonial Heights, Hanover, Louisa, Richmond, Clarke, Amherst, Albemarle, Lexington, Lynchburg, Augusta, Smyth, Williamsburg, Blacksburg, and Fairfax County.\textsuperscript{114} Past lone wolf extremist presence has been reported in Chesapeake, Christiansburg, Farmville, Norfolk, Smithfield, Smyth, and Wise.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{kk} (OS) In some cases, lone wolf extremists have been expelled from extremist groups for their views or behavior. In other cases, lone wolf extremists have left such groups voluntarily because the organization was not sufficiently extreme or active to meet the goals of the lone wolf extremist.

\textsuperscript{ll} (OS) Lone wolves with no prior group affiliation may be even more dangerous and unpredictable due to their isolated nature and anti-social behavior (\textit{STRATFOR: The Lone Wolf Disconnect}, January 30, 2008).

\textsuperscript{mm} (LES) Lynchburg man was arrested for having homemade bombs. The bombs were constructed in an effort to stop protestors from disrupting a funeral (TIPS C070502); Alexandria man claimed to be a bomb maker (TIPS C070333).

\textsuperscript{nn} (LES) Augusta County woman is under investigation for storing several fertilizer bags in an apartment building. Investigation revealed subject worked for a government contractor, had applied to work with the FBI, and had ties to Pakistan (TIPS C070311).
Intelligence Gaps

1. Have there been any reports of suspicious activity related to paramilitary training?
2. Have there been any reports of subjects stockpiling weapons or tactical gear?
3. Have there been any reports of suspicious purchases of chemicals, explosive components, or electrical devices that could be used to make IEDs?
4. Have any subjects previously identified with an extremist group distanced themselves from said group because the group is not radical enough?

Projections

The threat from lone wolf extremists is difficult to assess, as these individuals may not be involved in activity that would garner law enforcement attention. Often lone wolves’ threat capabilities and intentions are not discovered until after an attack. One of the more vulnerable areas for a lone wolf and a possible venue for law enforcement detection is in the acquiring of training and skills necessary for successful attacks. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Possible Increase – Attacks by lone wolves, small cells, and leaderless resistance pose a significant threat because they are difficult to detect, identify, and disrupt. The election of an African-American president may serve as a catalyst for white supremacists or for Islamic radicals who perceive him to be an apostate.

**Membership/Influence:** N/A for this topic

**Fundraising Activities:** N/A for this topic

**Other Criminal Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps concerning the lone wolf threat make this difficult to assess, but it is possible that lone wolf actors may engage in lesser criminal activities to harass or annoy or may commit criminal violations in order to obtain and experiment with weapons.

In 2004, the FBI identified the lone actor or lone wolf terrorist as the most significant domestic terrorism threat over the next five years. “They typically draw ideological inspiration from formal terrorist organizations, but operate on the fringes of those movements. Despite their ad hoc nature and generally limited resources, they can mount high-profile, extremely destructive attacks, and their operational planning is often difficult to detect.”

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Militia Extremists

With the increase in controversy surrounding illegal immigration and terrorism concerns, militia groups which seek to defend their members independent of government control could constitute a threat to authority in the Commonwealth. Generally, members of such groups have viewed the federal authorities as their primary enemy; however, state and local governments may also be perceived threats. The paramilitary nature of these groups and their heavily armed condition create an environment of potential conflict. Militia groups have been known to train for armed struggle against authorities, resist government authorities, and amass arms.\(^{117}\)

Identified militia groups in the Commonwealth include the Virginia Citizens Militia, Virginia Freeborn Militia, and Live Free of Northern Virginia. 2009 survey data included law enforcement encounters in Rockingham and Fairfax counties and potential individual members in Chesterfield, Hampton, Newport News, Strasburg, and Mecklenburg.\(^{118}\) Wythe County and Western Virginia Community College noted internet postings of potential concern.\(^{119}\) Previously reported Militia presence in Virginia has included Bedford and Lexington.\(^{120}\) Recent activities have included the online promotion of a rifle and pistol marksmanship training on December 20, 2008\(^{121}\) and a Winter Survival exercise on January 16-17, 2009 at the Thompson Wildlife Management Area by a Virginia Citizen Militia affiliate.\(^{122}\) In mid-February, a citizen posted a call to action on Richmond’s Craigslist advertising the formation of a new group, the Vara Assault Force, with a website of www.vamilitia.ning.com.\(^{30}\) This group appears to have been started as a direct result of the founder’s frustration with the Obama administration.

Intelligence Gaps

1. How many new members have joined or begun to monitor militia groups or websites as a result of the November 2008 elections?
2. What is the likelihood that militias will engage in violence if significant changes in gun laws or immigration are enacted by the new administration?
3. How many adherents of militia ideology are active in Virginia?

\(^{30}\) This group only had two members as of February 25, 2009, including the founder, who is the lead singer of a musical group by the same name. Advertised as “Information Age Pagan Para-Military” the musical group’s MySpace page included digitally altered photos of the group members at Nazi functions. The second militia group page member has posted photos of a vehicle bearing armed forces license plates.
Projections

The threat posed by militia groups to Virginia is assessed as low; however, the catalysts of immigration and terrorism could increase this threat. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Low – All available intelligence suggests that Virginia-based militia groups have focused on defensive, rather than offensive strategies.

**Membership/Influence:** Potential Increase – Membership and support for militias could increase if the Obama administration proposes or enacts legislation to curtail private ownership of firearms and related equipment.

**Fundraising Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of fundraising activity, if any, by militia-linked individuals in Virginia. It is currently assumed that group expenses are low and members bear most of the expenses, but personal and online solicitations are possible.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Unknown - Current intelligence gaps make it impossible to assess the level of criminal activity, if any, by militia-linked individuals in Virginia.
Special Interest Extremism

Special interest extremism in Virginia encompasses anti-abortion extremists as well as animal and environmental rights extremists. While special interest groups often incorporate a religious or political message, it is generally a method used to support the overarching group goal. Anti-abortionist extremists pose a significant threat due to their willingness to take human life in the advancement of their cause. Environmental rights extremists pose a legitimate threat to critical infrastructure as they routinely target the energy sector. Animal rights extremists, while posing a significant threat elsewhere in the country, are considered a less viable threat due to their lack of significant presence and activities in Virginia.

Anti-Abortion Extremists

The anti-abortion extremist movement is comprised of radical individuals dedicated to changing the laws protecting abortion using violence, if necessary. In recent years, law enforcement has received increased reported incidents nationwide at Planned Parenthood centers, possibly by anti-abortion activists. Incidents have included harassing phone calls, suspicious inquiries, possible surveillance, recovered incendiary devices, and direct threats to employees.

There are at least two active anti-abortionist groups of interest to law enforcement headquartered in the Commonwealth, the Army of God and Life (Chesapeake) and Life & Liberty Ministries (Powhatan). There is no information that the latter group espouses violence; however, the group causes disturbances and can be confrontational during their demonstrations. In Virginia, only a few incidents involving anti-abortion groups have been reported. In May 2007, an incendiary device was found outside of an abortion clinic in Virginia Beach; however, it is unknown if members of an anti-abortion group were involved. The most recent reports of anti-abortion extremist presence were noted in the Virginia Commonwealth University and the College of William & Mary, as well as Albemarle, Manassas, Nelson, and Hanover. Prior anti-abortion extremist presence has been reported in Chesapeake, Farmville, Henrico, Newport News, Norfolk, Richmond, and Virginia Beach. Additionally, several Virginia residents have been reported by other states as engaging in anti-abortionist activity.

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(LES) Life & Liberty Ministries conducts tours throughout Virginia, whereby members engage in street ministry, leafleting, and the display of graphic materials. A protest at Longwood University in Farmville had a group of anarchists along with the anti-abortionist demonstrators (LES) VFC Intelligence Bulletin 07-86: Life & Liberty Ministries 2007 Virginia Campus Tour; (LES) TIPS C070832; Life and Liberty Ministries; 2008 Threat Assessment Surveys
Army of God

The Army of God (AOG) has provided biblical justification for the use of violence against abortion providers and has engaged in threats, intimidation, kidnappings, and murder in their pursuit to end abortion in the U.S. The group distributes information via the Internet on resistance against the government and abortionists\(^q\) and has published a manual outlining how to disrupt and put an end to abortion clinics.\(^r\) In August, the AOG was believed to be behind several email bomb threats sent to colleges and universities nationwide, including to the College of William and Mary and James Madison University.\(^{128}\)

Operation Rescue, an anti-abortionist group with ties to the AOG, has been reported in Norfolk.\(^{129}\) Operation Rescue was founded by a violent anti-abortionist who promotes the killing of abortion clinic workers.\(^{130}\) Although the group currently advocates nonviolent actions, the group’s website is full of inflammatory articles, such as Barack Obama’s “Jihad Against the Unborn!”, that could serve as a catalyst for lone wolf actors.

Intelligence Gaps

1. Are anti-abortion extremists in Virginia planning acts of domestic terrorism or engaging in paramilitary training?
2. Which, if any, extremists are assessed as potentially violent anti-abortion offenders or are known to be interested in acquiring weapons and explosives?
3. What ties exist between anti-abortion extremists and other right-wing extremists in Virginia?
4. How many anti-abortion protests/demonstrations in Virginia have ended in arrests, resulted in injury, or property destruction?
5. Have anti-abortion extremists expressed an interest in targeting pharmacies, pharmacists, or pharmaceutical companies providing ‘morning after pills’ in Virginia?
6. What changes are there in the methods that anti-abortion extremists are using to spread and sustain their message in Virginia?

\(^q\) (OS) The Army of God Manual contains anti-government sentiments and details illegal activities, including methods for blockading entrances, attacking with butyric, arson and bomb making.

\(^r\) (LES) A college in Iowa was the only one to report receiving an email claiming to be from the AOG. Other colleges and universities received emails that were similar in content, sent around the same time, and used anonymous re-mailers. All the bomb threats were determined to be hoaxes (TIPS C070643).
Projections

The Army of God’s presence, ideology of promoting violence, and their demonstrated willingness to take human life constitutes a significant threat to Virginia. Their threat level is assessed as medium; however, AOG encourages individuals to engage in violent attacks, so the possibility of a lone wolf carrying out an anti-abortionist agenda increases the threat level. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Likely to Increase – The election of a pro-choice president may encourage more violence by extremists or incite violence by previously non-violent activists.

**Membership/Influence:** Likely to Increase - Membership levels in radical anti-abortion groups will likely increase due to perceived changes in reproductive health policies that are expected to come from the new president.

**Fundraising Activities:** Increasing – Fundraising activities in radical anti-abortion groups appear to be increasing due to anticipated policy changes expected from the Obama administration.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Likely to Increase - Clinic violence and targeting of abortion providers will likely rise if significant policy changes are enacted.
Animal Rights Extremists

Animal rights extremists use illegal and non-traditional means to stop perceived animal cruelty and exploitation. These extremists target animal research labs, livestock farms, fur suppliers and retailers, restaurants, and anyone they deem benefits from the abuse or killing of animals. Animal rights extremist activity in the Commonwealth has been minimal; Virginia does not appear to have a significant leadership cadre. It is important to note, however, that Virginia residents linked to extremist groups have been implicated in domestic terrorism activities in other states.\textsuperscript{ss}

Groups of current prominence in the U.S. currently include the Animal Defense League (ADL), Animal Liberation Front (ALF), and Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty (SHAC). Although SHAC is based out of the U.K., members of this group have conducted numerous actions in the U.S., with six conviced for animal enterprise terrorism, interstate stalking, and harassment by a New Jersey jury in 2006. A planned SHAC cyber attack against Bayer Group assets on January 26, 2009 was foiled by U.K. law enforcement.\textsuperscript{131}

2009 survey data show a recent Virginia presence of animal rights extremists in Albemarle, Arlington, Chesterfield, Danville, Fairfax County, Fredericksburg (visiting lecturer), Hampton Mecklenburg, Montgomery, Salem, and Wythe (internet), with periodic activity at the state capitol reported by the Virginia Department of Capitol Police.\textsuperscript{132} Animal rights extremist presence has been reported in Henrico, Norfolk, Richmond, and Smithfield.\textsuperscript{133} The majority of animal rights groups' activities have consisted of nonviolent protest demonstrations\textsuperscript{134} and public speaking events.\textsuperscript{tt} Other activities have included small-scale vandalism of fur-industry assets and self-proclaimed 'liberations' of animals in commercial industries.\textsuperscript{135} No reports of violence against persons or significant property destruction have been received.

\textsuperscript{ss} (LES) Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) affiliates, including two Virginia residents were arrested in Illinois. (TIPS C070438; Pennsylvania C070617). In an effort to end animal testing by the research laboratory firm Huntingdon Life Science, SHAC activists have engaged in sabotage, vandalism, and threats. SHAC actions have focused primarily on the west coast (\textit{Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty}; FBI: \textit{Resurgence in Targeting of University Research Personnel by Animal Rights Extremists}, January 14, 2008).

\textsuperscript{tt} (OS) Convicted animal rights extremist, Peter Young, went on a nationwide speaking tour stopping at several colleges and universities, including a few in Virginia (Upcoming Events: \textit{Peter Young Speaking Event at George Mason University}, November 6, 2007).
Animal Liberation Front

The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) promotes direct action against organizations or individuals perceived to be exploiting animals or engaging in animal cruelty. ALF is self-described as a global organization without an organization in which small groups of radicalized adherents form autonomous cells and conduct operations independently of one another. Activities advocated by ALF include animal theft, arson, hoax bomb devices, cyber attacks, harassment, property theft, threats, and vandalism. Although there has been limited activity in Virginia, individuals or groups sympathetic to ALF have been involved in vandalism and animal theft. Animal Liberation Front presence has also been reported in Fairfax County and suspected ALF members have been identified in Blacksburg.

Intelligence Gaps

1. Have there been recent incidents, however small, in Virginia possibly linked to animal rights extremists?
2. Is Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty active (criminally) within the Commonwealth?
3. What ties, if any, do the Virginia residents who have been investigated in other states maintain with out-of-state networks? How much influence, if any, do they still have in Virginia?
4. How many commercial laboratories and educational facilities in Virginia are conducting animal testing that might attract the attention of animal rights extremists?
5. Have private security providers for Virginia’s commercial laboratories experienced any criminal activity or encounters of interest regarding animal rights activists?

Projections

Due to their limited presence and lack of violent activities, animal rights groups pose a low threat to Virginia. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Likely to Increase - ALF attacks on the West Coast have become increasingly violent in recent years, incorporating bombs as well as arson to intimidate researchers. While there is no direct evidence that this trend will come to the Commonwealth, the presence of many available, known targets here coupled with the possibility of relocation of activists from the West Coast does increase the threat level.

**Membership/Influence:** Remain Constant - ALF members cross the spectrum of traditional left leaning constituencies, but continue to appear within a young demographic, usually with ties to a institution of higher learning. It appears unlikely that
any upsurge in membership levels will occur in the short term, as local leadership cadres within the animal liberation movement (PETA) have steered a more legitimate course.

**Fundraising Activities:** Remain Constant - Fundraising activities for actual radical activities is often obscured; however no evidence suggest that persons linked to the radical Animal rights movement in Virginia have conducted traditional criminal activities to raise funds.

**Other Criminal Activities:** Remain Constant – Little criminal activity has been noted in the Commonwealth related to these individuals and no intelligence exists to suggest impending changes

The threat could increase if extremists in the area become motivated by the attacks against animal researchers occurring on the west coast, and the perceived success of these attacks in forcing researchers to abandon animal testing. Additionally, a recent proposal in tactic change from group action to individual tactics by animal rights extremists is cause for concern.\(^{139}\)
Environmental Rights Extremists

Environmental rights extremists employ a variety of radical, violent, and illegal means to defend the environment. Unlike environmental activists, who typically operate within legal parameters, extremists’ ideology permits and even encourages violent acts designed to prevent exploitation and further degradation of the earth.140

Prior Virginia environmental rights extremist presence has been reported in Glen Lyn, Henrico, Richmond, Scott, and Wise.141 Updated reporting includes Albemarle, Amherst, Arlington, Chesterfield, Danville, Montgomery, Powhatan, and Wythe (internet).142 The majority of reported activity revolves around Earth First-affiliated groups. Activities claimed or attributed to environmental rights extremists include vandalism, sabotage, and surveillance.143 Due to their propensity to engage in acts of violence to further their cause and the presence of numerous potential targets located throughout the state, eco-terrorists remain a considerable threat to Virginia.

Earth First!

Earth First! (EF) is a movement that supports environmental protection through grassroots organizing, civil disobedience, vandalism, and property destruction. Similar to other eco-terror or animal extremist groups, EF has no single leadership, but rather small autonomous cells or individuals. EF has routinely employed direct action resistance tactics, notably equipment sabotage and arson. Although EF appears to pose a minimal threat to the Commonwealth, past action camps and protest activity suggests the group will continue to lobby in Virginia. Available information indicates a strong EF presence in southwest Virginia with activities linked to coal fields, mountaintop removal, and logging.144 Katuah Earth First and Blue Ridge Earth First are loosely affiliated with the Earth First movement. The environmental activist group, Mountain Justice Summer, appears to be a Virginia nexus for the EF groups.145

Katuah Earth First (KEF), based in Asheville, North Carolina, sends activists throughout the region to train and engage in criminal activity. KEF has trained local environmentalists in non-violent tactics, including blocking roads and leading demonstrations, at action camps in Virginia. While KEF has been primarily involved in protests146 and university outreach, members have also engaged in vandalism.147 Their primary areas of concern appear to be southwest Virginia, especially Wise County, and possibly northwest Virginia, as well as a heavy Internet presence.148
Blue Ridge Earth First (BREF) emerged in September 2007 in an attempt to form a Virginia specific organization separate from the KEF operation. The group has become very active, and has conducted public protest actions in Blacksburg149 and Charlottesville in 2007.150 2008 actions included protests against Dominion Power and Massey Energy in Richmond, with at least one protest resulting in multiple arrests. BREF has also indicated it has and will continue to conduct action camps.151 Available information suggests ties between BREF and anarchist groups, including joint participation in a November 2007 anarchist meeting in Richmond.152

Earth Liberation Front

Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is an off-shoot of Earth First. ELF members operate in autonomous cells and engage in economic sabotage to stop the perceived exploitation and destruction of the environment. The last known activity by ELF in Virginia was a 2004 arson in which equipment was damaged at a construction site in Charlottesville.153 Several subjects associated with ELF reside in or have ties to Virginia;154 however, there is limited information on their continued activity with the environmental movement. Persons associated with ELF may have merged with Earth First-affiliated groups, which may account for the lack of current reporting.

Intelligence Gaps

1. Has BREF taken over the training camps and satellite offices in southwest Virginia? How much overlap, if any, exists between prior leadership and staffers?
2. How long do members remain involved in direction action versus supporting roles?
3. How much leadership overlap, if any, exists between BREF, Greenpeace/Rainforest Action Network, and other groups?
4. How many identified individuals from Blacksburg Mountain Justice Summer (MJS) have been specifically identified with participation or been arrested in Virginia?
5. What national and state forests in Virginia are located in close show proximity to high value targets such as mining or lumber operations?

Projections

Due to their propensity to engage in acts of violence to further their cause and the presence of numerous potential targets located throughout the state, eco-terrorists remain a considerable threat to Virginia. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.
Attack Capability: Likely to Increase - Threat of attacks against energy concerns and facilities is likely to increase given the perceptions of successful media attention garnered from previous arrests. This threat level may be affected by changes in climate strategy enacted by the Obama administration; it is unclear, however, if any potential changes would satisfy the extremists or encourage further actions.

Membership/Influence: Likely to Increase - The increased attention focused on Dominion Power, especially the Wise County plant, combined with national political and entertainment figures calling for more action in "defense" of the environment has created a more positive environment for recruiting in the Commonwealth. This was demonstrated at the Southeast Climate Convergence this in the summer of 2008.

Fundraising Activities: Remain Constant - There is no traditional fundraising for a group of this type, rather, monetary flow is likely to be personal in nature to the involved individuals, and parasitic in siphoning from established, "legitimate" groups which act as cover for the secret cells.

Other Criminal Activities: Remain Constant - As the operation of the coal plant in Wise moves forward, combined with the developing situation as outlined above, it is expected that the incidence and severity of "direct action" by ELF cells will increase. This will take the form of more sabotage and vandalism related criminal activity, as well as expanded opportunities for increasing protest activity.
Sovereign Citizen Extremists

The sovereign citizen movement involves individuals and groups who uniformly reject federal and state authority. Activities by these groups have included redemption schemes, use of fraudulent driver’s licenses and vehicle plates, and use of documents that falsely claim diplomatic and law enforcement privileges. Recent intelligence suggests elements of the group are dissolving nationally. Sovereign citizen activity is found nationwide; however, participation in these groups by Virginia residents is scant and primarily relates to fraudulent documents.

Previous reporting on sovereign citizen presence in Virginia has been reported in Colonial Heights, Henrico, Newport News, and Shenandoah. 2009 survey data shows possible public safety encounters with sovereign citizens in Augusta, Fairfax County, and Montgomery. The Little Shell Pembina Nation, a sovereign citizens group primarily located in North Dakota and Washington, has been identified as having previous activity in Virginia.

Moorish Science Temple of America

The Moorish Science Temple of America (MSTA), also known as the Moorish Nation, is a collection of independent organizations that evolved in the early 1990’s. MSTA promotes an ideology that African Americans constitute an elite class with special rights and privileges that convey sovereign immunity to U.S. governments. MSTA proclaims its members are the descendants of the original inhabitants of North America and are outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and legal system. DHS estimates that fewer than 1,000 active members are currently in the U.S., but noted that self-identified MSTA members have been arrested in all parts of the U.S. Local groups are generally small and feature charismatic leaders.

Activity by members is typically limited to sovereign citizen-type violations of property and tax laws and attempts by individuals to impersonate diplomats; however, one MSTA affiliated individual was associated with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing plot. New DHS reporting suggests that some MSTA groups have attended events with numerous black separatist groups as

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uu (LES) Moorish Nation members utilize “paper terrorism” to harass government officials through the misuse of financial mechanisms, such as filing false liens or submitting fraudulent tax documentation. These tactics have been employed against law enforcement officers, court officials, and other civil authorities.

vv (OS) In 2006, seven men claiming to be members of a branch of the MSTA called the Seas of David were arrested in Florida for planning to blow up the Sears Tower and other U.S. government buildings (Associated Press: Retrial Starts in Liberty City Seven Case, February 1, 2008).
well as street gangs such as the Bloods and Latin Kings. This same reporting also notes that MSTAs have also attended workshops by militias and militant tax protestors.

In Virginia, the Moorish Science Temple of America has previously been reported in Chesterfield, Henrico, the Virginia Department of Corrections, and parts of northern Virginia. New reporting indicated at least one law enforcement encounter with MSTAs in Hanover County. Virginia incidents involving MSTAs or activity have included fake license plates, claims of sovereignty, and traffic stop encounters with law enforcement.

Intelligence Gaps

1. Only a few jurisdictions have reported recent activity by sovereign citizens in the state— is this due to a lack of activity or a lack of detection and recognition?
2. Are there any indications that individuals within this movement are more willing to engage in violent incidents involving sovereign citizens in Virginia in the past?
3. Are Virginia-based individuals still producing their own license plates and driver’s licenses, or have these activities been replaced with fraudulent activity linked to property titles and deeds?
4. What are the current membership levels of MSTAs in Virginia?
5. What impact, if any, has the 2008 election had within the MSTAs movement in Virginia? Have any of the claims regarding potential birth certificate fraud involving President Obama emboldened MSTAs members?

Projections

The threat posed from sovereign citizen groups is assessed as low; however, they are of concern as they have attempted to gain entry to sensitive areas including airports and government facilities using their false documents. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Low – No current intelligence suggests the intent or capacity for attack.

**Membership/Influence:** Remain Constant – No current intelligence supports efforts to recruit by these types of groups in Virginia.

**Fundraising Activities:** Remain Constant – Adherents to this philosophy manufacture identification documents, however this does not currently appear to be a large-scale industry for this movement.

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ww (LES) Richmond resident observed with several vehicles at his house bearing Moorish National Republic of the USA license plates (TIPS C051043).

xx (LES) Mechanicsville resident claimed she was an ambassador of the Moorish Nation and demanded the release of an incarcerated relative due to her belief the state did not have the right to incarcerate members of the Moorish Nation (TIPS C060019).
Other Criminal Activities: Remain Constant – Virginia’s sovereign citizens primary criminal activity appears to be a failure to obey identification, licensing, and vehicle safety inspection requirements rather than violence or criminal enterprise.

White Nationalist Extremism

The white nationalist extremist movement encompasses several types of groups including neo-Nazis, skinheads, and white supremacists. Often the distinction between these types of groups is minimal; however, there exist differences between their ideological beliefs and their propensity for violence and criminal acts. Several white nationalist groups in Virginia have become defunct; non-activity by these groups may be due to fragmentation, infighting, or members being absorbed by other groups. Despite the presence of neo-Nazis, skinheads and other white supremacist factions, violence in Virginia related to these groups has been minimal. Many white nationalist groups are internally fractured, which presumably diminishes the unified power of the movement and the possibility that they could successfully organize an ideologically-based terrorist attack. Although the threat of an organized terrorist attack by these groups remains low, lone activity by individuals loosely affiliated with white nationalist groups cannot be discounted.

Neo-Nazis

Neo-Nazi affiliated groups adhere to the National Socialism political view espoused by Adolf Hitler and the German Third Reich. These groups rarely refer to themselves as neo-Nazi, instead preferring terms associated with National Socialism. Neo-Nazis espouse anti-Semitism and promote white nationalism through political rallies and conferences. Groups with a presence in Virginia include the:

- American National Socialist Workers’ Party (ANSWP)¹⁶⁹
- American Renaissance¹⁷⁰
- National Socialist Movement¹⁷¹
- Volksfront(yy)

These groups are primarily involved in non-criminal civil disobedience, propaganda distribution, and recruitment efforts; however, ANSWP has engaged in harassment and intimidation of political officials and public figures including inciting violence against those individuals.²² In previous years, ANSWP leader William White had been one of Virginia’s most visible white nationalist figures. In September 2008, ANSWP posted the “mock-up”

(yy) (LES) Volksfront email correspondence dated October 29, 2007, indicated a group event would be held in Virginia Beach. In addition, a member residing in the Norfolk area may be attempting to purchase property, somewhere southwest of Richmond City or in the general Petersburg area (VSP Field Intelligence Report, February 12, 2008).
cover insinuating an Obama assassination for its next publication online in an effort to draw donations. Days later, White posted information on a juror from the Nathan Hale trial. White was arrested on federal charges of obstructing justice in October 2008, leading to speculation of the impending collapse of the ANSWP.\textsuperscript{172}

**Racist Skinhead Movement**

Racist skinhead groups are among the most violent and tenuous subsets of the white nationalist movement. Skinhead groups typically attract young males with criminal records and a propensity for violence. Although some of the groups have developed partnerships with other white nationalist groups, many neo-Nazi groups consider the Skinheads to be thugs. While most Skinhead groups form and dissolve regularly, several groups have developed a more lasting presence in the Commonwealth:

- American Thule Society\textsuperscript{173}
- Confederate Hammerskins\textsuperscript{174}
- Northside Wrecking Crew\textsuperscript{175}
- United Virginia Skinhead Front\textsuperscript{176}
- Vinlanders Social Club\textsuperscript{aaa}

Although the Skinheads tend to be the most violent of the white nationalists and the movement remains popular in correctional institutions, reported activities have been limited to meetings and social events. Although their activity has been minimal, due to the presence of several skinheads groups, the movement remains a threat to Virginia due to their propensity for violence towards non-whites and law enforcement.

**White Supremacists**

White supremacist groups have beliefs similar to neo-Nazis and Skinheads; however, white supremacists adhere to more of a cult-like mentality and often times tie their racism to a religious ideology. Three primary white supremacist groups are active in Virginia:

- Ku Klux Klan\textsuperscript{bbb}
- Creativity Movement (TCM)\textsuperscript{177}
- Aryan Nations (AN)\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{22} (OS) ANSWP leader, Bill White, made a harassing phone call that included veiled threats to a Delaware college president. White has also posted the names and home addresses on his websites of local newspaper employees, political figures and individuals involved in national news stories, such as the Jena Six Case in Louisiana (TIPS C070888).

\textsuperscript{aaa} (LES) 2008 VFC Threat Assessment Surveys; Additional skinhead presence has been identified; however, it has not been linked to a specific group (Bland County, TIPS C070079; Buchanan County, TIPS C070007)

\textsuperscript{bbb} (LES) KKK presence reported in Domestic Terrorism Tracking Assessment System; 2008 VFC Threat Assessment Surveys
The most active group of all the white nationalists in the Commonwealth is the Ku Klux Klan who holds various rallies throughout the year. The Creativity Movement and the Aryan Nations both have a considerable prison presence in Virginia, and AN members have hinted at possible cooperation with Islamic extremists. Not all white supremacist groups are affiliated with a religious movement, however; groups such as the National Alliance and the now defunct National Vanguard are similar to the neo-Nazi groups in maintaining a political alignment.

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. What impact has the arrest of William ‘Bill’ White had thus far on the ANSWP?
2. How many new members have joined or begun to monitor white supremacist groups or websites as a result of the November 2008 elections?
3. What is the likelihood that white nationalist groups will engage in violence if significant changes in gun laws or immigration are enacted by the new administration?
4. How many adherents of white nationalist ideology are active in Virginia?
5. How many of the members or sympathizers of white nationalist ideology who have left organized groups are potential lone wolf threats?

**Projections**

Although the threat of an organized terrorist attack by these groups remains low, lone activity by individuals loosely affiliated with white nationalist groups cannot be discounted. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Attack Capability:** Likely to Increase - This could increase as the level of heated rhetoric does, but will likely be a single actor attack or lone wolf, influenced by white nationalist ideology but not specifically ordered or mandated by any existing group. There has been evidence of this sort of disturbing trend already.

**Membership/Influence:** Likely to Increase - Based on the recent election of an African-American president and the corresponding increase in web traffic related to this event, it is reasonable to assume that some increase in membership will result in a state which has had a fairly consistent membership strata in white supremacist organizations.

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**Footnotes:**

ccc (LES) In 2005 and 2006, a splinter faction of the AN began posting pro-Islamic rhetoric, suggesting the concept of an Aryan Jihad within the Christian Identity Movement. White supremacist organizations espouse anti-Semitic beliefs and have criticized the U.S. government for its support of Israel (Federal Bureau of Investigation: *Collaboration between Islamic and White Extremists in the U.S.*, July 20, 2007).

ddd (LES) Some members of the National Vanguard (NV) may be forming two separate groups, the European Americans United and the Nationalist Coalition. Due to NV presence being reported in several jurisdictions, these new groups may be of concern as well (2008 VFC Threat Assessment Surveys).
Fundraising Activities: Remain Constant - No evidence of criminal activity for fundraising by Virginia’s white supremacists groups has been discovered; most operating expenses appear to derive from member contributions.

Other Criminal Activities: Remain Constant - To date, little in the way of group criminal activity has been noted from white supremacist organizations; activities consist primarily of leafleting, rallies, and other types of peaceful activity.
Overview of Terrorism and Extremism Trends

While terror and extremist groups across the globe may develop tactics and short-term strategies based on regional circumstances, most activities can be categorized according to identified or emerging trends. Trends tracked by the VFC generally correspond to the major needs and objectives of such groups, including logistical concerns, such as procuring people and financing, as well as operational concerns involving the preparation for and execution of attacks. Several of the trends monitored by the VFC represent specialized efforts to raise funds or conduct attacks, while other trends represent general, but evolving efforts to support terrorist objectives.

Suspicious incidents reported to the VFC by law enforcement, public safety, and private sector partners are analyzed for potential linkages to these international or national trends. Reviews of data since 2006 show that most of the Virginia-linked terror and extremist groups of interest engage in three trends:

- terrorism financing,
- terrorism tradecraft, and
- recruitment/radicalization

Despite these commonalities, the VFC has noted differences in the prevalence of major trends in various parts of the Commonwealth. These regional differences are based primarily on the preferences and capabilities of the main terrorist and extremist groups active in each area. Other differences, especially in terrorism tradecraft reporting, are potential due to variations in population density and critical infrastructure concentrations.

While the VFC has intelligence to suggest that several of these trends are occurring in Virginia, it is important to note that information of criminal and suspicious incidents is reported infrequently and sometimes inconsistently. It is likely that potential incidents of interest are occurring, but that such incidents are either not recognized by initial responders or simply not reported. The lack of detailed information for Virginia instances of monitored trends should not be construed to represent a lack of occurrence.
Bioterrorism

A bioterrorism attack is the intentional release of viruses, bacteria, or other germs (agents) in order to create illness or death in people, animals, or crops. Although the effectiveness of various dispersal methods for biological agents varies widely, agents can generally be spread through the air, through water, or in food. Biological agents are an attractive option for terrorist organizations because they can be extremely difficult to detect and treat, as the effects of many agents may be delayed for several hours to several days.

Potential Impact for Law Enforcement and Critical Infrastructure

Although the majority of the current bioterrorism literature focuses on the recognition and response roles of the Public Health sector or the preventive measures available to the Agriculture and Food sector, law enforcement personnel is involved in potential bioterrorism incidents during ‘white powder’ responses. While the VFC receives direct reporting of suspicious substance events from both local agencies and Virginia State Police specialty response teams, uneven reporting from local jurisdictions makes complete analysis impossible. Data available to the VFC does not indicate any currently identified terrorist threats, nor any significant date, target, or geographic patterns. As with previous years, most recent white powder incidents in Virginia appear to be related to hoaxes often targeting schools, correctional or other government facilities.

Domestic Incidents

While incidents reported to the VFC do not appear to be linked to organized terror groups, extremist movements, or lone wolves, the 2001 anthrax attacks against U.S. political and media figures underscores the need for continued vigilance. Anthrax tainted letters and parcels in New York, Washington, and Florida killed five Americans and infected 17. While the perpetrator(s) of this attack was identified last year, captured al-Qa’ida documents clearly show an interest among Islamic extremists and terrorists in acquiring biological weapons. The increasing availability of Internet sites advertising literature on the manufacture of biological agents in a variety of languages is cause for concern.

In January 2008, a loosely organized but sophisticated group known as Anonymous mailed at least 19 letters to Scientology facilities in Southern California containing white powder and bomb threats. Also of note in early 2008 was the widely reported discovery of ricin inside a Las Vegas hotel room in February 2008; subsequent investigation of the room uncovered a gun, a silencer, a copy of The Anarchist's Cookbook, and a backpack containing ricin and castor beans. Although the

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(End of Document)
occupant was not linked to any identified domestic or international terrorist group, charges were filed for weapons offenses and possession of biological toxins.\textsuperscript{183}

**Virginia**

White powder incidents remain the largest volume of potential bioterrorism attacks in Virginia. Although the vast majority of incidents involve hoaxes directed at institutions, at least one Virginia-based extremist group, the Army of God, has been linked to promoting white powder attacks. In October and November 2001, hundreds of abortion clinics and abortion-rights organizations received packages containing white powder and threatening letters alleging that the substance was anthrax.\textsuperscript{184} The notes were signed by the “Virginia Dare Cell” of the Army of God, an anti-abortion group headquartered in Chesapeake. The Army of God, described in the special interest extremism section of domestic terror groups, has published a “how to” manual for abortion clinic violence providing biblical justification for the use of violence against abortion providers.\textsuperscript{185} In 2006, law enforcement in Chesterfield uncovered an alleged plot by an identified suspect to use manufactured ricin in an attempt to poison his wife.\textsuperscript{186} Although the incident was not deemed terrorism-related, and the suspected ricin was in a semi-solid mash form which did not pose a threat to the public, the incident heightened local concern about the threat posed by bioterrorism agents.

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. Which commercial and academic institutions in Virginia currently conduct research involving methods and substances which could be used to conduct an attack?
2. Have any suspicious incidents involving employees or other potential insiders occurred at Virginia food-processing plants, pharmaceutical labs and production facilities, or other potential sources of agents?
3. Has any internet chatter by known groups or individuals with an interest in Virginia suggested feasible, innovative methods to conduct an attack against Virginia assets?

**Projections**

The Virginia Fusion Center lacks sufficient intelligence to forecast any changes in the frequency, volume, sophistication, or geographic extent of future bioterrorism incidents affecting the Commonwealth. Recent FBI reporting suggests that information alleging terrorist possession or use of tetanus toxin, saxitoxin (STX), or strychnine was received between August 2006 and March 2007, but do not appear to have a U.S. nexus or represent a concerted effort to expand the scope of potential materials to be used in an attack. According to this report, extremists in the U.S. will likely continue to restrict their toxin acquisition efforts to ricin and botulinum in the near future. It is possible, however, that the “widespread dissemination of the acquisition methods or production recipes allegedly used in these reports could occur, and these toxin and poison efforts represent potential paths that terrorists could follow in the future.”\textsuperscript{187}
Cyber-crime and Cyber-terrorism

Cyber-terrorism is defined by the FBI as the use of information technology systems resulting in violence, destruction, and/or disruption of services, where the intended purpose is to create fear by causing confusion and uncertainty within a given population, with the goal of influencing a government or population to conform to a particular political, social, or ideological agenda. Cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism are developing trends that utilize computers and/or telecommunications capabilities to further the aims of extremists. Components of cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism include the use of information technology to organize and execute attacks against networks, computer systems and telecommunications infrastructures, or for exchanging information or making threats electronically. Examples are hacking into computer systems, introducing viruses to vulnerable networks, website defacing, denial-of-service attacks, or terrorist threats made via electronic communication.

Cyber-crime techniques are sometimes employed to conduct denial-of-services attacks, but they are also linked to economic offenses that generate funds to benefit terror and extremist groups. Cyber-crime is usually conducted through a connection to the Internet, but can also include security breaches involving the unauthorized removal of data on small, portable flash drive storage devices. The amount of cyber-crime directly or indirectly attributable to terrorists is difficult to determine; however, linkages between terrorist groups and criminals that allow terror networks to operate leveraging the computer resources, money laundering activities, or transit routes operated by criminals have been identified.

Several important sub trends within cyber-terrorism have been observed. The greatest threat discovered thus far is insider sabotage by individuals who were, or previously had been, authorized to use the information systems they eventually employed to perpetrate harm. Insiders pose a substantial threat by virtue of their knowledge of, and access to, employer systems and/or databases. In cases involving cyber attackers without inside access, the technique of cyber extortion is used, in which hackers threaten to inflict cyber damage to critical infrastructure, such as cutting off city lighting and power supplies, unless they are paid huge sums of ransom money. In some sectors, including the Banking and Finance sector, cyber extortion efforts usually involve the penetration of account protection data and the threat to reveal these breaches to the public, resulting in a loss of confidence. Such attacks have been noted, but are frequently not reported so as to minimize the potential for media leaks; as such, the true scope of the threat and potential damages of this type of attack is not fully understood.
Also of note is the phenomenon of hacktivism, defined as "the nonviolent use of illegal or legally ambiguous digital tools in pursuit of political ends. These tools include website defacements, redirects, denial-of-service attacks, information theft, website parodies, virtual sit-ins, virtual sabotage, and software development." On March 28, 2008, Wired News reported that "Internet griefers"—a makeshift term for people who cause grief—posted code and flashing computer animations with the intention of triggering migraine headaches and seizures. Hacktivism and griefing incidents have ranged from minor inconveniences involving modified website content and denial-of-services to potentially dangerous scenarios, such as the modification of electronic traffic safety signs.

**Potential Impact for Law Enforcement and Critical Infrastructure**

Cyber attacks are of significance to law enforcement because of the potential consequences for large-scale, cascading disruption of critical infrastructure and the possibility of criminal activity in support of terrorism financing. Terrorists are most likely to use cyber weaponry in a blended fashion, combining the offensive cyber elements to aggravate the damage and hamper recovery from a physical attack (See Table 3). The most probable targets for such attacks are critical infrastructure or assets, response and recovery assets, and security systems. If terrorists were to choose a cyber only attack, the most likely target would be critical infrastructure such as power or telecommunications, SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems, and companies supporting U.S. government interests.

Computer worms, destructive software programs containing malicious code capable of accessing and modifying or deleting computer network data, are of great concern, and could impact a wide range of sectors. Transportation systems have been identified as an especially attractive target for malicious or reckless attack with potentially serious casualty and economic consequences. Civil aviation, in particular, is a tempting target and is “extraordinarily dependent on computer-telecommunications information systems.” Other sectors that have experienced recent activity include the Banking/Finance, Energy, Government/Military, and Information Technology.
Table 3: Potential Types of Blended Cyber-Physical Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Threat Group(s)</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyber to Exacerbate Physical</td>
<td>Terrorists would use the cyber component of the attack to increase chaos caused by the main, physical attack.</td>
<td>Scenario: A cyber attack is launched on 911 services after a physical attack on response and recovery personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber to Facilitate Physical</td>
<td>This attack would be intended to defeat security systems, gain access to certain areas, or delay security force.</td>
<td>Scenario: A cyber attack on a chemical plant's telecommunications system degrades security coordination efforts allowing terrorists to plant and detonate explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical to Exacerbate Cyber</td>
<td>This type of attack aims at disabling infrastructure assets needed to recover effectively from a cyber attack.</td>
<td>Scenario: A bomb threat is called in to an electric power company to evacuate personnel, decreasing the likelihood of interference with a cyber attack on the company’s network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical to Facilitate Cyber</td>
<td>The physical component gains access to assets required for the cyber attack.</td>
<td>Scenario: A physical attack on a brokerage firm allows access to financial networks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Most likely**
- Requires the least amount of resources and knowledge

**Cyber to Exacerbate Physical**
- Terrorists would use the cyber component of the attack to increase chaos caused by the main, physical attack.
- Scenario: A cyber attack is launched on 911 services after a physical attack on response and recovery personnel.

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- This attack would be intended to defeat security systems, gain access to certain areas, or delay security force.
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**Physical to Facilitate Cyber**
- The physical component gains access to assets required for the cyber attack.
- Scenario: A physical attack on a brokerage firm allows access to financial networks.

**Potential Threat Group(s)**
Cyber-crime and cyber-terror incidents could be launched by a variety of international and domestic groups with varying levels of expertise. While the most common perception is of an intrusion incident by a hacker, it is also important to note the possibility of insider threat due to infiltration or recruitment. The most publicized research regarding non-state cyber terrorism and cyber crime pertains to al-Qa’ida, whose increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet continues to generate concern. An example of al-Qa’ida developing cyber expertise is seen in the case of...
Younes Tsouli (AKA Irhabi 007), a U.K. hacker who served as an al-Qa’ida conduit for two years. He not only accessed U.S. university computers and propagandized for the al-Zarqawi-led insurgents in Iraq, but he also taught other online jihadists how to “wield their computers for the cause.”

The most likely domestic threat is Anonymous, a loosely affiliated network of cells that communicates via Internet message boards and networking websites. The group also uses forums in which they target individuals by engaging in cyber attacks and has also been affiliated with white powder incidents. The ability of a group of Internet-based hackers to organize and succeed in launching real world protests may be a developing trend. The group appears to be using forums, information sites, and video sharing sites to spread their messages. This tactic may be used by domestic extremist groups to organize protests, disturbances, or attacks. The successes of Anonymous are unprecedented and may be the beginning of a new type of Internet activism that has real world implications.

**Domestic Incidents**

A wide variety of cyber incidents and attempted intrusions have been reported throughout the U.S. in recent years. While reported activity ranged from ‘hacktivism’ to attempted botnet attacks, most experts agree that not all cyber incidents are reported and analyzed. One issue in this field that is particularly difficult to measure and analyze is cyber-related extortion. In these cases, a perpetrator compromises a corporate network and then threatens to divulge the breach or sell proprietary information unless their demands are met.

While the VFC does not have the specialized resources required to monitor the technical aspects of cyber terrorism attacks, the unit does receive reporting from citizens and Virginia-based organizations. Although most of the suspicious activity reported by citizens appears to be spam-related text messages or Nigerian-style email scams, a few reports of interest have been received. On June 9 2008, a Richmond-based financial institution reported an attempt to infect the institution’s computers via a “software as a service” style attack. In another reported incident, the compromise of an identified Virginia government agency’s computers by a Botnet was discovered in May 2008. One local jurisdiction reported that they received notification that their local government network had been hacked, but did not report any additional information.

Two incidents were reported by Virginia colleges and universities; one attack featured an actual network intrusion, while the second featured email-based bomb threats to multiple institutions in and outside of Virginia. While linkages cannot be conclusively demonstrated, initial investigation suggests that the Army of God may have sponsored the email-based bomb threats.

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**Note:** Tsouli, largely credited with maintaining al-Qa’ida’s presence on the Internet, is arguably the most important al-Qa’ida operative who operated on the Internet. Tsouli was responsible for stealing web resources and using the proceeds of web-based theft to spread al-Qa’ida’s message to potential recruits all over the world (Gulf Times, Three Admit to Online Terrorism Charges, July 5, 2007).
Intelligence Gaps

1. Which domestic and international groups have expressed an interest in using cyber weaponry to achieve their goals?
2. Which groups of interest in Virginia have shown the technical capability to employ cyber weaponry?
3. Have there been suspicious or criminal incidents in Virginia involving cyber security that appear to have a terrorism nexus?
4. What new cyber attack capabilities are emerging that could potentially be used by terrorists to attack Virginia assets?

Projections

The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Frequency** – Likely to Increase – The potential financial gain, the difficulty in investigation and prosecution, and the rate of technological change that drives new threats suggest that this trend will continue.

**Volume** – Likely to Increase – The use of increasingly sophisticated botnets makes it easier for hackers to increase the number of attacks on a given target in a short amount of time.

**Geographic extent** - Likely to Increase – Critical infrastructure, particularly the energy and financial sectors, will likely be the target of increasingly sophisticated attacks.

**Sophistication** – Likely to Increase – The rapid advancement of cyber attacks and an increase in complexity, technical aspects, and difficulty in tracing the cyber attacks back to the aggressor is expected.

The sophistication of network attacks and intrusions from a variety of sources including terrorists, hostile countries, and insiders will continue to escalate. Domestic terrorists groups, who already use the Internet for recruitment and propaganda distribution, also have the potential to delve into cyber attacks, although they will likely be targeted towards a specific group or infrastructure.
Illicit Entry into U.S.

Illicit entry to the U.S. is a primary security concern in the current threat environment of global terror. Entering the U.S. without government authorization or failing to honor the terms of authorized forms of entry, such as tourist or student visas, represent the most common means of violation of law. According to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the government inadequately tracks individuals with expired tourist or student visas. Given the proximity of the Commonwealth to the nation’s Capitol, the extensive network of critical federal assets and potentially vulnerable higher education system across the Commonwealth, understanding and controlling the illegal entry of foreign nationals is a vital element of concern for Virginia.

Potential Impact for Law Enforcement and Critical Infrastructure

One of the primary concerns for law enforcement officers regarding the trend of illicit entry into the U.S. remains officer safety. While most individuals attempting to gain illegal entry try to remain low key, and thereby undetected when confronted, the potential for an encounter to escalate into violence persists. The most likely infrastructure sectors to be impacted by illicit entry include Government/Military and Transportation – including Aviation and Ports. Government facilities that issue identification or process immigration requests are susceptible to infiltration or compromise by disgruntled insiders. In 2007, 76% (929) of all Terrorism Screening Center hits in Virginia were related to airport-based travel inquiries. Due to changes in reporting mechanisms which separate Dulles International Airport and Reagan National Airport from Virginia, comparable data for 2008 is unavailable. Law enforcement personnel working at or near port facilities have also reported concerns regarding human cargo or unauthorized entry by the crews of seagoing vessels as a possible terrorism threat.

Potential Threat Group(s)

Due to the nature of this trend, the primary threat derives from members of international terror groups. Limited reporting suggests that certain domestic movements, most notably sovereign citizen groups such as Little Shell Pembina Nation, have sold illicit documentation to individuals entering the U.S. in the past. This is of particular concern to law enforcement and those in charge of securing critical infrastructure, as some of these individuals have attempted to gain entry to sensitive areas including airports and government facilities using false documents.

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208 (OS) Mohamed Atta and two of his co-conspirators had expired visas when they executed the September 11, 2001 attacks. All of the attackers had U.S. government issued documents and two of them were erroneously granted visa extensions after their deaths (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: The 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004).
Fraudulent Documents

Illicit entry into the U.S. via document fraud includes activities such as the forgery of official documents and making false statements to obtain entry. These documents include driver’s licenses, birth certificates, Social Security cards, and immigration arrival records. In addition to using these techniques to obtain government-issued documents, many document mills have been created to manufacture convincing, but counterfeit documents. According to Immigration and Terrorism, a 2005 study of the immigration histories of 94 terrorists who operated in the U.S. between 1990 and 2004, there were:

- 11 identified instances of passport fraud and 10 instances of visa fraud, with a total of 34 individuals charged with making false statements to an immigration official;
- At least 13 instances where terrorists violated the terms of entry by overstaying temporary visas;
- At least 17 instances in which terrorists applied for asylum while claiming to lack proper travel documents.

Most of the subjects included in this study, not including six of the studied September 11th hijackers, were arrested on criminal charges prior to inclusion in the report.

Virginia

Numerous Virginia jurisdictions have reported instances of encountering false documentation related to illicit entry into the U.S. in the past three years. Several recent task force investigations have uncovered document mills, which are now considered prevalent in both the northern Virginia and Richmond areas. New reporting included:

- Northern Virginia - In January 2008, several U.S. businesses and a ring leader were identified in a mortgage fraud/illegal document ring. One business offered visa sponsorship in exchange for employment. The leader, believed to have ties to terrorism, attempted to obtain fake US Birth Certificates in order to smuggle people into the US.
- Northern Virginia - In July 2008, fifteen individuals were charged in nine separate complaints in overlapping contraband cigarette trafficking, money laundering, and identification fraud and identity theft schemes. One subject was charged with identification document fraud and two others were charged with conspiracy to commit passport fraud.
- Richmond - As of December 2007, a USPER in Richmond claimed to have access to fraudulent green cards and Mexican driver’s licenses. Fraudulent documents cost $140-$250.
Reston- A sign at a supermarket in Reston in August 2008 advertised "Citas para el MVA ID/Licencias" which translates to "Citations for MVA ID/licensing" and gave a phone number for contact.  

The vast majority of reported instances appeared to be related to illegal immigration issues regarding undocumented workers. Internal research on fraudulent documentation in Virginia revealed one reported instance of fraudulent license plates on a parked vehicle linked to a member of the Moorish Nation.

**Employer Fraud**

In employer-based visa fraud schemes, recipients may never report to a job for which they were issued a visa. In some cases, businesses profit from selling these visas outright, but they can also serve as fronts for human smuggling operations. Reporting of potential employer-based fraudulent entry from localities is still rare in Virginia, but this is likely due to a lack of investigative resources, rather than a lack of actual activity. A review of recent requests for information from federal agencies revealed that the majority pertained to investigations of passport and employer based visa fraud. A Northern Virginia attorney was indicted in November 2008 in connection with an ongoing investigation of a large-scale immigration fraud scheme. The attorney used an identified business in Alexandria to sponsor foreign nationals and aliens for either no-show jobs or jobs for which they were not qualified. The attorney created documents making false claims about the aliens' work experience and offers of employment.

**Marriage Fraud**

Marriage fraud is a common method of facilitating the extended stays of foreign terrorists in the U.S. While such marriages afford many privileges to aliens remaining in the U.S., federal statutes also prohibit marriage fraud, defined as a marriage that is entered into solely “for the purpose of evading any provision of the immigration laws.” The number of foreign nationals obtaining green cards through marriage to Americans has more than doubled since 1985 and has quintupled since 1970. More than 25 percent of all green cards issued in 2007 were to the spouses of American citizens; in 2006 and 2007 nearly twice as many green cards were issued to the spouses of American citizens than were issued for all employment-based immigration categories combined.

Marriage to an American is the clearest pathway to citizenship for an illegal alien; waivers granted to individuals marrying U.S. citizens can eliminate ineligibilities for green cards, including the 3/10-year bar on entry for those with long periods of illegal presence. In fact, a significant percentage of petitions to bring foreign spouses or fiancés to the U.S. illegally or to help them adjust visa status if they are already in the U.S. on non-immigrant visas are approved. Many petitions are successful, even in cases where the couple may only have met over the Internet and may not even

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hnn (OS) As federal law allows an alien who is a spouse of a U.S. citizen to be considered the citizen's immediate relative, the alien is permitted to gain lawful permanent residency in the U.S. (U.S. Code Section 1151: Worldwide Level of Immigration, January 3, 2005).
share a common language. According to the Center for Immigration Studies, marriage to an American citizen remains the most common path to U.S. residence and/or citizenship for foreign nationals, with over 2.4 million gaining a legal status in the U.S. between 1998 and 2007.  

Known cases of sham marriages exist involving al-Qa'ida, Hizballah, and individuals with radical ties. Fraudulent marriages have enabled individuals affiliated with al-Qa'ida, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to remain in the U.S. One regional example is the Charlotte Hizballah cell, where a key figure “helped secure three fraudulent visas and three sham marriages for the purpose of ‘legally’ bringing in the United States his brother, his brother-in-law, and sister so that they might become legal permanent residents.”

Virginia

Only a few Virginia jurisdictions have reported potential marriage fraud incidents within the past three years, with a small number showing indications of potential terrorist-related criminal activity. Recent media attention on potential sham marriages in northern Virginia has highlighted a lack of a “waiting period” for marriage licenses, which could make marriage fraud easier. Research indicated that previously reported marriage fraud in southwest Virginia involved subjects who had left the area a few years ago. In addition, one Virginia-linked case occurred in which a Norfolk police officer testified against an Ohio-based Jordanian man who had tried to recruit him online for a terrorist cause. Subsequent federal investigation showed this subject likely entered the U.S. through a fraudulent marriage to a Kansas City woman in 2001; the marriage was annulled five months later.

Student Visas

Temporary visas represent another common means of entering the U.S. Many individuals enter the U.S. on student visas and never enroll in school. Instances such as this example show that individuals may enroll and seem to be legitimate students but may still be working as operatives. The three categories of nonimmigrant student visas monitored and tracked by DHS are F visas for academic study, M visas for vocational study, and J visas for cultural exchange. Such visas can be exploited by terrorists not only as a method to legally penetrate the borders, but also present a legitimate opportunity to study technical fields which may be of use in future attacks.

One of the FBI’s most wanted subjects, Aafia Siddiqui, who has ties to al-Qa'ida, entered the U.S. on a student visa and lived in the country for over a decade while studying and teaching at Brandeis and MIT. Her whereabouts had been unknown until July 2008 when she was found with handwritten notes referring to a 'mass casualty attack' at various prominent locations in the U.S.,

iii (LES) The somewhat sophisticated marriage fraud scheme operated from Augusta County and involved individuals of Middle Eastern descent; ties to specific terrorist organizations had not been determined (TIPS C050043).
such as the Empire State Building, Statue of Liberty, Wall Street, and the Brooklyn Bridge.\textsuperscript{230} Separate FBI reporting advised that an individual in the U.S. had sponsored several individuals from Egypt to enter to the U.S. on F-1 student visas.\textsuperscript{231} This individual had an identified contact at Strayer University who prepared and filed the visa paperwork through the University for a fee. The sponsor and the university contact allegedly hold radical Muslim beliefs. Despite the issuance of the visas through Strayer, the Egyptians have not attended that University.

Virginia

Virginia has 39 public and 65 private institutions of higher learning located across the state, with a significant number of Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)\textsuperscript{iii} approved schools.\textsuperscript{232} State Council of Higher Education for Virginia (SCHEV)\textsuperscript{iii} enrollment figures for the 2007-2008 academic year show 278,876 students enrolled in four-year programs and 168,414 in two year programs.\textsuperscript{233} According to a 2007 SCHEV report, foreign/international undergraduate enrollment in Virginia remained relatively constant in the 1990’s; it decreased by 6% between 2001 and 2006. 2007-2008 academic year statistics show an estimated 8,830 foreign students enrolled in Virginia institutions of higher education.\textsuperscript{234} The most recent SEVIS quarterly report ranks the Northern Virginia Community College fourth in enrollment (1,817) among F-1 and M-1 approved schools in the U.S.\textsuperscript{235}

Seven Virginia jurisdictions reported evidence of student visa fraud, but insufficient information was available to link these instances conclusively to terrorism-related activities.\textsuperscript{236} Although the previously noted FBI report regarding Strayer University did not specify which University campus or staff were involved in the potential fraud ring, it is noteworthy that this institution shows twelve locations throughout Virginia. It is also important to note that a lack of reporting on this trend by Virginia college and university law enforcement agencies does not necessarily indicate a lack of fraudulent activity, but may rather represent an area of potential criminal behavior outside the normal scope of investigations for many departments.

\textsuperscript{iii} (OS) The Student and Exchange Visitor Program acts as the bridge for varied government organizations which have an interest in information on foreign students. SEVIS is a web-based application used to track and monitor schools and programs, students, exchange visitors and their dependents throughout the duration of approved participation within the U.S. education system (U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of State).
Intelligence Gaps

1. What is the prevalence, customer base, and concentration of document mills in Virginia?
   a. Are Virginia-based mills run by or have connections with terrorists, gang-affiliated groups, or human smuggling rings? Do the mills have connections at DMV, ICE, Department of State, or other government agencies?
   b. What documents do the mills produce and what are the current prices?

2. What is the prevalence of human smuggling taking place in Virginia?
   a. What volume of business is handled, and from which countries are the individuals smuggled?
   b. Is there a business front associated with the operation?
   c. Are they run by or have connections with terrorist, gang-affiliated groups, or document mills? Do these rings have connections at DMV, ICE, Department of State, or other government agencies?

3. What is the extent of marriage fraud cases in Virginia?
   a. Are these individual instances or organized crime operations?
   b. From which countries are the fraudulent spouses coming?
   c. Are they run by or have connections with terrorist or gang-affiliated groups?

4. What is the extent of the exploitation of the following visas as they relate to Virginia?
   a. Religious
   b. Student
   c. B-2 visas including those issued for medical purposes
   d. J-1 visas including those issued to summer workers in tourist areas
   e. All other visas
Projections

It appears that the incidence of passport and visa fraud is most prominent in the northern Virginia and Tidewater regions, largely due to the numerous ports of entry in those areas. Some reported fake document use is also being reported in central and southwest Virginia. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Frequency** – Likely to Increase - As businesses in tourist areas such as Virginia Beach and Williamsburg increase their sponsorship of summer workers on J-1 visas, the opportunity for visa, immigration, or document fraud will increase; in Virginia, document fraud was the most reported problem associated with illicit entry.

**Volume** – Likely to Increase – Current federal intelligence suggests that instability in areas such as Mexico, Somalia, and Sudan, and other areas of corruption or unrest may drive individuals to seek entry into the U.S. at a time that quotas for such areas are being lowered. It is likely that the lack of official options for entry may inspire motivated individuals, with or without nefarious intentions, to seek illicit entry.

**Geographic extent** – Likely to Increase - Cases of immigration fraud, marriage fraud, and document fraud have been in northern and central Virginia, as well as Hampton Roads; immigration could rise in rural areas also due to the need for migrant workers while student visa fraud will likely be concentrated in college towns.

**Sophistication** – Likely to Increase - Technological improvements are increasing the quality of false documents and busy document mills can recoup the cost of new equipment in less than one day. Although human smuggling operations are often extremely unsophisticated, they are organized and reliant on the quality of documents they can provide.

It is increasingly important that local, state, and federal authorities concentrate efforts on locating and interdicting individuals that use fake documentation to enter the U.S. Discrepancies in illegal immigration enforcement contain potential for exploitation by terrorists.
Narco-terrorism

Although the term narco-terrorism attempts to characterize the trafficking of drugs as a means of financing terrorist organizations, disagreements on the exact definition exist. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), a narco-terrorist organization is “an organized group that is complicit in the activities of drug trafficking in order to further, or fund, premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets with the intention to influence [that is, influence a government or a group of people].”

Currently, more evidence of narco-terrorism can be found at an international level than domestically, the most notable example of which was the use of drug trade proceeds to purchase the explosives used by the 2004 Madrid train bombing cell. Domestic instances of potential narco-terrorism have generally indicated that funds from U.S. sales were being funneled out of the country to support foreign activities. While a variety of international and domestic groups have alleged interest in this method of fundraising, the most notable groups involved in this activity domestically include Hizballah, HAMAS, and al-Qa’ida. Recently, a member of Afghan Taliban was convicted in U.S. court on narco-terrorism and drug charges. This conviction represents the first time a defendant has been convicted in U.S. federal court of narco-terrorism since the statute was enacted in March 2006.

Potential Impact for Law Enforcement and Critical Infrastructure

As with any potential interaction with a drug trafficker, the primary law enforcement concern is officer safety. In dealing with a group or individual potentially linked to terrorism-related drug trafficking, several critical infrastructure sectors could be impacted. While the sector impacted would vary widely based on the type of drug being created or transported, the most likely impacts would be on the Chemical/HAZMAT or Transportation– Highways sectors.

Potential Threat Group(s)

The illegal drug trade has provided significant profits for extremists, sometimes replacing funding from Cold War era state sponsors. According to DEA statistics, “nearly half of the 41 groups on the government’s list of terrorist organizations are tied to narcotics trafficking.” Of particular note to the U.S. are the past activities of Hizballah and Usama bin Laden’s support of the drug trade though it is against the teaching of Islam, because it is used to kill Westerners. Although there are not many reported instances of U.S. drug trade profits financing al-Qa’ida, the group is poised

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k!!k (OS) Three separate investigations have shown U.S. drug proceeds benefiting Hizballah. The group has also been tied to extensive illicit cigarette trafficking in the U.S. (Steven Emerson: Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the U.S., 2006; Washington Post: Cigarette Smuggling Linked to Terrorism, June 8, 2004).
to benefit from the international drug trade. Due to its presence in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, al-Qa’ida earns millions of dollars from the international drug trade.243

**Domestic Incidents**

Although the VFC does not have any current intelligence linking international groups to narco-terrorism in Virginia, the presence of potential members is cause for continued awareness. Virginia law enforcement officers confronted with evidence of narcotics trafficking, especially on major thoroughfares, are encouraged to maintain vigilance for evidence of linkages to terror or extremists groups. While the VFC provides assistance to agencies and task forces investigating drug-trafficking activities linked to terrorism, specific reporting is restricted to involved agencies to ensure operational security.

Intelligence suggests that khat is being trafficked to the Somali, Ethiopian, and Yemeni immigrant communities in the U.S., including Virginia.244 Khat, a green and leafy plant containing cathinone, a Schedule I drug, is typically chewed.245 There is evidence to suggest that some non-immigrants in these areas have begun abusing the drug as well.246 As such, abuse levels are highest in cities with sizable populations of immigrants, including the National Capital Region. In Virginia, much of the East African population is in Arlington County, Alexandria City, Fairfax County, Loudon County, Prince William County, and Falls Church.247

Khat is not typically sold as a street drug, but instead is sold in Middle Eastern restaurants, food stores, and tobacco stores. Khat trafficking is significant to Virginia due to the established Somali communities and past seizure of khat within the Commonwealth. Additionally, intelligence has indicated that khat distribution may possibly be linked to funding for Islamic extremist groups such as al-Itihadd al-Islamiya (AIAI) and Al-Shabaab (AS).248 As a result, the potential for khat trafficking investigations to uncover linkages to terrorism financing activities in Virginia.

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8 (OS) al-Itihadd al-Islamiya may have ties with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab, a group affiliated with al-Qa’ida. According to recent open source reporting, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab may be cooperating in the fight against mutual enemies.
Khat shipments have been seized in numerous states, including in Virginia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Other Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Port of Baltimore, MD</td>
<td>Shipping</td>
<td>3,000 lbs estimated at 5 million dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Chesterfield, VA</td>
<td>Parcels</td>
<td>3 overseas (Netherlands) parcels addressed to VA residential address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>30 lbs and 34 people arrested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Philadelphia, PA</td>
<td>Parcels</td>
<td>2 overseas (Netherlands) parcels addressed to Pennsylvania address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>Parcels</td>
<td>Numerous overseas parcels addressed to United States addresses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. Does the growing prevalence of khat usage in Virginia by east Africans represent a potential funding stream for organizations such as Al Shabaab?
2. What impact, if any, will current economic conditions in the U.S. encourage terror and extremist groups to switch from previously utilized fundraising methods to drug sales as a means of generating financial support?
3. Are any individuals with suspected terrorism linkages currently involved in drug diversion operations in Virginia?
4. Are any of the potential front businesses believed to be supporting terrorist activities in Virginia also selling drugs as an additional income stream?

**Projections**

International operatives, especially those in organizations with increasingly decentralized leadership, may resort to theft, fraud, or drug trafficking to obtain funds locally. This may indicate that narco-terrorism could increase in the very near future because of the increasing necessity for homegrown cells to fund their own operations. While conventional wisdom suggests that narco-terrorism will thrive in times of economic hardship, insufficient intelligence specific to Virginia is available, to offer projections regarding the frequency, volume, geographic extent, and sophistication of possible narco-terrorism activity in the Commonwealth.
Terrorism Financing

International terrorist organizations employ a variety of financing mechanisms to earn, move, and store assets. Terrorists and criminals attempt to conduct these activities without attracting law enforcement attention by utilizing closed networks and systems with limited regulation. Funds are often earned through the trafficking of profitable commodities such as contraband cigarettes, counterfeit goods, and illicit drugs.

Terrorists also generate funds through charitable organizations that collect large sums in donations from both witting and unwitting donors. Assets are then moved through nontransparent trade or financial mechanisms that conceal or launder, including charities, informal banking systems, bulk cash, or commodities, such as precious stones and metals. Assets may be stored in commodities not only because they are likely to maintain value over time, but also because they are easy to negotiate outside of formal banking systems.

Potential Impact for Law Enforcement and Critical Infrastructure

While many smaller scale white collar or economic offenses are committed for personal gain or in support of a drug habit, it is important to note that crimes involving identity theft, organized retail theft, counterfeit goods, or cigarette smuggling could also be supporting terrorist activity in the U.S. or abroad. While all three phases of terrorism financing are important, the earning and moving phases represent the greatest opportunity for law enforcement detection and disruption (See Table 5). Law enforcement officers are most likely to detect terrorism-linked financial earning schemes through routine reporting avenues. Terrorism-linked financial movement efforts may be detected through routine traffic stops, burglaries at linked businesses, or proactive Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) checks.

Depending on the nature of the fundraising or moving tactics, a number of critical infrastructure sectors may be impacted. While linkages to the Banking/Finance and Information Technology/Telecommunications sectors are intuitive, the organized retail theft and trafficking of counterfeit infant formulas and pharmaceuticals can present major issues for the Public Health sector.
Terrorism Financing Phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earning</th>
<th>Moving</th>
<th>Storing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong></td>
<td><strong>Moving</strong></td>
<td><strong>Storing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Front businesses</td>
<td>• Bulk cash smuggling</td>
<td>• Conflict gems and precious metals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fraudulent charities</td>
<td>• Unregistered informal transfer systems</td>
<td>• Sympathetic banking institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Donations at religious institutions</td>
<td>• Over/under invoicing between front businesses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Drug trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Counterfeit goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fraud (includes ID theft)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External</strong></td>
<td><strong>Moving</strong></td>
<td><strong>Storing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Individual donations</td>
<td>• Wire transfers</td>
<td>• Fake bank accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Donations from charities</td>
<td>• Business transactions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Potential Threat Group(s)

Despite differences in ideology and intended actions, all terrorist and extremists groups must raise money in order to conduct actions. Some groups active in Virginia, such as the white nationalist extremists, black separatists, and single-issue extremists groups appear to be focused mostly on internal fundraising or donations from sympathetic groups and individuals. Internationally linked groups, such as Muslims of America and Hizballah, appear to be raising funds through front businesses in Virginia.

Domestic Incidents - Earning

Front Businesses

Businesses owned by known or suspected terror group members can offer not only a source of income, but can also offer an avenue for laundering funds raised through more lucrative by illicit means. While some terror-linked businesses have intuitive ties with their member base (ethnocentric restaurants, salons, and markets), others focus on potentially high cash flow industries (convenience stores and gas stations). Although the primary concern with front businesses is revenue generation, the Fort Dix plot also highlights the potential scenario of employees in certain industries to leverage normal work tasks as an opportunity to collect information and conduct surveillance. A number of potential front businesses have been investigated throughout Virginia since September 2001. Businesses of interest have included restaurants, convenience stores, and a security firm linked to individuals affiliated with terror or extremist groups.

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(Internal) The suspects, all foreign-born and described as radical Islamists, have been charged with conspiring to attack Fort Dix and kill soldiers. One of the suspects had delivered pizzas to the base from his family's nearby restaurant and claimed he knew the area like the palm of his hand. The suspects also used cell phones to take photos of the base. (Washington Post: Six Charged in Plot to Attack Fort Dix, May 9, 2007).
Fraudulent Charities

Many groups based on shared religious or ethnic identities emphasize charitable giving in the form of tithing, zakat, or a general sense of contributing to the greater good. While the majority of charities in the U.S. are legitimate organizations that operate in compliance with IRS codes granting tax-exempt status, terror groups have been known to either trick existing organizations or establish new ones. Fraudulent charities are similar to front businesses, but are subject to much less scrutiny by state and federal regulators. Current literature reviews of successful prosecutions focus on three charities accused of either raising or laundering funds to further the goals of terror groups. These groups included:

- **Benevolence International Foundation (BIF)**, an Illinois-based Islamic charity, used its tax-exempt status to finance overseas combatants, including the mujahideen in the Afghan-Soviet war and al-Qa’ida. BIF hid these activities from authorities by combining its donations to military operations into legitimate charitable donations.  

- **Holy Land Foundation (HLF)**, a Texas-based tax-exempt Islamic charity, was established with the guise of providing support to the needy in the West Bank and Gaza. An indictment against the group noted HLF transmitted or caused to be transmitted approximately $12,400,000 to various HAMAS controlled zakat committees and organizations.

- **Al Haramain Islamic Foundation**, which was established in Saudi Arabia, obtained a tax-exempt charitable status and established a U.S. headquarters in Oregon. In January 2005, Al Haramain’s U.S. branch and two directors were indicted for illegally moving money out of the U.S., with the intent that the funds be delivered to the Chechen mujahideen.

KindHearts, a Toledo-based Islamic charity, has been identified as the successor to the HLF, and the al-Qa’ida-linked Global Relief Foundation. While charges have not been filed, KindHeart’s assets were frozen by the Treasury Department in February 2006. As a result of such investigations, linkages to several prominent Islamic organizations have been uncovered, including:

- **Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)**, which describes itself as an association of Muslim organizations and individuals in the U.S. and Canada

- **Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)**, which promotes itself as the largest Muslim “civil rights” group in the U.S.

- **North American Islamic Trust (NAIT)**, which describes itself as a Shari’ah complaint trust that serves the ISNA, MSA, and other Islamic institutions that holds the deeds for more than 300 U.S. mosques

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<sup>nnn</sup> (OS) Zakat, one of the Five Pillars of Islam, is the payment of 2.5% of wealth for public alms required by Muslims when their annual wealth exceeds a minimum level.
In a major policy shift, the FBI suspended its relationship with CAIR in October 2008. CAIR and its former chairman, Omar Ahmad, were named as unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation trial; during testimony, CAIR was described as a front group for HAMAS and the Muslim Brotherhood. Evidence emerged showing that the groups’ early leaders were involved in HAMAS-related organizational meetings in the U.S. and in funding activities.

CAIR was also the subject of a November 2008 civil suit filed by former Muslim clients who claim to have paid CAIR thousands of dollars for a promise of U.S. citizenship. The complaint identifies CAIR as a racketeering enterprise under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which is a criminal racketeering statute that allows victims to sue the defendants in civil court. Plaintiffs are seeking damages and injunctive relief to shut down CAIR and to prevent the individual defendants from engaging in future public interest legal work.

Virginia

The HLF is known to have had numerous links to individuals and Islamic organizations in northern Virginia. The leader of the Iqaamatiddeen Movement, an Islamic group with ties to Virginia, has suggested the group obtain charity status to improve its fundraising efforts. The charity status, the leader asserted, would help overcome the reluctance of the Muslim immigrant community to donate to the IM because of potential donor fears of U.S. government scrutiny, and would also encourage donations from foreigners. It is unknown if this status has been granted. Other charitable, fraternal, and student-based organizations have been identified as possible sources of fundraising for terror and extremist groups.

Counterfeit Goods

Intellectual property crime, defined as “counterfeited and pirated goods, manufactured and sold for profit without the consent of the patent or trademark holder” is a growing trend in terrorism financing. According to DHS, over 14,700 seizures of counterfeit goods valued at over $267 million were conducted in the last year. Although much of the current reporting focuses on counterfeit clothing or fashion accessories, the counterfeiting of goods such as brake pads, pharmaceuticals, and medical products can pose serious safety risks to unwitting end users. Currently, there is “mounting evidence of terrorists’ involvement in the lucrative underworld of counterfeiting.” The production and sale of counterfeit goods is a growing trend with a high profit margin, low risk of detection, and low probability of prosecution. In fact, trafficking in counterfeit goods is much lower risk than trafficking in drugs.

Counterfeit goods have become a significant source of financing for some international terrorist groups, and are believed to have funded past terrorists incidents. Although the extent to which

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oooo (OS) A phonebook seized in 2004 from the Virginia home of unindicted co-conspirator and Palestine Committee member Ismail Elbarris listed the names of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood's leadership (NEFA Foundation: U.S. vs. Holy Land Foundation- 1992 Phone Directory).

oooo (LES) FBI IIR 4 201 2358 06
the sale of fake goods by terrorist associates in the U.S. are supporting the central organizations, funding has been provided to Middle Eastern criminal enterprises,\textsuperscript{262} as well as overseas terrorist entities, including Hizballah\textsuperscript{ppp} and Jama’at al Fuqra (Muslims of America).\textsuperscript{263} The link between terrorism and the sale of counterfeit merchandise in the U.S. came in 1996 when the FBI confiscated 100,000 counterfeit Nike T-shirts bearing a fake “swoosh” and Olympic logo.\textsuperscript{264} This counterfeiting ring was tentatively linked to supporters of Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman who is now serving life in prison for his involvement in a 1995 plot to bomb New York City landmarks.

**Virginia**

Counterfeit goods continue to be an issue in Virginia; U.S. Customs and Border Protection announced the seizure of over 19,000 articles of counterfeit clothing from a container received at Norfolk International Terminals on January 29, 2009. The 40-foot container, which arrived on a ship from Egypt, contained fake NBA and NCAA clothing and 8,100 pairs of fake L.E.I jeans with a manufacturer’s suggested retail price of $331,105.\textsuperscript{265}

In the past few years, a number of special task forces have been developed to confront the problem of counterfeit goods in Virginia. While many investigations of this crime are ongoing, a significant, multi-state counterfeit goods ring tied to Muslims of America was successfully prosecuted in 2007.\textsuperscript{266} Eight individuals were arrested for selling counterfeit clothes, music, and shoes in Virginia and New York. Several of the Virginia subjects resided in or had close ties to the Muslims of America compounds.

**Fraud**

According to a 2004 FBI report, Detroit area criminal enterprises that raise money for Hizballah are engaged in a wide range of offenses, including credit card fraud, bank fraud, mail fraud, mortgage fraud, wire fraud, and bankruptcy fraud.\textsuperscript{267} In addition to fraudulent activities targeting institutions and financial processes, terrorists and extremists can reap financial benefit from the theft of data concerning individuals.\textsuperscript{268} The utilization of fraud by terrorist entities is demonstrated by al-Qa’ida in its training manual which provides instruction on forged documents.\textsuperscript{269} The manual instructs trainees to adopt false personas and to conceal their identities using false identity cards and passports.

**Identity Theft**

Identity theft provides a number of important benefits to terror and extremist groups. Not only is it a profitable crime with low risk of arrest, but it also affords the perpetrator a false persona with which to conduct suspicious activity, whereby utilizing the stolen identities to avoid watch lists and to gain unauthorized access to U.S. entry ports or other sensitive facilities. According to the FBI’s

\textsuperscript{ppp} (OS) Hizballah-linked ring in Dearborn, Michigan was involved in cigarette smuggling and the sale of counterfeit goods, including Zig Zag rolling papers and Viagra—a high demand and easily transportable item. The profits were allegedly sent to Hizballah in Lebanon (\textit{U.S. Department of Justice: Nineteen Charged with Racketeering to Support Terrorist Organization}, March 29, 2006).
Terrorism Financial Review Group, identities are often stolen to facilitate crimes such as bank fraud, credit card fraud, wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and cyber-crimes. Identity fraud constitutes a violation of federal code, which lists eight kinds of prohibited activity, including: producing identity documents without legal authority, transferring stolen or forged identity documents, possessing such documents, or trafficking in false authentication features or false identity documents. While these crimes can generate income, they also afford terrorists an opportunity to evade identification while traveling, conducting business, or accessing potential target facilities. There is also a federal statute for aggravated identity theft that covers acts of identity fraud that occur in relation to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries.

Virginia

In Virginia, past reporting indicates that members of Muslims of America have engaged in identity fraud to raise money. Available information suggests that female members have committed insurance and benefits fraud through the use of fictitious names for themselves and their children.

Medicare Fraud

January 2009 reporting from the FBI highlights a number of incidents involving Medicare Part D fraud. Medicare Part D, a federal program to subsidize the cost of prescription medications, is an increasingly attractive target for health care fraud perpetrators due to its size and complexity, which makes fraud detection difficult. A July 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office indicated that oversight of Part D providers has been limited, and the extent to which providers have implemented fraud and abuse prevention programs is largely unknown. In 2007 Medicare Part D enrolled more than 25 million beneficiaries and processed over one billion drug claims with $50 billion in expenditures. According the FBI, an individual in Newport News, Virginia, had completed 52 falsified enrollment forms on 35 Medicare beneficiaries for a Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug Plan as of July 2008. While it is important to note that this bulletin did not highlight any current linkages to terrorism financing, the history of benefits fraud by terrorism-linked individuals in Virginia employed in the healthcare field enhances the likelihood that this activity could emerge in Virginia.

Bank Fraud

While a number of crimes are considered bank fraud under federal law, each of these offenses are undertaken to defraud financial institutions. Financial institutions are required by the Bank Secrecy Act to develop a compliance program for identifying and reporting of suspicious transactions. A Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) is required for certain types of activities or transactional thresholds; if an activity does not meet these automatic criteria then the bank must conduct additional examinations to determine if the dealings reflect illicit activities or legitimate business. Examples of suspicious conduct or transactions that warrant a SAR filing include:
• Activity inconsistent with the customer’s business: patterns of bank transactions are dramatically different from those of similar businesses in the same general area
• Avoiding the reporting or record keeping requirement
• Unexplained or excessive fund or wire transfers
• Insufficient or suspicious information provided by the customer
• Bank employee activities: lavish lifestyle inconsistent with the employee’s salary; failure to conform with recognized systems and controls
• Bank-to-bank transactions

Currently credit card fraud is one of the most lucrative and potentially the most widespread types of fraud employed. Indian authorities have recovered $1,200 and several credit cards from a backpack carried by one of the Mumbai terrorists. The presence of the cards, issued by Citibank, HSBC, ICICI Bank, Axis Bank, HDFC Bank, and State Bank of Mauritius, might signal that credit card fraud helped fund the terror attacks. The Millennium Plot terrorists also allegedly committed credit card fraud and planned to buy a gas station in order to steal customer account numbers.279 Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, linked to an alleged September 11 financier, was arrested with a laptop computer that had 1,000 stolen [credit card numbers] on it, along with a host of Internet bookmarks pointing to fraud and fake ID-related sites.281

Virginia

The Virginia Fusion Center has not received credible Virginia-based reporting on this trend, although a few reports have been received from concerned citizens.

Mortgage Fraud

Mortgage fraud is one of the fastest growing financial crimes; the continued decline in the housing market has contributed to the rise of mortgage fraud. Just as organized crime groups have historically utilized economic crimes to generate operational funds, terrorist groups have also employed these techniques. According to the San Diego Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center, past incidents of housing fraud have had suspected ties to terrorism.282

There are two types of mortgage fraud, fraud for property and fraud for profit. While fraud for property is usually committed by individuals purchasing homes for themselves, fraud for profit is typically committed by a group of knowledgeable insiders, such as mortgage brokers, real estate agents, property appraisers, or settlement agents.283 Activities related to fraud for profit include appraisal fraud, fraudulent flippingqqq, straw buyersrrr, and identity theft.

Foreclosure rates have steadily increased in the past few years. In the first quarter of 2008, there was a 112% increase in foreclosure rates in the U.S. compared to the first quarter of 2007.

qqq (OS) Property flipping is the buying and selling of the same property within a short period of time in order to make a quick profit. This activity is illegal when the property is falsely appraised at a much higher value.
rrr (OS) A straw buyer is an individual who buys a property for another person, with the purpose of concealing the identity of that true buyer.
Virginia's foreclosure rate in November was 121% higher than the same period in 2007, with one in every 567 Virginia households receiving a foreclosure filing. According to December 2008 RealtyTrac data, Virginia ranked 11th in the U.S. for foreclosures. Foreclosure rates will likely continue at least at their current pace, and mortgage fraud is expected to continue and increase in frequency.

Several cases of mortgage fraud have involved potential individuals suspected of funding terror activities. The following are examples of suspected terrorists and their supporters being charged with non-terror related charges in order to have them prosecuted:

- Tarik Hamdi, a naturalized U.S. citizen living in northern Virginia, emigrated from Iraq. In 2005, he was charged with immigration and mortgage loan fraud for omissions on his naturalization papers and mortgage loan applications. Hamdi is believed to have delivered a satellite phone battery to Usama bin Ladin while in Afghanistan in May 1998, which was used in connection with the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

- Nemr Ali Rahal and his wife, Rania Fawaz Rahal, pleaded guilty in 2006 to bank fraud and credit fraud. The couple had obtained over $500,000 from banks through mortgage fraud and credit fraud schemes in Michigan; suspicions of funding terrorism arose when investigators discovered footage of Nemr Rahal at a Hizballah rally and $600 in change in buckets that were collected for children of suicide bombers.

- Same Hammond, indicted for conspiracy, racketeering, and providing material aid to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 2005, was later acquitted of the terror-related charges. He and his wife, Nadia Ibrahim Hammond, were found guilty in a separate trial of federal tax, immigration, and mortgage fraud charges.

- In 2006, the FBI arrested a group of California-based individuals involved in a mortgage fraud scheme. The investigation expanded in an attempt to determine if the group’s criminal activities funded terrorism through a conspirator’s brother, who was being investigated for suspected ties to al-Qa‘ida.

As of January 2008, several U.S. businesses and key figures were identified in a mortgage fraud conspiracy in Northern Virginia. One company allegedly had ties to the Korean mafia, while another promised U.S. visa sponsorship in exchange for employment. The ringleader, who appeared to be running a human smuggling operation as well as a mortgage fraud ring, was allegedly related to members of the Pakistani government and military with strong links to terrorism.

Organized Retail Theft

Organized retail theft (ORT), linked to money laundering and financing of terrorism, targets everyday household commodities and consumer items. ORT affects a variety of retail industries
including supermarkets, chain drug stores, independent pharmacies, mass merchandisers, convenience stores, and discount businesses. Products targeted include infant formula, cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, health and beauty aids, diabetes test strips, over-the-counter medications, and colognes and perfumes.\textsuperscript{294} Retail theft is attractive as a high-profit, low-risk method to generate funds for criminal organizations and international terrorist groups in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{295}

ORT rings operate in almost every region of the U.S.; several of these rings are led by foreign nationals that employ boosters and fences.\textsuperscript{296} The professional shoplifters, or boosters, steal merchandise through organized shoplifting, armed robbery, cargo theft, and hijackings.\textsuperscript{297} Fences purchase the stolen merchandise and sell it back to retail outlets. Fences, who are generally immigrants from various Middle Eastern and East Asian countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Pakistan, own businesses such as convenience and grocery stores, gas stations, travel agencies, used car dealerships, shipping companies, book keeping firms, and nightclubs.\textsuperscript{298} While the main activity of this group focuses on the theft and resale of stolen merchandise, members also engage in a number of side activities that include narcotics trafficking, prostitution, extortion, alien smuggling, organized auto theft, currency smuggling, credit fraud, bank fraud, and welfare fraud. Proceeds from the aforementioned illegal businesses are frequently used in financing terror-related activities.\textsuperscript{299}

Virginia

Only a few jurisdictions in Virginia have reported instances of organized retail theft.\textsuperscript{300} Additional research is underway to determine if these instances are linked to possible terrorist activity. It is still unclear if this trend may not be fully reported or understood as a potential indicator of terrorism financing.

Cigarette Smuggling

Cigarette smuggling has been used to raise funds for terrorist groups from within the U.S. In these schemes, smugglers purchase large volumes of cigarettes in states that have low tax rates, such as Virginia and North Carolina, and resell them below market prices in states with high cigarette taxes. As these sales occur outside of the legal markets and avoid taxes, the cigarettes are sold at profit despite the lower final cost to the buyer. In addition to concerns regarding the smuggling of authentic U.S. cigarettes from southern to northern states is the emergence of counterfeit cigarettes from China. Two recently prosecuted cases include:

- New York, 2008 – a smuggling operation led by a Jordanian national involving counterfeit tax stamps and Chinese-made counterfeit cigarettes\textsuperscript{301}
- New Jersey, 2007 – a diversion operation operated by individuals of Chinese descent reselling large quantities of tax-free cigarettes purchased from Native American reservations.\textsuperscript{302}
In 2004, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) had more than 300 open cases of illegal cigarette trafficking, with several linked to terrorist fundraising. Michael Bouchard of the ATF advised, “The deeper we dig into these cases, the more ties to terrorism we're discovering.”

**Virginia**

The Virginia Fusion Center has received notification of several traffic stops involving subjects with large numbers of cigarette cartons suspected of smuggling, but has not received confirmation that these subjects were linked to terrorism fundraising activities. Little Virginia-based information has been obtained regarding suspected thefts or suspicious purchases. It is unclear if this lack of reporting indicates a lack of notification or a lack of actual incidents.

**Domestic Incidents – Moving**

**Bulk Cash Smuggling**

In the U.S., bulk cash smuggling serves as a money laundering and terrorism financing technique to bypass financial transparency reporting requirements. Bulk cash smuggling is an attractive financing mechanism because U.S. dollars are accepted as an international currency and smuggling affords the terrorist control of the money throughout the whole process of movement. Bulk cash smuggling also avoids the creation of a paper trail and the potential reporting of suspicious activity reports. This technique also poses a number of well-documented risks, including the costs of using couriers and the risk of theft, as well as the risk of informants or losses due to border searches that could compromise the group or mission.

Smuggled currency is often concealed in personal effects, secreted in shipping containers, or transported in bulk via vehicle, vessel, or aircraft. According to the FBI, some of the 19 September 11 hijackers allegedly used bulk cash as another method to transfer funds. According to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a special investigation of outbound-currency operation between October 1, 2001 and August 8, 2003, seized more than $28 million in bulk cash. ICE officials noted, however, that they were unable to determine the number and the extent to which these cases involved terrorist financing. The Intelligence Community has assessed that a number of international terrorist groups are involved in bulk cash smuggling, including al-Qaeda, Hizballah, and HAMAS.

**Virginia**

The Virginia Fusion Center has received limited reporting on bulk cash smuggling, but continues to receive reporting regarding female members of Muslims of America acting as cash couriers during visits to Pakistan. These members generally carry less than $10,000 to avoid reporting requirements. It is likely that international terrorist groups with ties to Virginia may already be using

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*superscript* (OS) Financial transparency reporting requires Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports, which obligates the filer to declare if he or she is transporting across the border $10,000 or more in cash or monetary instruments.
cash couriers due to legislation overseas aimed at curbing terrorist financing through the banking system and money laundering schemes.

**Stored Value Cards**

Prepaid cards, also known as stored value cards, have grown into a $63.4 billion business.\(^{307}\) Currently, two types of stored value cards exist, closed-system and open-system cards. While closed-system cards can only be used by the issuing retailer, open-system cards can be used almost anywhere, including at ATMs around the world. Since open-system cards enjoy ATM privileges but are not linked to personal bank accounts, they represent an avenue to launder money easily.\(^{308}\) Due to their portability and the fact they can change hands a dozen times in one day without leaving a trace, stored value cards eliminate intermediaries such as financial institutions, allowing for virtually undetected global movement of funds.\(^{309}\)

Although law enforcement officials have not yet prosecuted many cases involving stored value cards, officials have noted new trends in illicit money transfers. One instance involving stored value cards involved a Mexican criminal caught at the border transferring funds from stolen credit cards onto prepaid cards. Stored value cards also appear to be reducing the number of suspicious wire transfers sending money from the U.S. that can be monitored.\(^{310}\) Stored value cards also allow criminals to avoid detection by law enforcement through ‘smurfing’, or breaking down large amounts of cash into smaller sums by loading them onto many different cards rather than making suspicious bank deposits. It is also important to note that stored value cards are easier to smuggle across the border than bulk cash, as they are easier to hide and few screeners have the capacity to determine the actual value stored on each card.

**Virginia**

The Virginia Fusion Center has received very limited reporting from law enforcement officers who have found large numbers of stored value cards during traffic stops and other encounters. None of the cases reported have been linked to terrorism financing activities at this time.

**Trade-based money laundering**

The federal government defines trade-based money laundering as the “use of trade to legitimize, conceal, transfer, and convert large quantities of illicit cash into less conspicuous assets such as gold or diamonds.”\(^{311}\) These assets are then transferred worldwide without being subject to bank secrecy laws. False invoicing\(^{312}\), another type of trade-based money laundering, is a simple way of moving money across borders sometimes used by hawala operators to balance books or move assets. The discovery of a second set of books at businesses with potential terror or extremist linkages may be indicative of this trend. Despite research on the possibility that terrorists may be

\(^{312}\) An example of false invoicing is the shipment of goods valued at $100,000, but invoiced for $150,000. The subsequent payment of $150,000 will allow the movement of $50,000 to cross borders illicitly and without scrutiny.
using trade-based money laundering to move assets, few estimates of the scope and value of such techniques have been released.

Virginia

The Virginia Fusion Center has received very limited reporting from law enforcement agencies regarding trade-based money laundering. Most reporting is derived from large-scale investigations that have occurred out of state. It is unclear if this lack of reported incidents in Virginia is due to the absence of this phenomenon or the difficulty of detection.

Hawalas

Terrorist organizations are known to have used a type of informal banking system, known as hawala, to move assets (See Table 6). Informal banking systems are mechanisms in which money is received for making it, or an equivalent value, payable to a third party in another location. Such transfers generally take place outside the conventional banking system through nonbank money services businesses or other business entities, often unregulated and undocumented, who conduct such transactions as a secondary business activity. These systems are based on trust and the extensive family or regional networks, and are traditionally used by expatriates such as traders or immigrant laborers to send money to or from countries lacking secure banking systems.\(^{uuu}\)

While the majority of informal banking systems’ activity may be legitimate in purpose, according to FinCEN, hawalas have facilitated the financing of terrorism.\(^{312}\) According to the FBI, some of the September 11 hijackers allegedly transferred thousands of dollars via hawalas in and out of the U.S. prior to their attacks. One example of this activity was the utilization of the Al Barakaat informal banking system, founded with a significant investment from Usama bin Laden, to move several million dollars a year for al Qa’ida.\(^{313}\) Somalis working in the U.S. also used the Al Barakaat informal banking network to send money to their families in Somalia.\(^{vvv}\)

\(^{uuu}\) (OS) U.S. and international law enforcement officials, as well as academic researchers, have identified a variety of ethnically-based informal banking systems that originated in China, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Somalia. Officials and researchers note that these informal banking systems generally predate formal banks, and that some groups may consider them more familiar and trustworthy than formal banks (U.S. General Accounting Office: Terrorist Financing- U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms, November 2003).

\(^{vvv}\) (OS) According to DOJ, Al Barakaat operated a hybrid hawala in which its informal system interconnected with the formal banking system. Because Al Barakaat also used financial institutions, law enforcement was able to discover the transactions to Somalia by analyzing Suspicious Activity Reports generated by the banks.
Table 6: Diagram of Hawala Operations

STEP 1. A person in Country A would like to send money to a recipient in Country B. The person in Country A contacts a hawaladar, a hawala operator, in Country A and gives the operator money and instructions to deliver the equivalent value to the recipient in Country B.

STEP 2. The hawaladar in Country A contacts the counterpart hawaladar in Country B via fax, e-mail, telephone, or other method and communicates the instructions.

STEP 3. The hawaladar in Country B then contacts the recipient in Country B and, through verification by some code passed from the person in Country A to the recipient in Country B, delivers the equivalent value (in foreign currency or some commodity), less a transaction fee, to the recipient in Country B.

STEP 4. Over time, the accounts between the two hawaladars may become unbalanced and must be settled in some manner. Hawaladars use a variety of methods to settle their accounts, including reciprocal payments to customers, physical movement of money, wire transfer or check, payment for goods to be traded, trade or smuggling of precious stones or metals such as gold and diamonds, and invoice manipulation.
Virginia

Although the Virginia Fusion Center has not received recent information regarding hawalas or other informal banking systems in Virginia, several individuals have been arrested for such activities. At least two individuals operated hawalas in Herndon that sent money from Virginia residents to subjects in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. In September 2005, one individual was sentenced for operating a money services business without a Virginia license after receiving at least $4.9 million dollars for overseas transfers. Another individual, also from Herndon, continued to operate a money transmission business in Virginia after the Virginia Bureau of Financial Institutions denied his company’s application. Subsequent prosecution showed that he sent at least $6 million to Pakistan and other areas.

Mobile Phones

Prepaid cellular phones may be exploited by criminal or terrorist entities for money transfers or mobile payments (m-payments). M-payment transfers are replacing the use of traditional banks and money service businesses in some population segments. These transfers allow criminals and terrorists to avoid the risk of physical cash movement, bypass financial transparency reporting requirements, and efficiently send digital value in the form of stored value cards (SVC) or mobile payment credits nationwide and globally. As SVCs do not qualify as “monetary instruments,” criminal entities are able to launder money internationally. Criminals with moderate technological sophistication have laundered money through conversion to gift cards and then sold the cards over the Internet for slightly less than the card value. Some reporting has also indicated the utilization of SVCs to make bulk purchases of prepaid cellular telephones.

The following highlights how m-payments work and how money can be moved via cellular phones:

- A stored value card or prepaid debit card and prepaid cell phone is purchased
- The individual, using a free anonymous email account, then registers the prepaid cell phone number and the amount on the stored value or prepaid debit card with the m-payment provider.
- The individual can now log on via cell phone and give the number of the mobile phones to which the funds are to be transferred.
- The m-payment service provider then sends a text message to the receiver’s phone for information on the destination of the money.
- The recipient now has the option to transfer the money to another stored value card or a prepaid debit card and withdraw the funds from an ATM.
Both parties can now throw away the cell phones and the stored value cards and begin another transaction without detection.

Although m-payment service providers in the U.S. are considered money service businesses and are required to register with the government, a majority fail to comply with the registration requirements. A lack of safeguards against the abuse of m-payments, coupled with existing security features and a lack of physical evidence for m-payments, suggests law enforcement will encounter difficulties when attempting to detect or investigate suspect transactions. Further complicating investigative efforts is the potential for anonymity through the use of false identification information.

PayPal, an Internet payment service, is also being used by extremist and criminal entities to facilitate money-laundering activities. Although PayPal is often overlooked as a money laundering instrument, due to the perception that it is only used for making Internet purchases, it not only allows individuals to make payments, but also to transfer funds. The introduction of “PayPal Mobile” allows a user to link their cell phone to their PayPal account, thus allowing them to transfer funds via PayPal Mobile.

Intelligence Gaps

1. Which groups currently active in Virginia are experiencing the most success in generating funds within the Commonwealth? Is this due to loyalty to the group or is it reflective of innovation?

2. What impact, if any, is the current economic situation having on the overall success of raising, concealing, or transferring funds from Virginia?

3. To what extent are low-tech measures, such as bulk cash smuggling, cash couriers, and hawalas being used by international groups?

4. To what extent are technologically sophisticated measures, including internet and mobile phone technology being used in Virginia at this time?

5. What is the prevalence of terrorism-linked mortgage fraud in Virginia?

6. Are any Virginia-based charities currently providing financial support to terrorist entities, either intentionally or unintentionally? (Possible examples of unintentional support include partnerships with local chapters of the American Red Cross, community-based foundations, or interfaith organizations.)

7. Did any Virginia-linked individuals or groups donate to InterPal via the Facebook link that was established in response to the January 2009 conflict in Gaza? Were donations collected at anti-Israel rallies in Virginia diverted to operational funding for HAMAS?

8. How much, if any, Medicaid Part D or other benefits fraud schemes in Virginia are benefitting terrorist or extremist groups?
Projections

The need for financial resources is a common denominator for almost every organized extremist group. While smaller movements without aspirations for a physical attack may have modest needs supported through member contributions, larger, more complicated groups can require significant funding. The following projections are specific for Virginia, but include regional, national, and international data.

**Frequency** – Likely to Increase – Groups with aspirations of conducting attacks may need to conduct fundraising activities more frequently in order to achieve their goals due to current economic conditions. The increased media attention of global conflicts in areas of interest to international groups may also provide additional venues for collection (as in recent rallies protesting Israel’s actions in Gaza).

**Volume** – Likely to Increase – Just as the frequency of fundraising activity will likely increase in order to fulfill fundraising goals, criminal extremists may engage in larger efforts to achieve the same ends.

**Geographic extent** – Remain Constant – It is likely that most groups will engage in activities in familiar areas to reduce the risk of discovery; however, many of the groups in Virginia would consider taking additional risks if the potential financial margins could be attained

**Sophistication** – Likely to Increase – Technological advances that offer anonymity may offer terrorist groups low risk methods of earning and moving monetary instruments at a lower risk than ever before. Processes such as m-payments can help skirt SAR reporting, while schemes involving benefit and mortgage fraud will continue to evolve new methods for evading detection.

Also somewhat likely to increase is the creation and trafficking of counterfeit goods, as current economic conditions may tempt more consumers to purchase known knockoffs. It is also important to note that the past trend of cigarette smuggling from the Commonwealth may be impacted by legislative efforts to raise taxes.
**Terrorism Tradecraft**

Terrorism tradecraft identifies the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures used by terrorist and extremists to plan, prepare, and carry out attacks. The table below shows a simplified model of the terrorist attack cycle and the observable indicators that can be used by law enforcement to detect and disrupt plots.

**Table 7: Terrorist Attack Cycle and Interdiction Opportunities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Planning &amp; Target Acquisition</th>
<th>Pre-Operational Surveillance</th>
<th>Supply Acquisition</th>
<th>Operational Rehearsal</th>
<th>Terrorist Attack</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Surveillance</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Collecting and recording information by drawing diagrams, taking notes, photographing or videotaping targets</td>
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<td><strong>Elicitation</strong></td>
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<td>Gathering assessment information through casual or professional conversation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social Engineering</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conning legitimate system users into providing information that helps a hacker access to a computer system</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Decision to conduct an attack and develop list of ideal targets</strong></td>
<td>Collect security and vulnerability data on target through direct observation, Internet research, and elicitation attempts.</td>
<td>Purchase, steal, or obtain necessary tools and weapons needed to exploit vulnerabilities found during detailed surveillance efforts.</td>
<td>Prepare for final attack by conducting practice runs with required materials or mapping routes to detect possible problems in attack.</td>
<td>Conduct the actual physical, cyber, or blended attack against selected target.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Physical</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Attacking people and facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cyber</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Attacking computer assets</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Blended</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Attacking both computer and physical assets to amplify damage</td>
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</table>

**Easiest to detect and disrupt attack plans**

Possible to detect and disrupt attack plans

Response mode only
While the duration and complexity of the attack planning cycle is often linked to the sophistication of the group, most plots involve the key elements of each phase. While analysis of ideological motivations and historical analysis of attacks is useful, the key to detecting and disrupting attack planning efforts is the recognition of observable behaviors. The techniques, tactics, and procedures that represent terrorism tradecraft generally fall into one of the following categories:

- clandestine communications procedures,
- comprehensive information collection techniques,
- surreptitious supply acquisition methods, and
- effective deployment of personnel and weaponry

Although the focus of effort shifts as the terrorist attack cycle progresses, communications, information collection, supply acquisition, and effective deployment concerns influence decision making in each of the phases described below.

**Initial Planning & Target Acquisition**

Once the decision to conduct an attack is made, key individuals begin to define the scope of the attack by identifying and collecting data on a number of desirable targets. The depth and detail of the research varies with the group and the type of target selected. Targets meeting the objectives of the group and which appear to have sufficient vulnerabilities are further scrutinized by the key planning personnel. Planners can also engage in "electronic scouting" which makes use of search engines to obtain pictures, maps, histories and sometimes even satellite or street-level images of their targets. In most cases, open source research is supplemented by preliminary surveillance efforts in order to determine the most appropriate target.321

**Pre-Operational Surveillance**

In the Pre-Operational Surveillance phase, details involving personnel, attack tactics, and incident timing are determined. Plotters must conduct additional surveillance, initiate logistic support, and assemble the attack team in order to make these decisions. These activities involve observable behaviors that increase the likelihood of detection.322 In addition to detailed surveillance efforts, information collection efforts may include elicitation of information by cell members posing as tourists or customers, as well as potential infiltration or even intrusion attempts.323

**Supply Acquisition**

During the Supply Acquisition phase, communication in the form of phone calls or Internet traffic increases, as does the movement of group funds and members. The acquisition of supplies can include weapons or weapons components, ranging from firearms and explosives to precursor chemicals, biological agents, or radiological materials. In addition to weapons, however, supplies such as credentials, uniforms, or vehicles that enable access to secure facilities can be acquired through theft or forgery.
Operational Rehearsal

Rehearsals of the attack may be conducted in order to improve the odds of success and to develop contingencies. Dry runs may involve both cell members, as well as unwitting bystanders, to test target reactions as well as test security measures. Typical rehearsal actions include deployment to target area, preliminary equipment, or weapons performance, and escape routes. Tests in the target area may be conducted to confirm information from earlier surveillance efforts in order to detect any physical or procedural changes. One of the primary benefits of conducting a dry run is the opportunity to expose the strengths and weaknesses in an attack plan, allowing for adaptation of initial planning efforts.324

Terrorist Attack

In the deployment stage, the attackers will leave their safe houses to collect and assemble any weapons and improvised explosive devices and form assault teams. If counterterrorism and law enforcement personnel have not stopped them by this point, the terrorists will conduct the attack with little chance of disruption by law enforcement.325 Members of an attack cell will likely still carry out their plan at this point, even if part of the attack cell has been interdicted. In the December 2004 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Saudi intelligence and anti-terrorism forces disrupted one of two attack cells. Not only did the second group still attack the target, but it also appeared they might have been unaware that their colleagues had been apprehended.326

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Terrorist groups, especially international groups and movements, continue to research new methods for attacking targets of interest, and have shown innovation in response to countermeasures. Among the predominant tactics, techniques, and procedures employed in attacks are:

- Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) can create mass confusion and fear as well as generate highly destructive forces.327
- Radio-controlled model aircraft (RCMA) equipped with explosives continue to generate interest. The toy and hobby industries provide an array of relatively inexpensive RCMA that terrorists could adapt, but DHS and the FBI have no current, credible intelligence indicating terrorist intent to use this delivery tactic in the U.S.328
- Impersonation or cloned vehicles, including vehicles camouflaged with corporate or charitable logos or emergency response markings and equipment that provide the appearance of having legitimate access to restricted areas, provide an opportunity to conduct surveillance or launch an attack.329
- Multipronged attacks utilizing low tech, small arms weaponry represent the most likely means of attack by homegrown extremists, as they may not have the expertise to create or stockpile the materials for an IED or VBIED.330
Suicide bombing is used often overseas; while possible in the U.S., it is important to note that traditional suicide bombings by terrorist groups are not a solitary endeavor, but require extensive support systems. If this tactic were to be employed in the U.S., it would most likely be used by a lone wolf perpetrator.  

Key figures in the terrorist group involved in the coordinated shooting attacks in Mumbai, India in November 2008 were equipped with BlackBerry devices enabling them to monitor news even after the authorities turned off power. The availability of news updates from live TV streams and micro-blogging Internet sites like Twitter is thought to have given the hostage takers an advantage. Some of these updates were coming from individuals located where the events were taking place.

**Potential Threat Group(s)**

Despite differences in ideology and intended actions, all terrorist and extremist groups consider conducting attacks in furtherance of their goals. In Virginia, domestic movements such as anarchists and environmental or animal rights extremist groups show the greatest innovation. Recent activity involving the group Anonymous has been the subject of several VFC reports. Characterized as loosely affiliated cells of activists, Anonymous communicates via Internet message boards and networking websites. The group also uses forums in which they target individuals by engaging in cyber attacks and has been affiliated with white powder incidents.

**Domestic Incidents**

Potential surveillance activity around critical infrastructure facilities and assets are reported across the U.S. on a daily basis. While many reports tend to focus on suspicious activity around ports, bridges, and refineries, most incidents involve photography and videotaping incidents from vehicles in publicly accessible areas. Although many of these instances are ultimately determined to be innocuous, it is important to note that a significant number cannot be investigated due to a lack of identifying information. Actual surveillance efforts can be disguised as tourist-related photography or efforts to test settings on equipment.

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*(OS) Al-Qa’ida affiliate Dhiren Barot planned to attack a number of financial industry targets in the U.S. while also planning to use limousines packed with explosives in the underground parking lots of London hotels and train stations. Barot and his associates had also discussed using a radioactive dirty bomb in planned attacks (Associated Press: British Terror Plotter Gets Life in Prison, November 7, 2006).*
Virginia

No credible, current intelligence exists that indicates individuals are utilizing websites on the Internet for pre-operational surveillance on Virginia targets. However, the Internet has allowed operatives to search seemingly benign websites for crucial information that when presented alone is of no risk, but when coupled with other information can provide abundant information on possible targets. Numerous sites exist that could provide information for use in future attacks on critical infrastructure or that could pose significant vulnerabilities for law enforcement and homeland security personnel and/or operations.xxx

Incidents regarding possible surveillance activities remain the primary terrorism tradecraft related reports received by the Virginia Fusion Center.333 Although the bulk of reporting is received from Hampton Roads area bridges and tunnels, incidents involving military facilities or assets and airports are also noted. Incidents of potential note include:

- Suspicious photography of military aircraft/airfield in Norfolk334
- Possible incident of impersonation in which an individual attempted to purchase military vehicle decal to allow entry onto a military base without being stopped and inquired about retired military bumper stickers in Hampton.335
- Possible Surveillance incidence in which Ishmael Elbarassse was arrested in Maryland after being reported for videotaping the Chesapeake Bay Bridge Tunnel in August 2004.336 Elbarasse, a resident of Annandale, Virginia, has been listed as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation trial as well as a co-conspirator in an indictment of Muhammad Sala, Abdelhaleem Ashqar and Mousa Abu Marzook.337
- Possible Security Probe in which an unidentified male approached a lobby receptionist of a Fairfax corporation with numerous government and public safety contracts claiming to be a Verizon technician. The subject stated he required access to communication closets, then proceeded to ask questions about the company’s network and communications infrastructure. The company’s Network Operations Group was contacted to determine if there were scheduled visits. The subject failed to produce a Verizon company badge and work order when requested and departed the facility.338

xxx (LES) Some examples include: Virginia Places: This is an extensive website that features links to critical infrastructure throughout Virginia; Flikr: A photo-sharing website that has images of critical infrastructure throughout Virginia, including images of the naval bases and bridges. This site could also be used to exchange high quality photos with other individuals; and The Google Earth Community Forum: This forum allows individuals to discuss images from Google Earth. The forums include military installations, transportation infrastructure, and other important infrastructure in Virginia. (VFC Intelligence Bulletin 07-55: Potential Use of Websites Containing Virginia Information as a Tool for Pre-Operational Surveillance, July 17, 2007)
Suspicious Activity reporting received via the Terrorism Hotline regarding suspicious activity by 15 occupants of an Alexandria apartment complex. According to the complainant, one of the occupants receives regular suspicious UPS shipments of a heavy box and that the occupants have been observed with many laptop computers and long sheets of paper, which might be blueprints.\textsuperscript{339}

Possible Security Probe reported by an employee of the Marine Container Terminal Facility in Portsmouth; the employee noted that two males approached him and asked to come inside and look around. The subjects were told they could not come inside the facility at which point they left the area.\textsuperscript{340}

Other reported incidents that match possible terrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures include the loss or theft of public safety or private security credentials, uniforms, or vehicles. The loss or theft of other goods such as explosives used in excavation operations, tanker trucks carrying fuels, and shipments of missing chemicals which can be used to create large impact weapons have also occurred in Virginia in 2007.\textsuperscript{341} Although no linkages have been found to any of these instances to date, the potential acquisition of such materials could be a component of a cell’s attack plan.

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. Are there subjects in Virginia with the knowledge, skills or ability to carry out terrorist attacks in the Commonwealth?
2. What new technologies could be used to enhance terrorist operational capabilities?
3. Should another international terrorist attack occur in the U.S., what are the most likely methods of attack?
4. What are the recent terrorism tradecraft trends in domestic terrorist operations? How are they causing damage and what are they targeting?
5. What are the most likely mechanisms international, domestic, or homegrown terrorist groups or cells might use to train for a terrorist attack?
6. Are there individuals in Virginia that have participated in the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Kosovo and other areas that may have received terrorist training?
7. Do individuals in Virginia who have been associated with Islamic extremism have access or have expressed an interest in procuring materials that could be used in targeting the U.S. or U.S. interests? What measures are in place with private entities to report this information to law enforcement in Virginia?
8. Have individuals identified with ties to terrorism attempted to conduct surveillance on any key facilities in Virginia, including tourist attractions, financial centers, large public attractions, mass transportation or airport facilities?
Projections

Virginia law enforcement will continue to encounter individuals that are possibly conducting initial target planning and secondary pre-operational surveillance. Barring increased media attention or specific intelligence community warnings, it is unlikely that Virginia will see a significant change in reporting regarding the frequency, volume, geographic extent, or sophistication of potential terrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures. Unless the individuals conducting the surveillance are identified by field personnel, it will not be possible to assess possible connections to terrorist activities. Even then, surveillance-like activities can often be veiled as curious tourists taking pictures of unusual critical infrastructure or unique sights, such as U.S. Naval warships docked in Newport News. Virginia law enforcement must also be ready to respond quickly to calls regarding suspicious surveillance due to the potential deterrence effect created by the subject’s risk of identification or confrontation. Such efforts can help identify and interdict groups attempting to move beyond the pre-operational phase.
Terrorist Use of Technology

The extremist use of technology trend includes the development or exploitation of systems, applications, or devices to further the objectives of the cell or group. Exploited technology is being used to connect and influence people (prospects, members, and enemies) and to acquire and manage logistics (funding, supplies, and equipment). Increased connectivity and interactive applications allow international and domestic groups to communicate with each other anonymously with little risk of detection. Technological assets, namely the Internet, allow a medium for connectivity for extremist organizations to recruit supporters from a range of geographic locations. These assets have also been an effective means by which to disseminate propaganda, radical inspiration, training materials, and to facilitate terrorist operations.\textsuperscript{yyy} These networks have also exploited devices such as cellular phones to generate or move funds or assets on behalf of the group.

Intelligence has shown that terrorist and criminal groups will weigh potential gains against costs in operational capabilities when choosing to adopt, develop, or exchange new technologies. In an effort to advance their technological resources, terrorist organizations are increasingly focusing on recruiting individuals with technological skills.\textsuperscript{zzz} These groups have also demonstrated an interest and proficiency in methods used to communicate among supporters and will likely continue to focus on leveraging existing technology to continue to achieve their objectives.

The terrorist use of technology trend includes the development or exploitation of systems, applications, or devices so as to further the objectives of the cell or group. The two primary categories of utilization covered in this section are to connect and influence people (prospects, members, and enemies) and acquire and manage logistics (funding, supplies, and equipment). The use of technology in the actual planning or commission of an attack (cyber, physical, or blended) is considered as a part of terrorism tradecraft.

The primary uses for technology, outside of the terrorist attack cycle, include connecting and influencing people and acquiring and managing logistics. Increased connectivity and interactive applications not only increase the ability for group members to share ideas and information, but

\textsuperscript{yyy} (OS) Terrorist groups actively use web forums and social networking sites to disseminate messages to target audiences, including recipes and instructions for the manufacture and detonation of explosives, which have been constructed by leveraging existing technology. They have also exploited technology, including digital media devices and cellular phones, to gather, conceal, and further circulate materials which espouse extremist ideology or information regarding pre-operational surveillance or related activity. (\textit{RAND}: \textit{Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies}, 2007)

\textsuperscript{zzz} (OS) This technological knowledge focuses on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) technologies as well as technical expertise in remote detonation technology and improvised explosives devices (\textit{RAND}: \textit{Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies}, 2007).
they also afford groups the opportunity to reach large numbers of prospective supporters from a range of geographic locations. In addition to connecting networks of like-minded people, terror and extremist groups have also used technological assets to disseminate messages against ‘target’ audiences. These networks can then be leveraged, either through commonly used applications such as Ebay or PayPal, or devices such as mobile phones to generate or move funds or supplies on behalf of the group.

**Potential Impact for Law Enforcement and Critical Infrastructure**

The primary law enforcement concern regarding the use of technology by terror and extremist groups is officer safety. Simple and affordable options for conducting surveillance and counter surveillance efforts are becoming more commonplace; the ability to use Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking, cell phones, and other devices to monitor law enforcement or security measures, especially when combined with Internet searches, creates a significant vulnerability for law enforcement personnel. Given the definition for this trend, anticipated impact on infrastructure assets is not significant, as the intention of terrorists and extremists is to avoid detection and disruption. The most important impact would likely be the economic impact to the Banking/Finance sector due to losses caused by fraudulent activity or alternative money transfer methods.

**Potential Threat Group(s)**

By their very nature, individuals belonging to terror or extremist groups have a need or desire to communicate which is often facilitated through electronic means. Typically, larger, more established groups display higher levels of sophistication due to greater financial resources and the likelihood of members with specialized knowledge. Advanced technological knowledge and skills are also common within groups that have a strong presence of college-aged members, regardless of their core ideology.
Internet technology has emerged as the preferred medium for extremist communication and is increasingly being exploited to assist terrorists in achieving their goals. The Internet is used to recruit and radicalize supporters to play a more active role in support of terrorist activities or causes. Both international and domestic groups have provided online membership applications and pledge forms which may be filled out and submitted by would-be members. Some groups also solicit funds on their websites through donations as well as the sale of various items, including publications and audio and visual media. Extremist groups also actively use web forums, blogs, and social networking sites such as YouTube, MySpace, Islam Tube, Google Video, and Twitter to post hate videos and games, motivational speeches, and other propaganda via blogs and emails, which espouse extremist ideology and perspectives. These networking venues have also been used to deliver near real-time information online and to cellular phones, suggesting evolving tactics that represent significant vulnerabilities for law enforcement personnel as well as have national security implications.

OS Some experts maintain that the Internet is a key tool for the training and recruitment of terrorists and may be replacing traditional terrorist training with cyber training (FOX News: U.S. Lawmakers Take Aim at Homegrown Terrorist Threat, August 7, 2008).

OS Al-Qa’ida raises funds by the siphoning of funds from donations intended for Muslim charitable organizations. Many charitable websites have PayPal accounts where monies may be donated with ease. These funds are then used by terrorist organizations to carry out operations. Other groups, namely white nationalist groups, raise funds through the sale of periodic publications and DVDs/CDs.

OS Twitter was used as a counter-surveillance, command and control, and movement tool by activists at the Republican National Convention. The activists would tweet (send messages to) each other and their Twitter pages to add information on what was happening with law enforcement near real-time (304th Mi Bn OSINT Team: Sample Overview: Al-Qa’ida-Like Mobile Discussions and Potential Creative Uses, October 16, 2008).
Table 8: How Websites Support Objectives of Terrorist/Extremist Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist/Extremist Objectives</th>
<th>Tasks Supported by Websites</th>
<th>Web Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Enhance Communications         | Composing, sending, & receiving messages  
Searching for messages, information, & people  
One-to-one, one-to-many communications  
Maintaining anonymity | Synchronous (chat, video conferencing, etc) & asynchronous (email, bulletin board, forum, newsgroups)  
GUI (Graphic User Interface)  
Help function  
Feedback form  
Log-in  
Email address for web master, organization contact | |
| Increase Fundraising           | Publicizing need for funds  
Providing options for collecting funds | Payment instruction and facilitation  
E-commerce application  
Hyperlinks to other resources | |
| Diffuse Propaganda             | Posting resources in multiple languages  
Providing links to forums, videos, & other groups’ websites  
Using websites as an online clearinghouses for statements from leaders | Content management  
Hyperlinks  
Directory for documents  
Navigation support  
Search features and browsable links  
Free website hosting  
Accessibility | |
| Increase Publicity             | Advertising groups’ events, martyrs, history, ideologies  
Providing group’s interpretation of the news | Downloadable files  
Animated & flashy banner, logo, slogan  
Clickable maps  
Information resources (e.g., international news) | |
| Overcome Obstacles from Law Enforcement & Military | Send encrypted messages via email, forums, or post on websites  
Move websites to different servers so that they are protected | Anonymous email accounts  
Password protected or encrypted services  
Downloadable encryption software  
Email security  
Stenography | |
| Provide Recruitment & Training | Hosting martyr stories, speeches, and multimedia that are used for recruitment  
Using flashy graphics to appeal to sympathizers  
Build massive & dynamic online libraries of training resources | Interactive services (e.g. games, cartoons, maps)  
Online registration process  
Directory  
Multimedia (e.g. videos, audios, images)  
FAQ, alerts  
Virtual community | |
Mobile Phones

According to a U.S.-based wireless service provider, 90% of prepaid cellular phones purchased in quantities of three or more at once in 2005 were not activated, totaling nearly 60,000 phones. Although many prepaid cellular phone providers have asked retailers to limit customer purchases of the phones and they are pursuing legal actions regarding the altering and reselling of phones as legitimate handsets, there exist numerous instances of bulk cell phone purchases and the theft of these items nationwide. A great deal of conjecture has arisen regarding the noted activities, as advances in mobile phone technology have been used surreptitiously in the planning, financing, and commission of terrorist attacks. Cellular phones are also becoming a significant means of dispersing terrorist propaganda. Multimedia clips in the form of audio, video, text, and photos may be downloaded onto mobile phones and some terrorist organizations are branding phones with a specific cell phone interface, making the phone a piece of propaganda.

While some reports indicate that the phones are being used in the construction of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or illicit money transfers, other intelligence information maintains that the purchases are being made solely for profit. Although the purchases may not be directly linked to any terrorist operational planning activities, profits from their resale may provide financial support for some criminal or terrorist networks, including those overseas, thus demonstrating causes for concern. Additional concern relates to suspicious bulk prepaid cellular phone purchases that have not been resolved.

Virginia

The Virginia Fusion Center continues to receive reports of bulk prepaid cell phone purchases occurring...
at retail locations throughout the Commonwealth, to include Wytheville, Marion, South Boston, Danville, Galax, and Pulaski County. Individuals of Middle Eastern and Russian descent are primarily making the bulk purchases of cell phones; however, Caucasian and African-American individuals in southwest Virginia have reportedly been solicited to make the purchases in an effort to circumvent suspicion and store policies limiting such purchases. In some instances, individuals have visited multiple retail locations and may have attempted to conceal their identities by making purchases with cash or gift cards. Additionally, after being told of a maximum store limit, individuals have also purchased the allowed amount and returned on several occasions to purchase more phones; others have solicited passersby to purchase phones on their behalf. Additionally, employees of hotel chains in Northern Virginia have reported large amounts of prepaid cell phone packaging and phone chargers being left in rooms by occupants. This is not only an indication that individuals are traveling to Virginia to purchase phones, but it is an indication that the phones are probably being shipped overseas as the chargers are not usable outside of the U.S.

Portable Digital Music Players

The VFC has received information regarding the potential use of portable Digital Music Players (DMP) as a medium for the covert transportation of criminal-related material with limited detection. This was evident recently when the Internal Revenue Service retrieved extensive financial records from the iPod of a money-laundering target. Investigators uncovered massive amounts of business records stored on the suspect’s iPod, which he carried on his person from Florida to the Caribbean. Criminals have also stored information on stolen identities and contact information of criminal associates on iPods. There are also reports of these devices being used to transport terrorist propaganda and to store audio, video, graphics, or text files.

Podcasting is the distribution of audio or video files over the Internet for listening on personal computers and other portable digital media players. The media files for podcasting are typically associated with music, but can be any audio, including spoken-word books and educational content. Podcasting provides similar challenges for regulators, as the information is widely accessible on the Internet and could be exploited as a communication tool by terrorist groups. Since the Australian

9999 (LES) MP3 players, cellular phones, and digital cameras can all be easily utilized to carry data beyond their initial design, including criminal data (Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Financial Operations; Connecticut Intelligence Center Weekly Intelligence Briefing: Another Use for iPods, March 30, 2007).

hnnh (OS) While the term podcast comes from the iPod, it applies to other portable digital media players (Tom Worthington Communications: Podcasting Policy and Terrorism, March 26, 2006).
government recently banned Podcasting, this trend could be cause for concern.

Virginia

The Virginia Fusion Center has received little reporting on this trend; however, it remains a viable concern. According to the Virginia Department of Corrections (DOC) and Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice, digital media devices are banned items for detainees.iii In addition, access to computers and other equipment where CDs or other data storage devices are used by DOC inmates is done so in a controlled environment, suggesting the use of DMPs by a susceptible population to radicalization is limited.

Intelligence Gaps

1. How are terrorists exploiting technology to achieve their goals in Virginia?
2. How technologically advanced are foreign or domestic terrorist organization that may be located in Virginia?
3. Are these organizations using technology for recruitment or fundraising efforts?
4. Are any foreign or domestic terrorist organizations planning to use technology in an attack in Virginia?
5. Are the funds from prepaid cell phone purchases and resales being used to finance terrorism?
6. Are there any extremist Islamic websites/blogs hosted by individuals located in Virginia?
7. Are any Virginia residents using the Internet for recruitment on behalf or terrorist entities?
8. Are there reported instances of individuals attempting to transport radical material via portable storage devices into Virginia correctional facilities? If yes, are they identified?

Projections

The use of technology by terrorists and extremists is forecasted to increase in each of the areas evaluated – frequency of use, volume of utilization, geographic distribution, and sophistication. Not only is technology itself advancing rapidly, but individuals and groups with nefarious intentions are also displaying innovation in applying programs, devices, and capabilities to meet the communications needs of the group.

iii (LES) The DOC indicated that inmates are allowed to purchase or receive CDs or other storage media provided it is shipped directly from the manufacturer and is in original packaging. Music and other CDs must be derived from a list of approved materials. Nothing inciting violence or containing obscenities or radical materials are accessible to inmates; anything that might be questionable is reviewed by a special panel.
Recruitment & Radicalization

Terror and extremist groups generally seek to increase support for their cause through the recruitment of potential new members. Recruitment can occur through a variety of avenues involving personal contact, Internet correspondence, or institutional affiliation. Although recruitment is a typical part of many extremists’ radicalization journey, it is not necessarily a prerequisite for radicalization. A number of products have been released since 2006 highlighting current hypotheses regarding recruitment and radicalization, but all agree that the two key areas of consideration include the recognition of radicalization nodes and the radicalization process.

According to a DHS assessment, radicalization in the U.S. is a complex and dynamic process with no single “pathway to radicalization.” While the study showed the radicalization process varies based on ideological, ethnic, and religious constructs, as well as differences based on geographic and socio-economic conditions, similarities have emerged in the key nodes that drive the radicalization process. One of the national-level preliminary key findings of this study noted that prison radicalization is a growing problem in various regions, not only for radical Islamic groups, but also for traditional domestic extremists. Other findings of significance include the potential increase of ‘lone wolf’ radicalization across all types of groups, and the emergence of ‘rites of passage’ as a general precursor node to operational activity. The table below highlights the major nodes utilized by different movements within the U.S.

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iii DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) working definition hypothesizes radicalization as the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.

kikk (FOUO) DHS I&A defines rites of passage as anything an individual does to move from passive to active support of an extremist ideology (e.g., participating in paramilitary training in preparation for violent actions in the name of an ideology, religious training/immersion overseas, participating in a violent domestic extremist protest, etc.). Rites of passage often are undertaken to solidify an individual’s membership in a group. This has been documented across all types of actor groups (see chart).
## Key Radicalization Nodes in Radical U.S. Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NODE</th>
<th>Islamic Extremism</th>
<th>White Supremacists</th>
<th>Right/Left Wing Extremists</th>
<th>Single Issue Extremists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charismatic Leader</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rite of Passage</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Student Organizations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DHS definitions for these radicalization nodes are:

- **Charismatic Leader** - Radicalization is facilitated by charismatic leaders, often an R-1 religious visa holder who is linked to the larger extremist community through affiliations with radical Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), extremist groups, or state sponsors.\(^{352}\)

- **Internet** - The virtual arena allows vulnerable individuals from around the world to discuss Islamic doctrine. Radicalization is encouraged both directly through chat rooms and bulletin boards and indirectly through inflammatory speeches, videos, and other extremist propaganda. Online forums allow individuals to self-recruit and enable Islamic extremists to identify and cultivate potential recruits.\(^{353}\)

- **Prisons** - Most cases of prison radicalization and recruitment appear to be originated by domestic radical Islamic groups with few or no foreign connections. Identified groups include Jamiiyat Ul Islam Is Saheeh, Dar-Ul, and Muslims of America. Attempted prison radicalization and recruitment occurs in isolated cases or small, regional clusters by contractors, volunteers, compromised tenured staff imams, as well as by radicalized inmates.\(^{354}\)
• **Propaganda** - Islamic extremists use propaganda including radical literature and extremist translations and interpretations of the Qur'an, DVD's, and videos in the media, at rallies, and in mosques to advance their agenda against the West.

• **Religious Institutions** - Charismatic imams may use hate-filled literature and sermons in mosques, religious schools, universities, and prisons to indoctrinate their congregation.\(^{355}\)

• **Rites of Passage** – Rites of passage can include shared experiences with other believers or individual expressions, such as becoming alienated from one’s former life; joining or forming a group of like-minded individuals in a quest to strengthen one’s dedication to Salafi Islam, giving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling, and urban hip-hop gangster clothes; wearing traditional Islamic clothing; growing a beard; and becoming involved in social activism and community issues.\(^{356}\)

• **University Organizations** - Student-led Muslim associations in the U.S. that include militant members may serve as recruitment channels.\(^{357}\)

The path to radicalization appears to be largely, though not solely, a group phenomenon, with friends deciding to join the jihad together rather than as isolated individuals. It also appears that homegrown jihadi transition from an individual devotion to Islamic beliefs into a network of friends who bond through a shared radicalization experience which gradually transforms the group into a cell.\(^{358}\)

Once individuals become interested in the radical cause, they may begin, either intentionally or unintentionally, the radicalization process. As noted in a NYPD radicalization report, each of the phases has unique attributes. It is also important to note that many of the individuals who begin this process do not complete each phase; many individuals who begin will stop or abandon the process long before reaching the violence threshold.\(^{359}\) It is also important to note that despite the logical and sequential basis for the model shown in the table below, not all individuals who undergo this process complete each phase in a linear fashion.
### Key Radicalization Nodes in Radical U.S. Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRE-RADICALIZATION</th>
<th>IDENTIFICATION</th>
<th>INDOCTRINATION</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivation/Conversion</td>
<td>Individual accepts the cause.</td>
<td>Immersion into a Group</td>
<td>Individual knowingly engages in extremist activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Jilted Believer</td>
<td>• Increased isolation from former life</td>
<td>• Social</td>
<td>• Operational activities of Facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Acceptance Seeker</td>
<td>• Begin to accept new social identity</td>
<td>• Terrorist</td>
<td>Recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protest Conversion</td>
<td>• Key Component</td>
<td>• Strengthening social identity</td>
<td>Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Faith Reinterpretation</td>
<td>• Overseas experience</td>
<td>• Increased vetting opportunities</td>
<td>include:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Religious training</td>
<td>• Training Camp</td>
<td>• Preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Basic Paramilitary training</td>
<td>• Surveillance activity</td>
<td>• Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Finance</td>
<td>• Execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stimulus</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key Component</strong></td>
<td><strong>INDOCTRINATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Self</td>
<td>• Overseas experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other</td>
<td>• Religious training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opportunity</strong></td>
<td>• Basic Paramilitary training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mosque</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Internet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prison</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Impact for Law Enforcement and Critical Infrastructure

Officer safety is the primary law enforcement concern regarding recruitment and radicalization by terror and extremist groups. While many radicalized individuals attempt to avoid confrontations during interaction with law enforcement, the potential for violence is possible, especially with a newer convert anxious to demonstrate their willingness to fight for the cause. Although most terror and extremist groups by their very nature dislike interaction with authority figures, separatist type groups may be more likely to provoke law enforcement officers.

The primary threats to critical infrastructure regarding terror and extremist group recruiting and radicalization is to Government facilities/Military installations. In addition to the ongoing threat of recruitment and radicalization by gangs and terror groups in correctional facilities, the VFC is aware of nationwide activities suggesting that groups and movements may be attempting to recruit...
military members. Other reports suggest these groups may be attempting to infiltrate military and law enforcement organizations in hopes of collecting intelligence on government activities. Although this technique is emphasized in online jihad encyclopedias and training manuals, little evidence of success within the U.S. has been noted.\textsuperscript{361}

### Islamic Extremism

Islamic radicalization activity is occurring within small subsets of Sunni and Shia communities.\textsuperscript{362} DHS has identified a wide range of groups that serve as radicalizing agents, including the Muslim Brotherhood, HAMAS, Jama’at Tabligh, black separatist groups, blended or unorthodox Islamic extremist groups, various domestic extremist groups, and Saudi-influenced or Iranian proxy non-governmental organizations. Islamic radicalization occurs in all venues and nodes, including ‘storefront’ and ‘basement’ mosques, prisons, tangible and virtual propaganda, and through the Internet and university student organizations. A NYPD radicalization report also details a number of less formal, but also likely venues, to include cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, prisons, student associations, nongovernmental organizations, hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops, and bookstores.\textsuperscript{363} Rite of passage experiences can range from actual attendance at a training camp, madrassa attendance, or Dawah\textsuperscript{iii} missionary work. Current DHS research suggests that a small number of radicalizing mosques have a disproportionate influence upon an area’s Muslim population when compared to the potentially moderating influence of mainstream mosques. While Islamic radicalization is commonly seen as an urban issue in major cities, such groups also exist in smaller cities as well as suburban and rural localities.

**Virginia**

The Virginia Fusion Center has received limited reporting regarding potential recruitment and radicalization activities by Islamic extremist groups or individuals. A few reports were received in 2007 regarding subjects who were stopped for traffic violations in the Hampton Roads or Northern Virginia regions and subsequently found to have radical Islamic texts or recruiting materials, but no information on consolidated recruitment efforts could be gained.\textsuperscript{364} In addition to these reports, internal research suggests that potential radicalization in Virginia may be occurring in Islamic halaqas, or study circles similar to those offered by Muslim Student Associations (MSA).\textsuperscript{365}

\textsuperscript{iii} (OS) In Islam, Dawah means a call or invitation, and has been used to refer to a person being called to follow Islam. However, it has developed into the idea of a mission or propaganda, either in a political or religious sense.
Islamic Prison Radicalization

Islamic radicalization within prisons occurs predominantly among the minority inmate population and those affiliated with gangs. The two primary radicalization nodes currently seen in prisons include charismatic leaders and propaganda. Charismatic leaders can include religiously radical inmates or clerics, contractors, and volunteers who serve prison populations as Muslim chaplains, and who may advocate extremist Islamic ideologies to inmates throughout the prison. The charismatic leader may also create or import radical propaganda into the prison while blocking more moderate Islamic texts.

The FBI and DHS have noted that two types of prison radicalization, basic and complex, can occur. Inmates subjected to basic radicalization receive general messaging, rather than specific tasking, creating the potential for lone wolf actors. Those subjected to complex radicalization receive individual follow-up, creating the potential for recommendation to a specific cell upon release. Reportedly, the Nation of Islam (NOI) and affiliated black separatist groups generally operate and recruit in prisons and share radicalization methodologies that reinforce beliefs of “brotherhood of the oppressed” typical of more conventional Islamic groups.

Virginia

In 2007, a number of potential matches for watch listed subjects attempted to gain paid or volunteer positions within correctional facilities. Recruitment and radicalization efforts were conducted by an inmate at a Petersburg area federal correctional institute who clashed with and subsequently issued his own fatwa against the institution’s imam. Personal correspondence highlighting radical Islamic authors and concepts, notes about the author’s assault of two police officers, and names of other ‘brothers’ in the system were found at a correctional facility in Buckingham County. One report was also received regarding an individual with possible terrorism ties visiting an inmate at a correctional facility in Greensville County.

White Nationalist Radicalization

Individuals active within white nationalist organizations and groups may have overlapping memberships, as the groups themselves often have similar ideologies. White nationalist beliefs may center on concepts of racial identity, anti-Semitism, and/or nativism, with specific groups sometimes forming around prison relationships. White nationalist groups sustain themselves on criminal activity and membership contributions, and rely on nodes such as charismatic leaders, prisons, propaganda regarding Christian identity or Nordic mysticism, and the Internet for...
bolstering membership. White nationalist groups are recruiting individuals who may be more apt than their predecessors to commit acts of violence, including military veterans skilled in weapons and tactics. FBI investigations suggest the white nationalist extremist movement is attracting recruits who view illegal immigration and multiculturalism as attacks against the white race.

As many white nationalists view themselves as patriots defending their own view of the U.S., this form of extremism tends to have more members with military experience.

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**Distribution of Military Experience in Post-9/11 White Supremacist Extremism**

(Reporting on 203 Persons from October 2001-May 2008)

- **National Alliance**: 29% (58/203)
- **Select Skinhead Groups**: 22% (45/203)
- **National Socialist Movement**: 21% (44/203)
- **Select Ku Klux Klan Groups**: 10% (20/203)
- **Aryan Nations**: 8% (17)
- **Creativity Movement**: 4% (12)
- **Other**: 6% (7)

* (U) Source: FBI White Supremacist Extremist subject and major group case files. Individuals have been categorized according to most recent group affiliation. In cases of concurrent multiple group affiliations, persons have been identified with the group with which they are most actively involved.
Virginia

White nationalist radicalization in Virginia takes place via Internet chat rooms, such as Stromfront.org, as well as through propaganda distribution, rallies, and informal social gatherings. Perhaps the most troublesome venue for white nationalist recruitment is the radicalization occurring in correctional institutions, where members may initially turn to the movement for protection.

**Right/Left Wing Extremists Radicalization**

Left wing extremist organizations are often identified as anarchist-type movements and generally have few violent actors. Right wing extremist organizations, such as militia and sovereign citizen movements, sometimes have a degree of overlap with white supremacist groups. Despite core differences in ideologies, both movements manifest radicalization avenues or gateways, including charismatic leaders, the Internet, university student organizations, propaganda, and rite of passage experiences such as protests or rallies.

Virginia

Left and right wing extremist organizations in the Commonwealth exploit basic alienation from mainstream society through closed social affinity groups, shared group experiences, and propaganda distribution on the Internet. In correctional facilities, these individuals may seek extremist group membership for protection. All of these methods involve a common strand, divorcing the subject, as much as possible, from moderating influences and reinforcing the extremist message built over the basic alienation.

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. Have there been any recent attempts by suspected extremists to gain access to Virginia correctional facilities and regional jail as employees, contractors or volunteers?
2. Are chaplains at Virginia correctional institutions espousing messages of hate or distributing extremist literature?
3. Which Virginia correctional institutions have inmates who are currently involved in recruitment and radicalization?
4. Are terrorist group members visiting inmates at correctional facilities in Virginia in an effort to recruit? If so, which facilities?
5. Which college universities in Virginia have existing organizations that espouse and promote extremist ideology?
6. Are terrorist groups in Virginia engaging in paramilitary training? If so, which groups and where?
7. What is the preferred recruitment method and process for extremist groups in Virginia?
8. Are extremist groups in Virginia receiving paramilitary training overseas? If so, from which countries?

9. To what extent is there crossover between domestic and international terrorist organizations and/or between extremist groups and gangs? Is there any evidence to suggest that these groups may forge an alliance based on political, ideological, or religious affiliations?

**Projections**

Virginia is home to a wide range of individuals with ties to foreign nations embroiled in turmoil, U.S. born citizens drawn to the concept of self-defense found in militias, extremists on both ends of the political spectrum, and radicals with strong racial prejudices. Current events, such as the recent election of an African-American president, military action in Gaza, the potential for change in gun legislation, and economic difficulties will likely increase the potential for radicalization across all measures – frequency, volume, geographic distribution, and sophistication.
Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources

According to DHS’ 2007/2008 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, critical infrastructure is defined as "assets, systems and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such assets, systems or networks would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of those matters". Current estimates suggest that roughly 85% of critical infrastructure/key resources (CIKR) assets in the U.S. are privately owned, necessitating public and private partnerships for effective CIKR protection.

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides the coordinated approach to establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for CIKR protection. It establishes a comprehensive risk management framework and defines roles and responsibilities for the Department of Homeland Security; Federal Sector-Specific Agencies; and other Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector security partners. The NIPP establishes the overarching concepts relevant to all CIKR sectors, and addresses the physical, cyber, and human considerations required for effective implementation of comprehensive programs.

The federal government asked each critical infrastructure sector to establish sector specific information sharing organizations to share information, within each sector, about sector specific threats and vulnerabilities. In response, many sectors established Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to meet this need. Each ISAC is a trusted, sector specific entity which performs the following functions:

- Provides a 24/7 secure operating capability that establishes the sector's specific information sharing/intelligence requirements for incidents, threats and vulnerabilities;
- Collects, analyzes, and disseminates alerts and incident reports to its membership based on its sector focused subject matter analytical expertise;
- Helps the government understand impacts for its sector;
- Provides an electronic, trusted capability for its membership to exchange and share information on cyber, physical and all threats in order to defend the critical infrastructure; and
- Share and provide analytical support to government and other ISACs regarding technical sector details and in mutual information sharing and assistance during actual or potential sector disruptions whether caused by intentional, accidental or natural events.

These partnerships between all levels of government and private sector owners help to ensure that essential governmental missions, public services, and economic functions are maintained in the event of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other type of incident. CIKR protection plans also
endeavor to prevent the exploitation of CIKR elements for use as weapons of mass destruction against people or institutions.

**Resources for Law Enforcement**

As CIKR assets represent likely targets for most terror or extremist groups, it is important for law enforcement agencies to develop strong relationships and institutional knowledge of facilities in their jurisdiction. While the bulk of CIKR related suspicious activity reports have no criminal or terrorism nexus, informed responses to such calls for service represent a strong operational opportunity for the detection and disruption of terrorist activity by law enforcement personnel.

The National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NCIPP) identifies domestic infrastructure that could critically affect the Nation’s public health, economic, and/or national security; and the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI), which identifies similarly critical infrastructure located outside the United States. The NCIPP is moving to a “List of Lists” approach to ensure the infrastructure protection community has the right list on hand to execute its mission at any geographic level, whether for risk or incident management purposes. This will be accomplished through the creation of four groups of lists:

- Tier 1 List;
- Tier 2 List;
- 18 distinct Sector Lists; and
- Individual State and Territory Lists

These lists will provide a tremendous resource to Federal, State, local, tribal and territorial partners engaged in risk management decision making. The move to consistent, consequence-based criteria for both Tier 1 and Tier 2 will help ensure that the results capture the true criticality of infrastructure assets based on consequences of the infrastructure’s disruption. Sector List criteria have been developed by national Sector Specific Agencies to reflect the unique qualities of assets in each sector, while criteria for each State and Territory List will be developed by each state to reflect the distinctive legal, economic, and geographic factors important to each jurisdiction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 1 Criteria</th>
<th>Tier 2 Criteria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those CIKR that, if disrupted, could result in at least two of the following consequences:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Greater than 5,000 prompt fatalities;</td>
<td>• Greater than 2,500 prompt fatalities;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Greater than $75 billion in first-year economic consequences;</td>
<td>• Greater than $25 billion in first-year economic consequences;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Mass evacuations with a prolonged absence of greater than 3 months;</td>
<td>• Mass evacuations with a prolonged absence of greater than 1 month;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Severe degradation of the country’s national security capabilities to include intelligence and defense functions, but excluding military facilities.</td>
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</table>
In Virginia, the Governor's Office of Commonwealth Preparedness (OCP) is responsible for developing a list of Virginia's critical infrastructure and key resources. As such OCP is working with the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM), the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT), the Virginia State Police (VSP) and other local, state, federal and private partners to identify, prioritize, assess, and protect Virginia's critical infrastructure and key resources. OCP facilitated the Virginia Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resiliency Strategy Plan (the Virginia Plan) in keeping with DHS's National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and other pertinent documents and practices.

OCP has also established Regional Preparedness Advisory Committees (RPAC) throughout the Commonwealth. The advisory groups focus on regional initiatives in training, equipment, communication, and strategy to ensure ready access to response teams in times of emergency; and to facilitate testing and training exercises for emergencies and mass casualty preparedness. Membership for each RPAC includes representatives from emergency management, fire, law enforcement, local government, the private sector, and institutions of higher learning.

Regional Preparedness Advisory Committees correspond to Virginia State Police Divisions.
Agriculture and Food Sector

Securing the national and state agriculture and food sector presents unique challenges because agriculture and food systems are extensive, open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structures providing attractive potential targets for terrorist attacks. Due to the rapidity by which food products move in commerce to consumers and the time required for detection and identification of a causative agent, attacks upon the Agriculture and Food sector—such as animal or plant disease introduction or food contamination—could result in severe animal, plant, or public health and economic consequences.

Protection efforts for agriculture and consumer infrastructure and resources focus on planning and preparedness, as well as early awareness of an attack. Science-based surveillance measures are essential to recognizing a possible attack on the sector so that rapid response and recovery efforts can be implemented to mitigate the impact of an attack.

### Sector List Criteria

Each State and Territory will use the Food and Agriculture Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT), to identify the top five critical systems/subsystems within their State or Territory based upon their weighted FAS-CAT scores. States may download FAS-CAT and accompanying guidance documents and tutorials through FoodSHIELD.

### Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector

Agroterrorism, defined as the deliberate introduction of a disease agent, into livestock, crops, or in to the food chain, is a subset of bioterrorism. An agroterrorist attack would create not only health-related damages, but could create significant cascading economic effects due to the potential impact on interdependent sectors.

A wide range of terrorism tradecraft tactics, techniques, and practices are of interest within this sector. While speculation regarding the potential use of crop dusters has focused on possible dissemination of chemical or biological agents against people or the food chain, some attention has been given to the potential use of such aircraft for surveillance activities. Another significant concern is the potential for the acquisition of agricultural chemicals which can be acquired to construct explosive weapons like those used in the Oklahoma City bombing or 1993 World Trade Center attacks. As the reporting of suspicious agricultural supply purchases or theft is voluntary, effective relationships between retailers and local law enforcement agencies remains one of the strongest avenues for recognizing unusual and potentially dangerous activities.
Potential Threat Group(s)

While international groups have attacked Food and Agricultural assets abroad, documents found at al-Qa’ida training camps have listed the U.S. food supply as a top priority target. Deliberate contamination to the Agriculture and Food sector by international terrorists would meet terrorist objectives, including harming people, creating panic, and inflicting widespread economic damage. Domestically, animal and environmental rights groups protesting the treatment of animals, the planting of genetically engineered crops, or the harvesting of timber in contentious areas all represent potential threats.

Domestic Incidents

In recent years, environmental and animal rights extremist groups have been primarily responsible for the domestic threat facing the agriculture and food sector, as they have targeted farms, research labs, and restaurants causing millions of dollars in damages. Recently, the greatest focus of attention for these extremists has been experimental crop facilities and companies with ties to biotechnical research facilities. Examples of such ecoterrorism include an act of arson by ELF against the Michigan State University’s agricultural department on New Year’s Eve 2000 due to its experimentation with biotechnology and crops, which resulted in nearly $1 million in damages. Farmers throughout the U.S. have also been targeted, with ecoterrorists destroying crops, stealing or freeing animals, and vandalizing farm equipment, which has also resulted in thousands of dollars of damages. While most attacks orchestrated by ecoterrorists have been limited to vandalism or theft and release of animals, it is important to note that such attacks have resulted in millions of dollars in damages and have harmed the agricultural industry’s efforts to grow and improve.

Virginia

The Agriculture and Food sector in the Commonwealth provides food and clothing for people far beyond state lines. This sector is almost entirely under private ownership and is composed of roughly 47,100 farms (as of 2007) covering over 8.62 million acres. Virginia’s Agriculture and Food sector is the largest industry in Virginia, contributing billions of dollars to the Commonwealth’s economy and providing 21.5% of overall employment in Virginia. Virginia is also host to a number of agriculture colleges and universities. Although there have been no known incidents or suspicious activity reported to the VFC relating to the Agriculture sector in Virginia, the Commonwealth has been impacted by a number of significant nationwide food distribution recalls. While recalls for contaminated products such as peanut butter, spinach, and Banquet frozen meals have affected individual consumers, the February 2008 national beef recall affected several Virginia school systems.
Intelligence Gaps

1. Do any international or domestic terrorist organizations have plans to disrupt or attack the agricultural sector in Virginia?

2. What additional information does local law enforcement or other local government entities have regarding extremist efforts to target agricultural infrastructure within their respective jurisdictions?

3. Have individuals or groups infiltrated or researched Virginia’s food system (i.e. farm to fork continuum) and facilities with the intent to conduct a potential attack?

4. Have employees reported incidents of individuals asking questions about security measures, farm equipment, animals, or crops?

5. Have facilities experienced any threats, thefts, animal releases or other types of vandalism? If yes, what level of financial losses have resulted?

6. Have there been any reports of damage to Virginia farms, facilities, or adjacent infrastructures? If so, have the perpetrators been identified or suspected of affiliation with any terror or extremist groups?

7. Have employees reported any suspicious photography incidents of farms or facilities and/or in the proximity of identified CIKR?

8. Have individuals attempted to gain unauthorized access to secure areas within the agricultural infrastructure in Virginia?

9. Have any agricultural sector related facilities experienced the following:
   1. Loss or theft of cultures, toxins, vaccines, and medications
   2. Suspicious inquiries about obtaining agricultural pathogen samples
   3. Suspicious activities at or near livestock feed lots, processing plants, or poultry plants
   4. Unusual increase in the numbers of sick or dying animals
   5. Reporting of large crop or livestock losses and deaths unrelated to seasonal climatic conditions
   6. Unusual interest in the acquisition of vaccines and medications for a crop or livestock disease
   7. Individuals appearing at hospitals with unusual symptoms
Projections

The threat of an attack targeting the agriculture industry in Virginia could be considered low as there is no intelligence indicating any groups are planning to attack the agriculture industry in Virginia. However, the economic impact an attack against Virginia’s agriculture industry would be devastating and demonstrates a need for continued analysis.

**Interest as target:** Likely to Increase - From both an international terrorist and domestic extremist perspective, an attack on Virginia’s agriculture system would likely cause economic devastation but not result in mass deaths. Recent attention highlighting the salmonella outbreak could generate renewed interest.

**Number of Virginia-based assets:** Likely to Decrease - Virginia has reported growth in many of the subsectors within the agriculture industry in recent years; the impact of the current economic recession may cause a decrease in total assets in the short to midterm.

**Interdependencies:** Forestry, Water Sector, Restaurant industry, Supermarkets, Overseas Trade

This threat is highlighted as recent incidents throughout the U.S. signify groups’ willingness and capabilities to conduct attacks against this infrastructure. In addition to international and domestic terrorists, disgruntled employees could attack the food supply. The Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services is occasionally notified of regulatory violations by disgruntled employees hoping to create difficulties for their employer. As observed with the current salmonella outbreak associated with a single processing plant, even non-terrorist events can greatly impact consumer confidence and produce measurable economic losses.
Banking/Finance

Prior direct attacks and repeated public statements by terrorist organizations demonstrate that the Banking/Finance sector continues to represent a symbolic target of potentially high impact. This sector is comprised of a wide variety of financial services firms, including banking firms and credit unions, securities firms, insurance companies, credit card companies, mortgage banking companies, financial services sector utilities, financial services service bureaus, and a wide variety of industry-specific associations. In addition to past physical and cyber threats from terrorists and extremists, large-scale power outages and recent natural disasters have demonstrated the wide range of potential threats confronting the Banking/Finance sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector List Criteria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Aggregate processors of wholesale funds transfer or securities and futures clearing, transfer and settlement services;</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Primary dealers in the government securities market (Headquarters and/or Information Technology Service Centers).</td>
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This sector does have an organized Information Sharing and Analysis Council (ISAC). Originally organized to plan for Y2K continuity issues, the FS-ISAC has over 4,200 direct members and 30 member associations. Current data suggests that the FS-ISAC has the ability to reach 99% of U.S. banks and credit unions, 85% of the securities industry, and almost 50% of the insurance industry.  

Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector

Traditional law enforcement interaction with this sector has primarily focused on response or physical security efforts to reduce the incidence and success of robberies; financial services sector leaders advise, however, that the cyber dimension poses an equal or greater vulnerability. Three major trends of significant concern to this sector are terrorism tradecraft, including pre-incidence indicators; terrorism financing, especially fraud and money laundering; and cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism. In fact, some of the best existing evidence of pre-incident surveillance efforts are the archived videos and sketches of Wall Street captured by al-Qa’ida operatives in April 2001.
Recent media reporting has warned that massive layoffs in the financial services sector over the last few months have created a “ticking time bomb” in the financial services industry, putting confidential consumer or corporate information at risk. Major security risks include:

- Financial services firms have laid off nearly 170,000 employees since mid-2007, with job losses expected to total 350,000 in mid-2009. In November, Citigroup announced 50,000 job cuts; the company is confronted with the need to close up to a million total accounts for these terminated employees.

- Employees can accumulate an average of 15 to 20 user accounts over the course of employment, each of which can take three to five minutes to close manually upon termination. Usernames and passwords pertaining to zombie accounts could be shared or even sold to the highest bidder, giving cyber-criminals access to sensitive information without the need for sophisticated hacking techniques.

- A recent Cisco-sponsored survey of 2,000 employees and IT professionals reported that one in 10 end-users had either stolen technology, accessed someone else’s computer, stolen information and sold it, or knew of co-workers who did.
  - In the case of Citigroup, this creates a pool of thousands of former employees who could be inclined to steal information through zombie accounts.384
  - Lending Tree reported that former employees who had access to zombie accounts were illegally accessing mortgage applications and even selling user names and passwords to mortgage lenders. The data breach harmed the credit scores of numerous consumers and prompted several class-action lawsuits.

**Potential Threat Group(s)**

The primary groups and movements that have publicly declared threats against this sector are predominantly international groups, such as “Electronic Jihad,” attacking the capitalist systems of the West.385 Some domestic groups, particularly single-issue type organizations, have targeted the financial institutions handling the accounts of their primary targets. The best-known example of this behavior is the targeting of Bank of America by environmental groups.386 Domestically and internationally, anarchists have also targeted Banking/Finance assets during high profile meetings in which international monetary and development policies are developed to protest social, economic, and political inequity.

**Domestic Incidents**

Domestic incidents involving attacks against financial services institutions within the past few years have largely been the product of single actor events, although an identified southern California bank was targeted in November 2007 by animal rights extremists using an improvised incendiary

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mmmm (OS) For Citigroup to close one million accounts manually, assuming an average of three minutes per account, would require 50,000 man-hours, leaving Citigroup exposed to data theft for an extended period.
device.\(^{387}\) In addition to physical targeting efforts by single issue and lone wolf extremists, allegations of cyber threats, such as the 2006 Electronic Guantanamo Raid, have emerged from groups such as Electronic Jihad.

The 2006 Electronic Guantanamo Raid was a series of planned attacks against American financial websites. The plan was to target U.S. Internet-based stock market and banking sites in retaliation for the holding of Islamists at the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. According to one Islamist website, the attacks were cancelled because the banks had been warned by American media and government agencies. The attacks were to be conducted in December until the “infidel new year,” and attackers were to use viruses that could penetrate Internet sites and destroy data stored there.\(^{388}\)

An individual known as The Bishop sent a number of threatening letters and bomb-like devices to financial firms in the Midwest from 2005 through 2007. The first threatening letters signed by the Bishop were sent to financial institutions in 2005 and contained demands that specified stock prices were to be raised to $6.66. The letters, which bore return addresses from a number of Midwest cities, contained specific deadlines and threats of escalation. Despite the fact that these deadlines were not met, no action was taken until two pipe bombs were mailed in January 2007. The pipe bombs, mailed to a business in Kansas City and one in Denver that was accidentally forwarded to Chicago, were missing critical components but were accompanied by typed letters with additional demands and threats.\(^{389}\) On April 25, 2007, U.S. law enforcement agencies in Dubuque, Iowa arrested The Bishop, who had been identified as a former postal worker.\(^{390}\)

Current economic pressures also seem to be affecting threats against financial institutions. An arrest was announced in early February 2009 regarding a series of threatening letters containing white powder sent in October 2008. A man upset over losing more than $60,000 when the government took over a failed bank has been arrested on charges alleging he mailed 65 threatening letters to financial institutions and federal regulatory offices in 12 states. Sixty-four of the letters contained a white powder later identified as calcium carbonate, a major component of blackboard; the 65th letter contained no powder but included a threat of the "McVeighing of your corporate headquarters within six months."\(^{391}\)

Virginia

Although there have been limited incidents or suspicious activity reported to the VFC relating to the Banking/Finance sector in Virginia, the high level of regulatory restraints and the regional nature of branches in this sector complicate reporting. On June 9, 2008, a Richmond-based financial institution reported an attempt to infect the institution’s computers via a “software as a service” style attack.\(^{392}\) The primary physical incident noted in 2007 involved a report from the Virginia Tech Police Department that an on-campus Bank of America ATM machine was vandalized in an apparent eco-terror attack. It is suspected that the perpetrators of the activity are members of the Mountain Justice Summer activist group or an affiliate, but no conclusive evidence was found. “Funding Coal, Killing Communities” stickers were posted and coal was dumped on the machine, but it was
not rendered inoperable or inaccessible.\textsuperscript{393} It is important to note that the absence of other reports concerning pre-incident indicators cannot be interpreted as a lack of incidents. As can be seen in the linked al-Qa’ida surveillance tapes of Wall Street, individuals engaging in such behaviors may be viewed as innocuous or be dismissed after providing a well-rehearsed cover story.

The Fifth District, which is headquartered in Richmond, VA, serves the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and most of West Virginia.\textsuperscript{334} The Federal Reserve Building is located in Richmond in the midst of other Virginia government buildings and significant historical sites. The Virginia Fusion Center has received several reports of interest concerning the Federal Reserve Building, including:

- An individual was observed photographing the Richmond Federal Reserve Building as well as Riverfront Plaza. When questioned, the individual claimed to be in Richmond attending a conference in the area.\textsuperscript{335}
- An individual was observed taking pictures of the Federal Reserve Building and the parking deck near the Federal Reserve Building.\textsuperscript{336}
- An individual walked onto Federal Reserve Property carrying two knapsacks and a cell phone. The individual approached an officer and inquired if the location was the Federal Reserve. The individual then claimed to be an employee of the bank and wanted to approach the bank.\textsuperscript{337}
- Suspicious documents recovered from a VA DOC inmate contained newspaper articles referencing the Federal Reserve.\textsuperscript{338}
- On April 1, 2008 and April 15, 2008, the Richmond Federal Reserve Building was a target location for protests regarding a movement to abolish the Federal Reserve and the IRS, and a revolution against American politics.\textsuperscript{339}

As the Federal Reserve System is perceived to be a symbol of the American economy and its location is near several points of interest, the Federal Reserve Building will continue to be the focus of such activities.
Intelligence Gaps

1. Have there been any suspicious attempts to elicit information concerning facility operations?

2. Have there been any suspicious individuals taking extensive notes, photographing, videotaping, or sketching the exterior or interior of facility or mobile surveillance by cars, trucks, motorcycles, boats, or small aircraft?

3. Have there been any persons showing uncommon interest in security measures or personnel, entry points or access controls, or perimeter barriers such as fences or walls?

4. Has there been any suspicious activity by current or former employees that could pose a threat to physical or cyber security?

5. Have there been attempts by foreign nationals to gain access or elicit information from facility personnel?

6. Which environmentalist group poses the largest threat to Banking and Finance facilities?

Projections

As the Banking/Finance sector often epitomizes the capitalist nature of Western society, it will likely remain an attractive target. The threat of a physical attack targeting this sector in Virginia is low given that the vast majority of financial services institutions are local branch or regional administrative centers. The highest potential for impact in Virginia would be from a cyber attack disabling systems or defrauding institutions. Financial institutions are seen as an increasingly attractive target for cyber-terrorists due to the economic ripple effect such an attack would create. Given the recent bank closures and layoffs within the financial services sector, the potential for disgruntled employees to tamper with systems or sell confidential data is also a significant risk that will likely increase.

Another potential scenario is the illicit accessing of Banking/Finance sector computer systems for the purpose of extortion. In such instances, financial institutions suffer a security breach and then receive threats from the intruders that the attack and subsequent loss of data security will be publicly announced unless specific payment demands are met. While a number of anecdotal reports of such events have been received, it is noted that companies are unlikely to report such events to avoid potential publicity and the resulting lack of public confidence.

Current calls for vandalism, boycotts, and other ‘direct action’ by environmental extremists such as Blue Ridge Earth First against financial institutions in Virginia deemed to be supporting environmental degradation are likely to continue. Similar activities have been suggested by the animal rights extremists, as demonstrated by past SHAC efforts to target financiers, suppliers, and customers of Huntington Life Sciences, but have not yet had a major impact in Virginia.
Chemical/HAZMAT

The Chemical sector is comprised of three main functional areas: manufacturing plants, transport systems, and distribution systems. This sector produces a diverse range of products which are incorporated into everyday essentials such as pharmaceuticals, pesticides, and water management chemicals. The Chemical sector deals with a vast array of chemicals that present unique security challenges. These challenges are based on the potential consequences of weaponization, diversion, or unavailability of the chemical. The expansive nature of the Chemical Sector complicates communications amongst public safety response and planning personnel and the large number of chemical facilities throughout the Commonwealth make this sector a cause for concern.

**Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector**

As with many other sectors, current or potential trends of interest to law enforcement pertain to physical, cyber, or human vulnerabilities. While various aspects of Terrorism Tradecraft can be used to probe physical and human vulnerabilities, cyber attacks on SCADA systems could result in major damage. Physical efforts to weaponize or divert chemicals could be used in the planning or execution of a bioterrorism incident.

**Sector List Criteria**

The Sector List for the Chemical Manufacturing Sector will be determined, in part, based on data submitted by facility owners and operators through the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). DHS will work directly with the sector and relevant federal government agencies to address those CIKR not subject to CFATS. The result will be a Sector List that combines high-consequence CFATS and non-CFATS chemical facilities.

**Potential Threat Group(s)**

The Chemical/Hazmat sectors could potentially be targeted by a number of international and domestic groups. International groups like al-Qa’ida could view an attack on a chemical manufacturing plant as a viable means to create significant human casualties as well as economic damage. Targeting from domestic groups could come from environmental or animal rights extremist groups. Environmental groups may view chemical plants as harmful to nature. Animal groups may target this sector due to some chemical suppliers providing materials to animal research labs.395
Domestic Incidents

Sporadic nationwide reporting of potential surveillance of chemical and HAZMAT facilities and transport systems continues. Most of the reported incidents involve suspicious videotaping or photography of facilities with no apparent scenic or tourist value. Some incidents involve potential probes of security by individuals claiming to be lost or confused. Of particular interest was a recent report regarding a potential threat to the petrochemical infrastructure advising that an “inauthentic safety survey request” had been received by several American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) members. A number of association members reported receiving calls from a group claiming to represent AIChE or Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) asking them to participate in a survey about process safety. Neither organization was conducting such a survey. The Virginia Fusion Center does not have a full picture of how many members may have been contacted or how their information was obtained. The individuals who reported this survey expressed concern that this may have been a social engineering attempt to determine security vulnerabilities regarding chemical processes.

Virginia

While white powder incidents are the predominant form of HAZMAT type situations for Virginia law enforcement, a number of suspicious incidents involving chemical sector infrastructure have occurred within the past three years. Incidents of concern have included:

- suspicious facility photography
- chemical theft
- suspicious chemical possession,
- possible tampering of transportation lines

Although none of these incidents have been conclusively linked to terrorist activities, additional information is needed to identify the individuals involved and their motivations for engaging in these activities.
Intelligence Gaps

1. What groups represent the largest threat to Virginia’s Chemical sector?
2. Have any Virginia facilities received suspicious inquiries about employment?
3. Have any Virginia facilities experienced potential surveillance activities?
4. Have any Virginia facilities experienced solicitation regarding facility access or tests of security measures?
5. Have any facilities experienced incidents of unauthorized access or break-ins to facilities, either physical or cyber related?
6. Have any institutions received threats against facilities or members?
7. Have any Virginia facilities experienced a loss of official uniforms, identifications, vehicles, or property?
8. Have any companies experienced potential issues of insider threat from current or recently separated employees, contractors, or vendors?

Projections

While physical breaches or attacks of a Chemical/HAZMAT sector facility will always be a primary concern, cyber attacks will likely play an increasing role in potential threats to this critical infrastructure. Although most facilities and plants are difficult to access remotely, the sector could be compromised by an insider either for individual malicious reasons or as part of an international terrorist group attack.

Interest as Target: Remain Constant – No intelligence suggests any change in interest; however, an attack on Virginia's Chemical / HAZMAT sector could result in significant physical and financial losses, as well as have a major psychological toll.

Number of Virginia-based assets: Possible Decrease - Virginia has reported steady production in many of the subsectors within the Chemical / HAZMAT industry in recent years; the impact of the current economic recession may cause a decrease in total assets in the short to midterm.

Interdependencies: The Chemical/Hazmat sector has interdependencies with most of the surface transportation subsectors, energy, IT, and wastewater facilities.
Commercial Facilities

The Commercial Facilities sector is notable due to its large size and diversity of subsectors which share common features such as open public access, proximity to other sectors of interest to extremists, the capacity to serve large numbers of people, and the inherent difficulty in securing such venues. DHS groups appropriate facilities into one of eight subsectors, which includes:

1. Entertainment and media
2. Lodging
3. Outdoor events
4. Sports leagues
5. Public assemblies
6. Resorts
7. Real estate
8. Retail

Attacks on significant venues within these subsectors could potentially fulfill three of al-Qa'idah's strategic objectives for attacks against U.S. interests: inflicting economic damage, causing mass casualties, and damaging targets symbolic of U.S. culture.

Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector

The open and accessible nature of most commercial facilities frequently compounds the difficulties in recognizing truly suspicious behavior by individuals engaging in pre-operational behavior and enthusiastic spectators trying to gain a better vantage point or souvenir. Although no current, significant information has been developed to indicate credible plots against commercial facilities CIKR, 2000-2001 casing reports recovered from convicted al-Qa'idah operative Dhiren Barot highlight the sophisticated use of surveillance and information collection used to reconnoiter businesses in New York and New Jersey. The techniques for data collection and review, as well as recommendations for selecting attack methodology based on potential targets, are widely available on the internet and could educate or inspire less sophisticated extremists to attempt attacks using improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, or even aircraft as a weapon.
Sector List Criteria

1. Retail Facilities with an area greater than 2,200,000 square feet, and a capacity greater than 10,000 individuals; OR

2. Mixed-use districts that comprise a geographic area defined by the local government and that typically include a high concentration of prestigious commercial and residential facilities, and that are nationally recognized as a tourist destination and a unified economic entity. Due to the interdependent nature of facilities within such mixed-use districts, the loss of any one facility within the district could create a cascading effect across all other facilities within the district; OR

3. Commercial Office Buildings with a height greater than 850 feet; or a capacity greater than 10,000 individuals; OR

4. Residential Buildings designated by the Sector as nationally significant due to their size and expected consequences if destroyed; OR

5. Stadiums and racetracks with a capacity greater than 100,000 individuals; OR

6. Arenas and amphitheaters with a capacity greater than 20,000 individuals and an annual attendance greater than three million individuals; OR

7. Convention Centers with a trade show/exhibit/performance space that exceeds 700,000 square feet; OR

8. Cultural properties (museums, performing arts centers, zoos, etc.) with an annual attendance greater than two million individuals; OR

9. Amusement/theme parks with an annual of attendance greater than four million individuals; OR

10. Lodging facilities (hotels/motels) with at least 2,000 guest rooms; or a height greater than six hundred feet; or that host sensitive guests (e.g., foreign delegations, military, heads of state, diplomats, law enforcement) on a regular and ongoing basis; OR

11. Resort facilities (casinos) with at least 2,000 guest rooms and an average daily attendance of greater than 40,000 individuals; OR

12. Commercial facilities that are recognized internationally as representing the Nation's heritage, traditions, and/or values; or are otherwise nationally significant for commercial, cultural, historical, or civic reasons.
Potential Threat Group(s)

Intelligence continues to suggest that al-Qa’ida remains the most likely terror group to attempt an attack on commercial facilities within the U.S. While the projected threat from international groups such as HAMAS and Hizballah are assessed as low, the potential for less sophisticated plots by homegrown cells or domestic extremists groups such as ALF, ELF, militias, and white nationalists persists.

Domestic Incidents

A February 2006 posting on a jihadi message board entitled “How You Can Kill Thousands of Americans with a Few Hundred Dollars and Three Men” suggested targeting facilities during public events, such as sporting events, to maximize casualties. According to DHS reporting, the six individuals arrested for plotting to attack Fort Dix were also alleged to have considered targeting the Army-Navy football game. Reporting consistent with the potential lone wolf threat to sporting events and other commercial facilities includes:

- October 2005 incident in which a University of Oklahoma student was killed in an apparent self-initiated explosion adjacent to the school’s football stadium during a game.

- A potential incident in which an individual angered by a local government decision regarding his business drove to the site of the 2008 Super Bowl with the intentions and weaponry to go on a shooting spree, but changed his mind and turned himself in to police.

Virginia

The VFC received the following reports of suspicious incidents at commercial facilities during the 2009 survey process:

- Pulaski Police, Wythe Emergency Management reported security probes
- Richlands Police reported surveillance
- Chesapeake Police, Manassas City Police, and Northampton County reported suspicious persons
- Virginia State Police Chesapeake BCI reported surveillance and suspicious persons
- Manassas Park reported elicitation and surveillance
Specific reporting was also received on the following events:

- Martinsville Speedway - A temporary employee called in a bomb threat during a Sprint Cup race in March 2008 because he was tired of picking up trash and wanted to go home.\(^4\)\(^0\)\(^5\)
- A Charlottesville subject threatened Charlottesville malls by posting online threats to schools and malls in Charlottesville; the poster claimed he had nothing to lose and that when he finally snaps, he will take out as many people as he can.\(^4\)\(^0\)\(^6\)
- A threatening email regarding a theater and Wal-Mart in the Waynesboro and Staunton areas was received on April 28, 2008. The email indicated the subject was from Americas Most Wanted and that he was going to AMC and Wal-Mart at Waynesboro or Staunton to find someone and kill them.\(^4\)\(^0\)\(^7\)

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. What groups represents the largest threat to Virginia’s commercial facilities sector?
2. Have any Virginia facilities received suspicious inquiries about employment?
3. Have any Virginia facilities experienced potential surveillance activities?
4. Have any Virginia facilities experienced solicitation regarding facility access or tests of security measures?
5. Have any facilities experienced incidents of unauthorized access or break-ins to facilities, either physical or cyber related?
6. Have any facilities received threats against property or members?
7. Have any Virginia facilities experienced a loss of official uniforms, identifications, vehicles, or property?
8. Have any companies experienced potential issues of insider threat from current or recently separated employees, contractors, or vendors?
Projections

Virginia has a variety of commercial facilities that meet the size or operational capacities to qualify as CIKR. While much of the Commonwealth’s applicable CIKR is in northern Virginia, venues such as the Richmond International Raceway are also included.

**Interest as Target** - Likely to Increase - Worldwide statistics have shown that the commercial sector is most vulnerable to attack because of its easy access, limited security, and potential for large casualty numbers. The success of the 2008 Mumbai attacks against hotels may embolden cells wishing to conduct an attack. It is also plausible that al-Qa'ida may attempt additional attacks on commercial key assets in an attempt to collapse the already volatile US economy.

**Number of Virginia-based assets**: Remain Constant - While the current economic recession will likely preclude the construction of new commercial facilities that meet the standards to qualify as CIKR, it is anticipated that most of the facilities of sufficient size will continue operations.

**Interdependencies**: Likely to Increase - An attack on one soft target may have a trickle-down effect on the rest of the U.S., as a terrorist attack to one retail facility may slow down shopping across the country or an attack on one hotel may slow tourism.
Critical Manufacturing

As the newest of the 18 CIKR sectors, the Virginia Fusion Center does not currently have sufficient data for analysis specific to Virginia. According to the DHS Prevention & Protection webpage, the following companies are members of the Critical Manufacturing Sector Committee:

- ArcelorMittal USA
- Caterpillar Inc
- Chrysler LLC
- Deere & Company
- Ford Motor Company
- General Motors
- Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
- Kohler Company
- Navistar International Corporation
- United States Steel Corporation

Sector List Criteria

The Sector List for the Critical Manufacturing sector will be comprised of those facilities meeting the criteria below that could create the greatest consequences if their production and/or supply chains are significantly disrupted. Critical Manufacturing Facilities on the Sector List are those that meet the following criteria:

1. Fit into one or more of the following functional areas that are defined in the Critical Manufacturing Sector-Specific Plan:
   a. Primary Metals Manufacturing
   b. Machinery Manufacturing
   c. Electrical Equipment Manufacturing
   d. Transportation and Heavy Equipment Manufacturing; OR

2. Provide systems, subsystems, components, or parts as a sole source supplier; OR

3. Produce goods and services requiring a long lead-time (as defined by the sector).
Emergency Services

The Emergency Services sector is a system of preparedness, response, and recovery components that prevent and mitigate the risk from terrorist attacks and manmade and natural disasters. Although the Emergency Services sector is comprised of nine distinct functions or disciplines, many personnel are cross-trained and thus provide services to multiple disciplines. Functions and disciplines include law enforcement, bomb explosive ordnance demolition, special weapons and tactics and tactical operations, firefighting, emergency medical services, search and rescue and urban search and rescue, emergency management, and hazardous materials response.

Sector List Criteria

The Emergency Services Sector (ESS) List will be determined by a number of factors, including the following:

1. Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP), and Emergency Broadcast Services (EBS) of particular note, will be nominated by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC), Protective Security Advisor (PSA), and Emergency Support Function 2 (ESF2) Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) representatives in coordination and collaboration with the Emergency Services and other Communications Sector representatives. Criteria include:
   a. Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) that are FCC registered, including single jurisdiction, multiple jurisdiction, and consolidated PSAPs as described in the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) Minimum Standards for Emergency Telephone Notification Systems Document 56-003, June 12, 2004. OR
   b. PSAPs that are located in areas of persistent critical impact. OR
   c. Service of unique capabilities (e.g., non-English broadcast of Emergency Alert System, information in areas with high concentrations of non-English speaking individuals).

2. Telecommunications Emergency Response Taskforces (TERTs), Type I and Type II as described in the National Joint TERT Initiative (NJTI) document, June 4, 2008.


The Emergency Services sector, which is comprised largely of local and state level public safety agencies is served by the Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC). The EMR-ISAC offers routine Infograms and periodic CIP Bulletins and Notices to vetted public safety officials throughout the U.S.

**Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector**

Emergency services personnel may observe indicators of terrorism tradecraft related to surveillance or elicitation, while public safety agencies face the risk of attempted infiltration. While infiltration attempts may be thwarted by thorough pre-employment screenings, agencies must also remain vigilant for signs that existing personnel may have become involved in extremist groups. An additional, pervasive problem affecting this sector is that of lost, stolen, and/or forged credentials which could afford a potential terrorist or criminal access to sensitive events and sites.

**Potential Threat Group(s)**

Large-scale attack plans envisioned by terror or extremist groups frequently involve a mechanism, such as a secondary device, to target emergency responders and hamper rescue efforts. Specific targeting of emergency services sector personnel has also been observed in attacks conducted by lone wolf or homegrown extremists. Also of interest to the Emergency Services sector is the recurring posts suggesting arson as a form of jihad; while the inspiration for the February 2009 Australian brush fires is currently unknown, the media coverage could inspire future attacks.

**Domestic Incidents**

California law enforcement officials have warned fire stations throughout the state about incidents of "covert photography and surveillance of fire response stations" reported between July and September 2007. These instances were reportedly being conducted by men described as Middle Eastern in appearance, taking photographs of fire stations located primarily north of the greater Los Angeles area.

With the advent of cyber-terrorism, computer systems, including those used by emergency services agencies, are now the targets of an increasing number of threats. Threat groups are determined to create a major malfunctioning in computer-controlled infrastructures, particularly during an emergency or disasters. Interruption or destruction of computer related services such as computer-aided dispatch would jeopardize response operations. A cyber attack on emergency services would most likely take the form of a blended cyber-physical attack. A cyber method may be used to facilitate or exacerbate a physical attack, such as disabling 911 services during a physical attack on emergency response personnel. In the most likely scenario, terrorists would use the cyber component of the attack to increase chaos caused by the primary physical attack.

An additional threat faced by emergency services agencies is that of infiltration. In the past three years, media reports of infiltration into local, state, and federal emergency services have focused on foreign individuals who committed fraud to gain sensitive positions. While some cases may
have intuitive linkages to international groups, other instances have involved undocumented aliens who came to the U.S. as young children, then falsified documents to create the appearance of citizenship. In some cases, agencies outside of Virginia have noted instances in which current emergency services personnel had affiliated themselves with extremist elements, such as white nationalist groups. Available reporting did not specify if such personnel had been recruited by such organizations or if they had sought out such affiliations.

According to the 2009 Terrorism Threat Assessment survey of Fire and EMS agencies, the City of Fairfax Fire Department noted a potential surveillance of facilities within the past year. Louisa, Powhatan, Spotsylvania, and Norfolk also noted suspicious activities. None of the responding jurisdictions reported suspicious individuals seeking membership; a few noted that prospective members had to undergo background checks and suggested that these checks would be sufficient to screen out potential infiltrators.

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. Have any agencies encountered suspicious inquiries about employment or volunteering with organizations?
2. Have any agencies experienced possible surveillance or elicitation of security measures of facilities?
3. Have any official uniforms, identifications, vehicles, or property been reported missing, lost or stolen recently?
4. Do any agencies have current or recently separated members involved in suspicious activity?
5. What groups represents the largest threat to each subsector?

**Projections**

The Emergency Services sector will remain an important and vulnerable sector of interest to groups with nefarious intentions. The three Emergency Services sector departments in California that reported surveillance incidents in late 2007 may be indicative of an increasing trend. Surveillance of this sector is often incorporated into pre-operational planning for terror and extremist groups. The infiltration of the Emergency Services sector by terror or extremist groups will remain tempting due to increased access to sensitive information and locations. National intelligence sources warn that terrorists may attempt to target related infrastructure as it could bring widespread media attention while also creating new dangers to responders. These attacks could include the use of tactics involving vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. Deliberate primary or secondary attacks could be directed at emergency services personnel and/or infrastructure by terror or extremist groups as seen in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

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nnnn (OS) Nada Nadim Prouty, a Lebanese national who fraudulently gained U.S. citizenship through a sham marriage, managed to obtain sensitive jobs at both the FBI and CIA, and at one point used her security clearance to access restricted files about the terrorist group Hizballah (Cl Centre: Nada Prouty Counterintelligence Case).

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**LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE**

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**Energy**

The Virginia Energy sector consists of electric, oil, nuclear, and natural gas assets that are dispersed geographically but connected by an array of physical and electronic networks to provide essential services to residential, commercial, and industrial users. While the interconnected nature of this sector helps to meet its key objective of efficient delivery of services, it also represents a vulnerability that can be exploited by terrorists or extremists. Damage or destruction to a critical energy sector facility could threaten public health and the environment.\(^415\) While the energy sector contains many sub-sectors, each of these features generation facilities and distribution networks which feature unique vulnerabilities which may attract extremists.

### Sector List Criteria - Energy

**Electricity Sub-Sector:**

1. Power generation plants having total generating capacity across all units that exceed 2,000 MW; **OR**
2. Bulk electric power system headquarters and operational control and coordination centers (Control Centers for North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Regional Coordinators and designated Regional Transmission Organizations, Independent Transmission Organizations, and Independent System Operators); **OR**
3. All transmission substations along lines rated at 345 Kilovolt (kV) or higher that serve standard metropolitan statistical areas of two million persons or more; **OR**
4. Alternate Current-Direct Current (AC-DC) converter stations for Direct Current (DC) transmission lines; **OR**
5. Transmission substations (likely more than one) that are needed to provide electric service to a Tier 1 asset.

The **Electricity Sector ISAC** (ES-ISAC), as a part of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), provides virtually 100% coverage in the continental United States and Canada for direct to bulk power system entities or via the eighteen Reliability Coordinators. The ES-ISAC is also working on developing the necessary communication and participation with non-bulk power system entities (i.e. smaller electric distribution organizations) to include relationships with their critical suppliers.\(^416\)
Electricity in the U.S. is commonly generated using coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear energy, or hydropower. Alternative energy generation methods include harnessing geothermal energy, wind power, biomass, solar energy, and fuel cells.  

- Coal-fired stations provide 26% of electric energy generation capacity in Virginia.
- Hydroelectric plants in Virginia include both conventional hydroelectric generators and pumped-storage generators. Virginia’s Bath County Pumped Storage Station in Warm Spring is the world’s second largest pumped-storage power plant. Electricity is generated by pumping water from a lower reservoir to an upper reservoir during off peak hours; during high electrical demands, water is released back into the lower reservoir using six 350-megawatt turbine generators.
  - The Bath County Pumped Storage Station has a Class I high hazard dam; a sudden failure of the dam would result in the probable loss of life and excessive economic loss downstream.
  - An attack on a high hazard dam could also cause hundreds or thousands of deaths and the economical and psychological impact of breaching one of these dams could be significant.
- Nuclear power generates almost one-third of the electricity in Virginia via Dominion’s two commercial nuclear facilities, North Anna in Louisa County and Surry in Surry County.

### Sector List Criteria - Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector

The Nuclear Sector List will be determined based on the following criteria:

1. All operating nuclear power plants; OR
2. All operating nuclear fuel fabrication facilities and other uranium processing facilities employing highly enriched uranium; OR
3. All operating nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, uranium hexafluoride production facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities employing low enriched uranium; OR
4. Research and test reactors employing highly enriched uranium; OR
5. Research and test reactors employing low enriched uranium; OR
6. Major active manufacturers and distributors of sealed sources and devices containing
   a. Category 1 or Category 2 radiation sources as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources” OR
   b. Active commercial irradiators (underwater irradiators and wet-source-storage panoramic irradiators); OR
7. All Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI).
The most serious vulnerabilities within the electric sector are those created by regional transmission systems. These systems include the power grids that carry the high-voltage power to consumers, high-voltage transmission lines, substations, and high-voltage transformers that “step up” current for transmission and “step down” current onto the low-voltage lines necessary for distribution to consumers. This particular aspect of the electric sector is extremely vulnerable to terrorist attack because there are very few high-voltage transformers held in excess inventory. High-voltage transformers also take months to replace, and are very difficult to transport because they can weigh in excess of 400,000 lbs.\textsuperscript{423}

The Energy ISAC is a non-profit group that educates and helps protect members of the energy industry from threats to their facilities and operations through Department of Energy grants. Key partnerships include the American Petroleum Institute, the American Gas Association, the Association of Oil Pipelines, the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, the Independent Petroleum Association of America, the National Petrochemical and Refiners Association, and the American Public Gas Association.

### Sector List Criteria - Energy

**Oil Sub-Sector:**

1. Petroleum terminals with total storage capacity of 1.5 million barrels or more; OR
2. All operable petroleum refineries, except those that primarily produce asphalt; OR
3. Ethanol plants that produce 10,000 barrels a day or more of ethanol.

**Natural Gas Sub-Sector:**

1. Natural gas plants with a capacity of 500 million cubic feet per day or more; OR
2. All active import liquefied natural gas terminals.

Virginia has a number of oil and natural gas infrastructure components, including wells, pipelines, refineries, petroleum terminals, storage plants, pumping stations, water and motor carriers, and railroads. In Virginia, oil and gas are produced or have the potential of being produced in commercial quantities from three general geologic regions:

- Appalachian basin in the western part of the state,
- Mesozoic basins that are exposed in the Piedmont Physiographic Province, or lie buried beneath the Atlantic Coastal Plain, and
The petroleum refining industry in Virginia uses energy to supply heat and power for plant operations and as a raw material for the production of petrochemicals and other non-fuel products. Due to the chemical structure of petroleum, it may be transported to refineries for distillation in order to be used for a variety of purposes. Oil can be transported to power plants by ship, pipelines, truck, or train. Petroleum-based fuels account for less than five percent of Virginia's electrical energy production but supports more than a third of Virginia's energy consumption of transportation fuels, such as gasoline, diesel fuel, and aviation fuel. Petroleum-based fuels are used as a fuel for eight electricity generation plants along the eastern region of Virginia.

Yorktown Refinery, Virginia's major oil refinery, processes around 70,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Located on the York River, the refinery receives crude oil shipments from around the world directly to the dock by barge through private deep-water port access. Refineries separate the various components of crude oil into specific petroleum products and are the critical link between oil and usable oil products such as gasoline and transportation fuels.

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is a colorless and odorless hazardous fuel that is frequently shipped in tankers from overseas to U.S. ports and is commonly used by electric generating stations. LNG infrastructure consists primarily of tankers, import terminals, and inland storage plants. LNG assets in Virginia include plants in Lynchburg and Chesapeake, a propane air plant in Staunton, and several compressor stations throughout the state. Major gas operating areas are located in the Central, Northwest, and Hampton Roads regions, including in Chester, Fredericksburg, Lynchburg, Gainesville, Staunton, Lexington, and Suffolk areas.

The pipeline system is an essential component of the Energy Sector. In the U.S., the oil pipeline system comprises some 200,500 miles of steel or plastic pipe, transporting around two-thirds of the nation's petroleum. Natural gas is carried though the U.S. by an additional 180,000 miles of carbon steel pipeline. In Virginia, gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oils, and aviation fuel are received from two petroleum-product pipelines originating in the Gulf of Mexico region. Due to the demand for natural gas throughout the U.S., several new pipelines have been proposed for construction in Virginia. Proposed pipeline routes include:

- the extension of a pipeline currently terminating in Radford to Roanoke and Franklin County;
- Greenbrier pipeline project that would extend from North Carolina to West Virginia, passing through Virginia along a path extending from Henry to Giles and Bland Counties; and
- Patriot Extension pipeline that would extend from Henry to Wythe County.
Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector

Terrorism tradecraft is the most significant trend affecting the Energy sector. Given the diversity of sites, structures, and geographic locations in this industry, the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by environmental groups can vary widely. In some cases, the remote location of towers and substations makes them vulnerable to vandalism and sabotage, while open access to wildlife areas or other public use of surrounding land may afford opportunities for surveillance.

Potential Threat Group(s)

Refineries, natural gas, and oil infrastructures are attractive economic targets for a variety of international and single-issue domestic groups. While international groups such as al-Qa’ida have specifically listed energy sector assets as targets, environmental extremists have conducted physical protests, vandalisms, and potential acts of sabotage against energy facilities. Animal rights groups could also represent an additional threat to coal stations as some are opposed to mountaintop removal mining, which is used to resupply stations, but could affect the surrounding wildlife habitat.

Energy infrastructure targeted for action is usually linked either to a controversial form of generation (i.e. coal or nuclear) or for potential environmental impact on a specific site. In a written document produced by environmentalist group South East Climate Convergence (SECC) entitled “Action Atlas 2008,” the Chesterfield Power Station was listed as a target that activists should consider targeting during their convergence conference in August 2008. Groups that have been affiliated with direct actions against Energy sector assets include Mountain Justice Summer, Katuah Earth First, Rising Tide North America, Southern Appalachian Stewards, and Animal Liberation Front. Another specific threat frequently cited in Energy sector publications is that of the insider threat posed by disgruntled employees.

Domestic Incidents

Reports of suspicious photography, videotaping, and vandalism to Energy sector assets have occurred throughout the U.S. Incidents have involved not only power generation facilities and substations, but also refineries, natural gas and oil infrastructures. Most of these incidents cannot be resolved through investigation due to a lack of identifying information on the vehicles or individuals involved.

A review of 2007 and 2008 suspicious pipeline events reported in the TSA-OI suspicious incident database suggests a marked decrease in suspicious incident reporting; likely causes for this decrease include increased security measures, training, information sharing, and timely investigation. Most suspicious incidents involve possible surveillance by individuals who are not intercepted and interviewed. Recent surveillance events include:
• March 2008: A mobile security team observed an individual photographing an unspecified oil refinery in Roxana, Missouri. The person abruptly left the scene before he could be questioned.

• April 2008: An identified foreign national male was observed photographing a chemical plant in Port Arthur, Texas. Later the same day, an unidentified male subject was observed photographing a refinery in the same area.

• December 2008: A security officer observed a female with a camera going through a security fence to take pictures of a refinery located in Houston, Texas.

Other suspicious events reported during this period include actual or attempted sabotage, vandalism, tampering or related threats, explosive-related items, and other activities.438

• April 2008: A pipe bomb was detonated at a U.S. energy company’s well site.

• December 2008: A failed improvised explosive device was found attached to a pipe connected to a natural gas well near Bloomfield, New Mexico. The device was comprised of a compressor coil, an automobile spark plug, and wires.

• September 2007: Gunshot holes were found on a six-inch oil products junction line for an identified U.S. railroad company in Valencia, Florida, which necessitated shutting the product line down.

• December 2007: At a liquid natural gas facility in Lake Charles, Louisiana, unknown perpetrators tried to remove the outer security gate using a cable and a vehicle.

Virginia

Suspicious activity reports concerning Virginia’s Energy Sector include:

• Vandalism of mining equipment at the A&G Surface Mining operation in Wise County439

• Anonymous note threatening to blow up refinery facilities found in a portable bathroom at the Yorktown Refinery Giant Industries in York County440

• On February 19, 2008, a security breach occurred at the Yorktown refinery where a gate located at the back of the property had been forced open and the chain was broken441

• Suspicious photography incident involving an identified individual claiming to represent an unknown group at a power station in Pittsylvania442

• Suspicious subject in attendance at a Dominion Power meeting in Louisa was subsequently discovered to be a possible match for a subject on the Terrorist Watch List443

• Suspicious individual engaged in persistent questioning of employees regarding refinery operations at the Motiva Enterprise Newington Terminal in Lorton444
On August 1, 2008, two suspicious individuals attempted to elicit information from a Dominion employee at the North Anna Power Station; subsequent investigation identified one of the subjects as a known environmental extremist.

On August 7, 2008, an environmental protest held at North Anna Power Station was conducted, resulting in seven arrests, including the arrest of a known radical organizer of the South East Climate Convergence (SECC).

On April 30, 2008, seven passengers aboard a white pontoon boat dressed in traditional Middle Eastern garments immediately sped away after being sighted in the recreational area, which is in close proximity to the plant. The boat registrant has been identified; however, additional follow-up information is not available.

On May 29, 2005, a Middle Eastern male and female were observed on the recreation island near the plant and were observed outside of the buoys scouting the complex. The individuals admitted that they had entered the no boat zone and appeared amused by security efforts.

On September 8, 2008, a suspicious individual was observed photographing an identified oil terminal in Virginia.

In February 2009, two camp propane tanks at the base of two high voltage Dominion Power tower legs were set on fire in Spotsylvania. The tanks had duct tape over the propane cylinders, and a separate container had been placed at the base of one of the tower legs and ignited. Numerous wooden matches, a cigarette butt, gasoline, and a light oil substance were also found. According to officials at the scene, if the propane tanks had been approximately 12” higher and fully engulfed and ignited, the resulting fire could have caused a tower collapse.
Intelligence Gaps

1. Have there been any suspicious attempts to elicit information concerning facility operations?
2. Have there been any attempts to test or conduct reconnaissance of security operations?
3. Have there been any suspicious individuals taking extensive notes, photographing, videotaping, or sketching the exterior or interior of energy facilities and mobile surveillance by cars, trucks, motorcycles, boats, or small aircraft?
4. Have there been any persons showing uncommon interest in security measures or personnel, entry points or access controls, or perimeter barriers such as fences or walls?
5. Has there been any suspicious activity by employees that could pose a threat to plant operations?
6. Have there been attempts by foreign nationals to gain access or elicit information from facility personnel?
7. Which environmentalist group poses the largest threat to Virginia’s energy facilities?

Projections

Energy critical infrastructure will remain vulnerable to acts of terrorism by domestic and international terrorist groups as the sector remains essential to the economy, national defense and the quality of life. In Virginia, power stations, including nuclear, hydro and coal facilities, will continue to be videotaped and photographed by saboteurs in order to assess the capabilities of existing security and discerning weaknesses in the facility. Dry runs and the probing of information from employees may also be conducted. Additionally, environmental extremists will continue to conduct protests against power stations due to issues such as climate change, pollution, conservation, and the environmental impact of dams. Transmission and distribution systems are also not seen as a likely target at this time; however, the potential for damage against these structures cannot be dismissed.

Interest as Target: Remain High - Energy sector assets have been listed as a high priority for al-Qaida and for many of the special interest extremists.

Number of Virginia-based assets: Likely to Increase – Increasing demands for power generation and emerging technologies, including proposed pipelines, represent the potential for growth in this sector. The potential for federal stimulus funding related to ‘green technology’ may also increase the number of energy assets in Virginia.

Interdependencies: Remain High – The energy sector is one of the core critical components that enables or facilitates the operation of almost every other sector.
Government Buildings/Defense Industrial Base

State government facilities include those owned or leased by all levels of government and can be located domestically and overseas. Many of these facilities such as courthouses, education facilities, libraries, and archives are open to the public and provide important government services. Other facilities contain highly sensitive information, materials, processes, and equipment such as military installations, embassies, and research facilities and are not open to the public. These facilities, varied in function, size, and location, are differentiated from other CIKR sectors because they are uniquely governmental. The abundance of government facilities and military related infrastructure in Virginia coupled with their symbolic nature and past attacks on such infrastructure in the U.S. suggests this sector remains especially vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist and extremist groups.

Sector List Criteria

1. Government facilities that regularly house national leadership personnel (elected or appointed). This includes personnel with the responsibility or authority to:
   a. Mobilize military or civil support resources
   b. Conduct negotiations with foreign governments
   c. Make decisions regarding national monetary or fiscal policy
   d. Pass national legislation
   e. Provide final arbitration or interpretation of legal issues; OR

2. Government facilities that house material or equipment that could cause a significant loss of life. OR

3. Government facilities that house material or equipment that are critical to execution of national essential government functions. OR

4. Government facilities that house personnel with specialized knowledge or skills necessary to conduct national essential government functions.
Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector

Due to the desire of most international and many domestic groups to target the U.S. government, trends of significance include terrorism tradecraft techniques of surveillance, elicitation, and security probes. The trend of illicit entry into the U.S. also affects this sector, as many individuals will enter government facilities to obtain necessary documentation.

Local, state, and federal government facilities are highly interconnected, both physically and through cyber networks. Efforts to identify, understand, and analyze interdependencies and dependencies are challenging because of the diversity and complexity of these facilities or components. Interdependencies vary widely and each has its own characteristics, whether physical, cyber, or geographic in nature.

Virginia facilities may be impacted by the closure of Guantanamo Bay; a recent report by the House Armed Services Committee has recommended government sites in Quantico and Norfolk as possible transfer locations for current Guantanamo detainees. According to early February 2009 reporting, a task force has 30 days to recommend where to put the 245 remaining detainees.451

Sector List Criteria – Defense Industrial Base

The identification of DIB Sector List assets is based upon the Department of Defense’s (DoD) analysis of the impact on current warfighting capabilities, recovery and reconstitution, threat, vulnerability and consequences of possible facility disruption and destruction, and other considerations. This analysis is a two-tiered process which first identifies a subset of the DIB based on the following factors:

1. Sole source for a weapon system, subsystem, component, or part
2. Uses obsolete/enabling/emerging technology
3. Requires long lead time
4. Lacks surge production
5. Has a significant unit cost escalation; AND

This subset is then further analyzed to produce the critical elements of the DIB that comprise the Sector List. The factors for this analysis include:

1. They are a prime or subcontractor single source with unique technology or industrial capability that could significantly impact war fighter operations due to non-availability of material;
2. They are a prime contractor with capabilities that support numerous programs or industries;
3. They are a single source subcontractor with a long re-qualification time that supports numerous programs across the services; and
4. They are an essential advanced technology source.
Potential Threat Group(s)
Local, state, and federal government facilities represent attractive targets for a wide variety of groups. While international groups are most likely to target the military and federal sector assets as symbols of the West, domestic movements including anarchists, black separatists, white nationalists, and homegrown extremists have conducted activities targeting facilities at various levels of government.

Domestic Incidents
On a national level, numerous reports of surveillance and security probes against military installations continue. These reports include incidents of elicitation as well as security breaches involving the use of fraudulent military and law enforcement credentials. Although the vast majority of these incidents have not been definitely linked to terrorism, the continued reporting of pre-operational-type surveillance merits increased vigilance.452

Virginia
The Virginia Fusion Center has not received a significant number of unresolved reports pertaining to general government facilities. Much more reporting has been received regarding suspicious activity around military bases. It is unclear at this time if this disparity reflects actual rates of occurrence or if this is due to the increased security awareness inherent in military force protection.

Examples of suspicious activity pertaining to Virginia include:

- Suspicious attempts to purchase military uniforms near Yorktown453
- Persistent attempts to bypass security controls by a group of subjects at Fort Story454
- Suspicious photography of the entrance gate to the Naval Weapons Laboratory at Dahlgren455

The Virginia Fusion Center does not currently possess active threat information against any of these facilities, nor is there any evidence of patterns in the timing, location, or individuals involved in these incidents.
Intelligence Gaps

1. Have suspicious employment inquiries been received at Virginia’s government or DIB facilities?
2. Have any possible surveillance activities of any building or assets associated with government or DIB assets occurred?
3. Have suspicious inquiries about security measures been received?
4. How frequently are unauthorized attempts to access government or DIB facilities in Virginia discovered?
5. Have there been any threats against government or DIB staff or officials?
6. Have any concerns regarding potential misconduct by current or recently separated employees been received?

Projections

The Government Buildings and Military Installations sector is expected to remain an important and potentially vulnerable sector at risk for surveillance, infiltration, or attacks by groups with nefarious intentions. It is anticipated the VFC will continue to receive reporting of potential surveillance or probing of government and military facilities.

**Interest as a Target:** Remain High - Due to the symbolic nature and the potential operational disruption, facilities within this sector may be desirable, if not necessarily feasible targets for many international and domestic groups.

**Number of Virginia-based assets:** Remain Constant – Current economic conditions make expansion unlikely, but industries that support government and military functions will not likely face the same contraction of other sectors.

**Interdependencies:** Significant - These sectors are heavily reliant on energy, IT, and telecommunications, as well as each major transportation mode. The interruption of government or CIKR could quickly cascade and have significant impact on other sectors, especially those that are highly regulated.

As shown in the Terrorism Screening Center’s 2007 Virginia Terrorist Screening Database Encounters Report, a number of potentially “watch-listed” subjects either applied for government and military positions or were involved in suspicious incidents near such facilities. Although these instances have not been linked to specific plots, these instances underscore the potential for infiltration or pre-incident activity.
Information Technology and Communications

The Information Technology (IT) and Telecommunications Sectors face numerous multifaceted global threats. On a daily basis, more than $3 trillion worth of U.S. economic activity passes through secure federal financial networks enabled in part by Virginia Information Technology and Telecommunications assets. CIKR sectors rely on Information Technology and Telecommunications for products and services, including the reliable operation of networks and systems and the movement and storage of critical data. These sectors proactively manage risk to their own operations and those of their customers through monitoring and mitigation activities that prevent routine incidents from creating significant disruptions. Although the Information Technology and Telecommunications Sectors are designed to maximize inherent resilience, its interdependent and interconnected structure presents challenges and opportunities for coordinating preparedness and protection activities.

Sector List Criteria

The IT Sector designates functions which are critical to the operations and processes that support the Nation's CIKR. These functions are:

1. Provide IT Products and Services, such as: networking elements; security and policy compliance elements; operating system services software; business operations, database, and business intelligence software and services; managed network/data center elements; semiconductors; storage hardware, software, and services; lifecycle product and service integrity, certification, and other assurance functions and mechanisms; Domain Name System (DNS) software; secure appliances that support DNS; and control systems products, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), and other automation systems.

2. Provide Incident Management Capabilities, such as: Preventative Guidance, Best Practices, Simulation, and Testing; Indications, Alerting and Warning Capabilities; and Operation Centers and Teams.

3. Provide Internet-based Content, Information, and Communications Services.

4. Provide Domain Name Resolution Services.


6. Provide Internet Routing, Access, and Connection Services.
The Information Technology ISAC (IT-ISAC) is a trusted community of security specialists from companies across the Information Technology industry dedicated to protecting the Information Technology infrastructure by identifying threats and vulnerabilities to the infrastructure, and sharing best practices on how to address them quickly and properly. IT-ISAC has the ability to reach 90% of all desktop operating systems, 85% of all databases, 76% of the global microprocessor market, 85% of all routers, and 65% of software security via membership.

Sector List Criteria - Communications

Nominations submitted through the National Coordinating Center (NCC) for will be submitted from all facets of the National Communications System (NCS):

1. Industry nominations – The private sector will designate those facilities critical to their networks, to include:
   a. Communication-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)
   b. Resident/overall (includes wireline and wireless)
   c. Other private sub-sectors such as satellite and broadcast
   d. Government technologies akin to Global Positioning System (GPS); OR

2. Nominations by the manager/director of the NCS – The manager/director of the NCS will work with HITRAC to identify any additional assets of interest; OR

3. Nominations by the Committee of Principals (COP)/Committee of Representatives (COR) will designate operations of mission critical, essential, and enhancing communications support and provide a comparison with identified communications support Telecommunication Service Priority (TSP) Circuits ID; OR

4. Emergency Services – Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP), and Emergency Broadcast Services (EBS) of particular note, will be nominated by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC), Protective Security Advisor (PSA), and Emergency Support Function 2 (ESF2) Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) representatives in coordination and collaboration with the Emergency Services and other

5. High Capacity Assets:
   a. Major switching centers that support end users in excess of 843,500 people, and support a capacity in excess of 2,745,000 phone numbers; OR
   b. Major underwater cable landings in a localized area with an aggregate Lit capacity of at least 240 Gigabits per second (Gbps), or those critical to the country’s national security capabilities to include intelligence and defense functions; OR
   c. Telecommunications hotels containing assets that directly connect the top six service providers with each other. Other service providers may also be considered within this criterion if they are deemed to provide critical mission support on a regional or national scale.
The National Communication Center is a designated Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) to facilitate the exchange among government and industry participants regarding vulnerability, threat, intrusion, and anomaly information affecting the telecommunications infrastructure. Members include communications equipment and software vendors, 95% of wire line communications providers, 90% of wireless communications providers, including satellite providers, and 90% of Internet Service Provider backbone networks.457

**Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector**

Cyber-crime and cyber-terror represent the overall trends of most impact to this sector. The high degree of interdependency of the Information Technology and Telecommunications sectors, its interconnectedness, and non-traceable and unidentifiable actors makes identifying threats, assessing vulnerabilities, and estimating consequence difficult.

**Potential Threat Group(s)**

Anonymous, which is characterized as loosely affiliated cells of activists, communicates via Internet message boards and networking websites. Group affiliates also use forums to target individuals by engaging in cyber attacks and have been associated with white powder incidents. The group appears to be using forums, information sites, and video sharing sites to spread their messages. If successful, this tactic may be used by domestic extremist groups to organize protests, disturbances, or attacks. The ability of a group of Internet-based hackers to organize and succeed in launching real world protests may be a developing trend. The successes of Anonymous are unprecedented and may be the beginning of a new type of Internet activism that has real world implications.

**Domestic Incidents**

As noted in the cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism trend section, a variety of incidents and attempted intrusions have been reported throughout the U.S. in recent years. While reported activity ranged from ‘hacktivism’ to attempted botnet attacks and cyber-security related extortion, most experts agree that not all cyber incidents are reported and analyzed. While the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), a partnership between the Department of Homeland Security and the public and private sectors has ceased publishing comprehensive reports on attack statistics, information on specific, widespread threats or trends is available through their website. In Virginia, only one local jurisdiction reported to the VFC that their local government network had been hacked. The VFC was not notified of any private industry incidents, but this is likely due to a lack of reporting rather than a lack of intrusions.
Intelligence Gaps

1. Have suspicious employment inquiries been received at Virginia’s IT or http://www.us-cert.gov/ facilities?
2. Have any possible surveillance activities of any building or assets associated with IT or http://www.us-cert.gov/ assets occurred?
3. Have suspicious inquiries about Virginia IT or http://www.us-cert.gov/ security measures been received?
4. How frequently are unauthorized attempts to access to IT or http://www.us-cert.gov/ facilities in Virginia discovered?
5. Have there been any threats against IT or http://www.us-cert.gov/ staff or officials?
6. Have any concerns regarding potential misconduct by current or recently separated IT or http://www.us-cert.gov/ employees been received?

Projections

Due to extensive dependence on IT infrastructure by Virginia state agencies, public works, and the private sector, the risk of an attack of this nature remains viable. This threat is highlighted as international and domestic terrorist organizations have expressed the capability and desire to exploit Information Technology for operational and logistical support. While the VFC does not possess information that such groups are planning attacks against Virginia IT infrastructure, extremist and criminal organizations could exploit cyber vulnerabilities targeting electric power, communications and rail systems, causing major service disruptions and a cascading effect to related industries.
Monuments and Icons

National monuments and icons (NMI) could be attractive targets to terrorists considering their national significance, generally open security, and concentration of people. Attacks on such symbolic infrastructure would have serious economic and social consequences.\textsuperscript{458} Not only could there be a number of casualties, especially for co-located icons or nearby infrastructures but the tourism and recreation industry, as well as the national psyche, could be damaged if a significant monument or icon were destroyed.\textsuperscript{2}

\textit{Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector}

The sector is especially vulnerable because it is open to the public and accommodates a large number of people within specific, known times, making it difficult to detect operational planning and surveillance. Given the wide variety of qualifying structures and location, the vulnerability and attractiveness of each site varies with the site’s engineering, size, age, purpose, and number of visitors.\textsuperscript{459} The most likely form of attack, due to the ease of access and the lack of security at national monuments and icons, as well as similar tourist attractions, is from vehicle borne or traditional improvised explosive devices (VBIED/IED).\textsuperscript{460} The potential for a small arms attack in a lone wolf ‘active shooter’ scenario is also possible, especially within the homegrown or domestic extremist categories.

\textbf{Sector List Criteria}

The National Monuments and Icons List will include Monuments and Icons that meet all of the following:

1. A monument, physical structure, or object; AND
2. Recognized both nationally and internationally as representing the Nation’s heritage, traditions, and/or values or is recognized for its national, cultural, religious, historical, or political significance; AND
3. Primary purpose is to memorialize or represent significant aspects of our Nation’s heritage, traditions, or values and to serve as a point of interest for visitors and educational activities. It generally does not have a purpose or function that fits under the responsibility of another sector.
Potential Threat Group(s)

Al-Qa’ida has repeatedly emphasized the importance of selecting targets of symbolic value, such as those within the NMI sector, which symbolize American history and values. As demonstrated in previous attacks, including those against the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, the USS The Sullivans and USS Cole in 2000, the Pentagon in 2001, and embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 all targeted symbols of American capitalism, military power, and global policies and presence.461 Domestic extremists, such as white nationalists or black separatists, may target sites that feature historic interpretation that is not aligned with the group’s ideology. Whereas white nationalists may target newer historic interpretations that include the roles of African-Americans, black separatists may target those sites that have not expanded their interpretive views.

It is also important to note the potential for insider threat, as many of the national monument and icon sites have private security with full site access. The potential for paid security staff or for volunteers to leverage their access to such sites for the purpose of surveillance and information collection is significant.462

Domestic Incidents

Terrorist operational planning and surveillance against tourist-related facilities and infrastructure is often difficult to detect due to the presence of crowds, the intentional open nature of public access and the availability of open source information. Although authorities have reported numerous suspicious activities, write-ins, and call-ins for this sector, such reports have generally been poor indicators of future operations.463 According to a DHS report, the following domestic incidents or plots concerned national monuments or icons464:

- September 2003 interviews revealed a now-detained senior al-Qa’ida operative’s desire to obtain pilots for al-Qa’ida in order to attack targets that included the Washington Monument.
- Convicted Taliban supporter John Philip Walker Lindh told FBI interviewers that the most recognizable landmarks to al-Qa’ida and Taliban soldiers, trainers, and students while he was in Afghanistan were the Statue of Liberty, the World Trade Center, and the Golden Gate Bridge.
- A senior al-Qa’ida operative stated in a December 2004 custodial interview that any symbol of the United States would be a good target and singled out the Statue of Liberty as an example of a potential symbolic target.
Virginia

DHS and the Department of Interior have identified the Jamestown Settlement, Monticello, and Mount Vernon as nationally significant; regionally critical assets include Colonial Williamsburg, George Washington’s birthplace, and the National D-Day Memorial. Richmond, Albemarle County, and the Division of Capitol Police reported surveillance and suspicious persons at monument and icon assets; Albemarle County Fire and Rescue also reported suspicious persons. Prior reporting of note included:

- During the Jamestown 400th Anniversary on May 12, 2007 approximately 70 individuals from the New Black Panther Party, Black Lawyers for Justice, and the American Indian Movement held a demonstration at Historic Jamestowne (formerly known as Jamestown Island); the demonstration was billed as an anti-slavery rally (Jamestown was where the first Africans came to an English colony) but ended up being an anti-Caucasian hate speech.

- The National Socialist Movement held a rally on Yorktown Battlefield on June 25, 2005; Communist Party counter protestors were very vocal and anti-police; Anti Racist Action also counter protested and swarmed individuals suspected of being racist.

**Intelligence Gaps**

1. How many monuments, icons, or other tourist facilities in Virginia border or otherwise provide potential surveillance access points for CIKR?
2. Have employees or visitors reported any suspicious photography incidents?
3. Have employees reported incidents of individuals asking questions about security measures?
4. Have Virginia monuments or icons experienced any bomb threats or suspicious package incidents?
5. How many monuments, icons, or other recreational areas have had suspicious fires? Was it determined who set them?
6. Have any special use permits been requested by white nationalist, black separatist, or other potentially disruptive protest group? Did such groups adhere to the regulations in the permit?
7. Have Virginia monuments, icons, or other recreational areas experienced any damage to trees or facilities caused by eco-terror groups such as Earth Liberation Front or Earth First?
8. Have any employees been harassed by animal rights activists or environmental extremists?
Projections

National monuments and icons offer potentially large casualty numbers, would damage the American psyche, and would have an adverse affect on the tourism industry - the 6th largest employer in Virginia. The Commonwealth is in close proximity to a number of major national targets, and is rich in regional and state monument and icons sector assets. Given this information, the following projections are offered:

Interest as a Target: Possible Increase - While the most visible and most frequently referenced targets are not within the Commonwealth, Virginia does have several upcoming 2009 events that might garner attention. These include:

- Monticello will have a grand opening ceremony for a new Visitor Center on April 15, 2009 which may attract regional and possibly national attention
- D-Day Memorial in Bedford will hold various events from June 4-7, 2009 for the 65th Anniversary of the invasion and expect 6000 in attendance and state VIPs
- Colonial Williamsburg holds the Grand Illumination annually on the first Sunday in December and attracts 25,000 to 35,000 visitors

Number of Virginia-based assets: Remain Constant – Given the emphasis on historical significance for this sector, it is unlikely that additional sites will be designated as monument or icon CIKR in the near future.

Interdependence: Possible Increase - Attacks on national monuments affect tourism, which affects restaurant and retail business, airlines, travel agencies, etc.; al-Qa'ida could view the volatile U.S. economy as an impetus to attack national monuments or nearby critical infrastructure that could have an adverse affect on monuments in order to inflict damage on the tourism industry.
Postal/Shipping

The Postal/Shipping sector is a network of collection, transportation, and distribution assets. Varying in size and complexity, these assets range from simple, single transportation mode systems serving a single metropolitan area to complex inter-modal networks linking millions of delivery points around the world. The sheer size and scope of the state Postal/Shipping sector makes protection an enormous challenge as it receives, processes, transports, and distributes billions of pieces of mail domestically each year.

Sector List Criteria

The criteria below identify the most important and critical infrastructure assets as understood by the Postal and Shipping Sector and utilizing their definitions of the terms listed below. Although the national resilience of the Postal and Shipping Sector is considerable, the loss of infrastructure described by these criteria would create significant consequences.

1. Large processing and distribution centers and associated air distribution hubs; OR
2. Large data processing centers.

Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector

The national Postal/Shipping sector has been leveraged to conduct attacks using biological agents as well as traditional explosive devices. While it is likely that the use of Postal/Shipping assets to transport weapons will continue, it is also important to note the potential application of a terrorism tradecraft technique using official or fraudulent identifications, uniforms, or vehicles to access sensitive sites.

Potential Threat Group(s)

The anthrax attacks of 2001 not only leveraged Postal/Shipping sector assets to attack national government and media targets, but also affected sector facilities and personnel. Other incidents have involved lone wolf extremists, while single-issue groups such as the Animal Liberation Front have threatened to pose as employees to gain access.
Domestic Incidents

Postal/Shipping sector assets have been used as a delivery mechanism for biological agents as well as explosive or incendiary devices, as seen with the anthrax letters of 2001 and the inert bombs sent to financial institutions by “The Bishop” from 2005 to 2007. In addition to these well-known cases, a series of suspicious packages were sent to financial, hospitality, and aviation organizations within a 30-mile radius of Charlotte, North Carolina. Also of interest to law enforcement are legitimate, periodic promotional mailings that generate public fear due to unusual appearances or sounds, or those that leak white powder.

In addition to the misuse of the Postal/Shipping sector to deliver weapons, assets in this sector can be used to gain access to sensitive sites. Access to government, military, and commercial sites can be gained through the theft or cloning of official vehicles, such as the one stolen in Maryland in December 2007. In late 2007, a convicted animal rights extremist recommended penetrating potential animal research targets disguised as package delivery employees. Such efforts can be facilitated through not only theft and cloning of official vehicles and uniforms, but also through disgruntled insiders, such as current or former employees who may be sympathetic to radical groups. At least one identified U.S. business operating in Virginia reported concerns regarding an employee who might be attempting to use his position to conduct surveillance activities.

Intelligence Gaps

1. Have suspicious employment inquiries been received at Virginia postal or shipping facilities?
2. Have any possible surveillance activities of any building or assets associated with postal or shipping assets occurred?
3. Have suspicious inquiries about security measures been received?
4. Has there been any unauthorized access to shipping facilities in Virginia?
5. Have there been any threats against postal staff or officials?
6. Have any concerns regarding potential misconduct by current or recently separated employees been received?

Projections

The Postal sector remains a target because of the size of the sector and the large volume of mail that is processed and delivered daily. The postal sector may be vulnerable to attack because of the ability to introduce potentially dangerous substances into the postal system. The postal system is developing robust countermeasures for possible attacks, but some vulnerabilities remain. An attack on the postal system could generate widespread media coverage and may spark public panic. This publicity and panic could be motivation for an attack. However, there have been no serious incidents in Virginia and there is no intelligence to indicate that future attacks are impending.
Public Health and Healthcare

The Public Health and Healthcare sector is comprised of systems, networks, services, facilities, functions, and roles needed to prevent disease and disability, treat patients, foster public health, and respond to public health emergencies. This sector spans all levels of government and the private sector. Ensuring a resilient healthcare system capable of withstanding disruption and poised to provide mass care, emergency services, and mortality services is vital for the safety and security of the Commonwealth. Protective programs within the state Public Health and Healthcare sector will continue to evolve in order to comply with updates to federal regulations, emergency response and recovery requirements, and the rapid technological advancements.

Sector List Criteria

1. Primary "HHS-owned or -managed" pharmaceutical and medical equipment stockpile sites, (e.g., Center for Disease Control (CDC)-owned or managed Strategic National Stockpiles) OR
2. Facilities (labs, warehouses, etc.) that house agents or activities requiring Bio-Safety Level 4 (BSL-4) containment (as validated by CDC). OR
3. Bio-Safety Level 3 (BSL-3) containment facilities that utilize select agents (as validated by CDC) for select agent research/work. OR
4. For single source manufacturing facilities of pharmaceuticals, medical devices or biologicals that, from a regulatory standpoint, are manufactured versus 'processed' OR
5. For single source processing or testing facilities for biologicals that, from a regulatory standpoint, are 'processed' versus manufactured (e.g., blood products/other human tissue) OR
6. For limited source (sufficiently few) manufacturers or processors OR
7. Storage/distribution facilities of medically necessary products that store at least 15 percent of the regional supply of a medically necessary product or medical countermeasure OR
8. Research facilities conducting unique, unduplicated research in direct support of biosurveillance or public health initiatives that would take at least 3 years to regenerate and would cost more than $50 million.
9. Hospitals must meet all of the following criteria:
   a. Hospitals located in close proximity to (but outside of the "hot" zone or directly impacted zone) of designated Tier 1 critical infrastructure assets from other sectors; AND
   b. An attack on said assets would create a mass casualty event likely creating a patient surge of more than 1000 patients per million people within the designated geographic area served by the hospital or hospitals; AND
   c. Such hospitals are site prepared to support all-hazards mass casualties including decontamination capabilities; AND
   d. Capable of trauma response, 24 hours a day and 7 days a week.
Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector
Two main trends of potential concern to the Public Health and Healthcare Sector are bioterrorism and terrorism tradecraft techniques that involve the surveillance of staff and facilities or theft of potential biological, chemical, or radiological agents. Nearly all other critical infrastructure is dependent upon the state Public Health and Healthcare Sector, especially during disasters.

Potential Threat Group(s)
Any group that would benefit from high profile attacks on soft targets could target public health and healthcare facilities, thereby threatening this sector. These groups include anti-abortion groups, international terrorists, single-issue domestic terror groups, and lone-wolf extremists.

Domestic Incidents
The Virginia Fusion Center has not received a significant number of unresolved reports pertaining to public health and healthcare. Much more reporting has been received regarding suspicious activity around hospital facilities. Examples of suspicious activity pertaining to Virginia include:

- Subject inquiries regarding nuclear materials
- Suspicious phone call received at Potomac Hospital in Woodbridge
- Suspicious phone call received at Halifax Hospital in South Boston
- Subject possibly conducting video surveillance at Retreat Hospital in Richmond
- Possible use of computer viruses to compromise hospital computer system or cause damage

Intelligence Gaps
1. Have suspicious employment inquiries been received at Virginia public health or healthcare facilities?
2. Have any possible surveillance activities of any building or assets associated with Public Health facilities occurred?
3. Has there been any unauthorized access to healthcare facilities in Virginia?
4. Have any recent threats been received by Virginia medical facilities which offer abortion counseling or services?

Projections
It is anticipated that reports of suspicious activity involving the Public Health and Healthcare Sector will continue and possibly increase due to increased vigilance in these sectors. The Virginia Fusion Center did note an increase in reporting by this sector in 2007, but it is unclear if this is due to an increase in actual incidents or if this is due to an increase of reporting following a joint public outreach effort with the Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association. This sector remains a possible target because of the perceived vulnerability and the high profile nature of the sector. Unfortunately, it is also likely that actual detection and identification of nefarious activities will be difficult due to the high volume of legitimate incidents.
Transportation System Sectors

The Transportation Systems sector includes all modes of transportation involved in moving millions of passengers and goods through a vast and interdependent network. This state sector includes, but is not limited to Aviation, Highways/Bridges, Ports, and Rail and Mass Transit. The federal and state Transportation Systems sectors have demonstrated leadership in establishing security networks throughout the Commonwealth and the U.S. Since the September 2001 attacks, this sector has enhanced the resiliency of transportation systems while balancing business and customer needs.

Interdependencies

Many interdependencies exist between the state Transportation sector and other state sectors. Virtually every sector exhibits some degree of dependency on the Energy, Information Technology/Telecommunications, and Transportation Systems sectors. In addition to cross-sector dependencies, the Transportation Systems sub-sectors are also reliant on the safety and security measures employed by each other. Due to the dependencies of the Transportation System sector on national and global transportation networks, it relies on partners from around the globe to share critical information.

Aviation

The Aviation Sector remains a key target for terror for a variety of reasons, including its high profile status, psychological impacts and resultant economic damage. Virginia aviation hubs and industry are attractive targets due to the proximity of many major airports to central federal and state government facilities, as well as the volume of travel through the international hubs present in the state. Any successful attack or attempted attack on the Commonwealth’s air facilities and/or aircraft would further serve to reinforce the terrorist goal that civilians are not safe. It would appear from both incidents in the Commonwealth and FBI national trend data that terrorists continue to seek vulnerabilities in this sector despite improved security.

Sector List Criteria

Category X Airports, which have annual enplanements of 5 million or more and international enplanements of 1 million or more
Potential Threat Group(s)
The Aviation sector has been a popular target overseas, including a failed attack on an Israeli plane in Africa in 2002. At the present time, the majority of domestic threat groups and movements tend to target buildings and physical assets rather than inflict the massive casualties likely with an attack on Aviation sector assets. International groups, such as al-Qa’ida, however, have already conducted attacks against the Aviation sector. The group continues to announce a desire to inflict high human losses, as well as structural and economic damage by attacking this sector. Incidents involving lone wolf or homegrown cells are also possible, as these groups would desire the publicity created by a high profile attack on the Aviation sector.

Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector
The two most significant trends of concern for Aviation sector assets remain terrorism tradecraft, including methods to collect information and launch attacks, as well as the potential for cyber-crime and/or cyber-terrorism targeting the computer control systems critical to safe flight operations.

Domestic Incidents
Open source reports of security incidents at airports throughout the U.S. highlight the detection of potential threat devices, as well as evasive behaviors potentially linked to evading security measures. While the majority of reports are resolved as frustrated travelers or criminals attempting to elude capture, the Terrorism Screening Center receives significant reports of air travel by Watch Listed subjects.

In addition to concerns regarding potential efforts to compromise the computer-controlled networks in this sector, open source reporting highlights other uses of technology to target Aviation sector assets. In October 2006, a Mujahideen website posted a message containing a link to what appeared to be live feed of Anchorage International Airport taken by the airport’s security cameras. The message, titled “You Can Spy on the Enemies’ Airports Directly by Controlling the Cameras’ Direction,” gave directions for how to control the cameras and promised to provide links in the future for other airports as well. If this was an authentic break-in, it indicated capacity to hack into highly secure servers.

Virginia
Terrorism Screening Center data reported numerous air travel records for Watch Listed persons traveling through Virginia airports. In addition to a significant volume of air travel by subjects with potential linkages to terror groups, the VFC did receive several reports of interest in 2007. These include:

- Employment-based security credentials possessed by an illegal alien with fraudulent identification through Dulles International Airport
- Suspicious behavior by an individual seeking job training funds for flight training
• Suspicious videotaping incident involving three subjects recording activity inside and outside of Richmond International Airport\textsuperscript{489}
• Suspicious videotaping of Reagan National Airport by a lone subject who fled when he realized he was being observed\textsuperscript{490}
• Suspicious threat call received in West Virginia against an unidentified airport\textsuperscript{491}

While these incidents are considered suspicious, investigative follow up did not identify any threats to Aviation sector assets in Virginia or the U.S.

**Projections**

Homegrown extremists could utilize seemingly innocuous hobbies like plane-spotting to engage in the collection of information through both direct observation and internet monitoring.\textsuperscript{492} This hobby could provide a legitimate alibi for individuals conducting pre-incident surveillance activities. Potential attackers could also pose as plane-spotters to conduct physical attacks against planes, airport personnel, or facilities. Law enforcement is urged to remain vigilant as the Aviation sector will remain a favorable target especially to individuals looking to conduct high profile attacks.

**Highways/Bridges**

Bridges and tunnels have been identified as a critical infrastructure due to the necessity of goods and services to be delivered through the use of the nation’s highways. Certain regions of Virginia are economically and socially dependant (public safety, goods and services) on bridges and tunnels. In addition to having significant interstate and major highway infrastructure, Virginia also has a number of high traffic volume bridges, including the Monitor Merrimac Bridge, Berkeley Bridge, Route 66 Bridge, Woodrow Wilson Bridge, and Memorial Bridge.
Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector

The most significant trends of concern for Highways/Bridges sector assets remain terrorism tradecraft, including methods to collect information and launch attacks. There is some potential for impact or disruption from the shipping or transportation of actual weapons or weapon components by extremists. Domestic groups continue to use disruptions to the flow of traffic, primarily on secondary roads in towns and cities, as a means to bring attention to their cause.\textsuperscript{493}

Potential Threat Group(s)

Potential threat groups to highways, bridges, and tunnels include international terrorist organizations such as al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups, Hizballah, and HAMAS.\textsuperscript{494} Al-Qa’ida has demonstrated through publications a desire to target highways, bridges, and tunnels in order to create mass confusion, economic destruction, and death. Hizballah and HAMAS both have a presence in the U.S. and are capable of carrying out such an attack, but are unlikely to attack targets in the U.S. unless provoked. Other threat groups that have targeted highways, bridges, and tunnels include both left wing and right wing extremists.\textsuperscript{495}

Domestic Incidents

Nationwide reporting indicates that most incidents pertaining to the Highways/Bridges sector involve photography or videotaping incidents. A review of the FBI’s Guardian Threat Tracking System for suspected targeting of US bridges between September 1, 2005 and August 31, 2006 revealed over 380 threats and suspicious incidents.\textsuperscript{496} While the majority of these incidents have been resolved through further investigation, some remain unresolved. While these incidents cannot conclusively be linked to terrorist pre-operational planning, several have raised concern within the intelligence and law enforcement communities. While levels of reporting for such incidents are fairly high, the limited amount of information available on the vehicles and individuals involved makes additional research and analysis difficult. Additional complications arise when attempting to determine whether these incidents involved image collection of the highways and bridges themselves or of general scenery and tourist attractions.
Virginia

The bulk of citizen reports received by the Virginia Fusion Center concern people seen in vehicles taking photos or filming with camcorders while traveling on Virginia’s highways or bridges. Bridges in the Hampton Roads area are the most frequent sites of suspicious videotaping and pictures, with the Hampton Roads Bridge tunnel having the most reports. The majority of reports involve subjects driving vehicles but frequently contain insufficient information for additional research. The VFC also receives reports from transportation personnel assigned to specific sites, after law enforcement personnel in the area attempt to locate the vehicle. Unfortunately, few vehicles are located at the time of initial complaint, and vague descriptions of drivers and occupants make subsequent identification and investigation challenging.
Intelligence Gaps

1. How many threats to highways, bridges, and tunnels have been reported in Virginia?
2. Which highways, bridges, and tunnels are the most vital to economic activity in Virginia? Is this divisible by economic sector?
3. Have terrorists targeted the highways, bridges, and tunnels in Virginia?
4. Are there any individuals in the Commonwealth capable of executing roadside IED deployment in the Commonwealth?
5. Which areas experience the highest reporting of suspicious activities related to highways, bridges and tunnels?
6. What tactics employed by domestic terrorist entities are most effective against highways, bridges, and tunnels?
7. Is there a clear threat to highways, bridges, and tunnel infrastructure in the Commonwealth from any known groups (and/or associates)?
8. What is the history of terrorist encounters on Virginia highways, bridges and tunnels?

Projections

It is anticipated that reports of suspicious activity involving the Highways/Bridges sector will remain significantly higher than for other CIKR infrastructure sectors. As a number of Virginia's highways and bridges have scenic qualities admired by tourists, it is likely that the phenomenon of photography as videotaping, especially of Hampton Roads area bridges and tunnels, will continue. It is also likely that actual detection and identification of nefarious activities will be difficult due to the high volume of legitimate incidents.

Interest as Target: Remain Constant - While terrorists overseas have targeted highways, bridges, and tunnels for attack there is still a low probability for similar attacks in the U.S. If this asset is attacked it will be in conjunction with another larger primary attack and the assault on the highway, bridge, or tunnel will be secondary in nature meant to create confusion, and fear as well as increase casualties.

Number of Virginia-based assets: Remain Constant – Barring major infrastructure funding allocations from the federal stimulus bill, current and forecasted economic conditions make significant new construction unlikely.

Interdependencies: The destruction of highways and bridges in Virginia will either cause severe localized traffic issues or, depending on the target, multijurisdictional traffic tie-ups. In the Hampton Roads region terrorist targeting of significant roadways could cause massive disruptions, effectively isolating the area.
 Ports

Ports infrastructure and their associated assets include ships and passenger transportation systems, coastal and inland waterways, locks, dams and canals. The threat to ports and other maritime assets stems primarily from al-Qa’ida and affiliates, as the group has routinely identified the transportation port sector as a highly prized target.\textsuperscript{498} Potential surveillance of ferries in Washington State in 2007 also raised the concern of possible attacks against the transportation sector.\textsuperscript{499} Due to Virginia’s considerable port infrastructure that includes military assets, commercial shipping, and a cruise ship terminal,\textsuperscript{500} threats to this sector are of increased concern.

 Sector List Criteria

The U.S. Coast Guard, the SSA for the maritime mode, will use its Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) to identify maritime, national level, critical infrastructure/key resource assets and systems (sector assets).

Within MSRAM, each potential sector asset is assigned values for the estimated consequences from at least one and possibly several likely terrorist attack methods. For each attack method evaluated, the overall consequence value includes approximations for death/injury, primary economic, environmental, national security, symbolic, and secondary economic consequence factors that take into account recoverability and redundancy parameters. The output of MSRAM process computations is a listing of the potential Sector assets’ evaluations ranked by consequence value. Where a particular potential sector asset is evaluated for multiple attack methods, only the highest consequence value will be listed.

The U.S. Coast Guard will establish an appropriate threshold for overall consequence values.

Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector

Attacks using terrorism tradecraft, particularly improvised explosive devices (IED) or vehicle-borne IEDs would have a devastating impact on maritime assets. Terrorists have used small boats packed with explosives against military and civilian vessels. There is also the potential for extremist groups to use a car packed with explosives against passenger carriers like ferries, which routinely transport civilian vehicles. Maritime assets, particularly commercial shipping, are also vulnerable to terrorism financing efforts via the shipping of counterfeit goods. Illicit entry through human smuggling has also been noted as a concern to the Ports sector.
Potential Threat Group(s)
International terrorist groups, specifically al-Qa’ida, are believed to pose the largest threat to the ports critical infrastructure. An attack on the maritime sector has the potential to cause mass causalities, disrupt tourism, and hurt the economy. A maritime attack, such as the 2000 USS Cole assault, has a spectacular element favored by terrorist plotters.\textsuperscript{501}

Domestic Incidents
Suspicious incidents involving maritime assets have been primarily focused on the potential targeting of ferries in Washington state.\textsuperscript{502} Although media attention has focused on suspicious incidents involving the Washington ferries, homeland security officials have noted several incidents occurring since 2004 that include possible pre-attack indicators. These indicators include photographing the interior of the vessel, measuring the boat length, and monitoring passenger loading and unloading procedures.\textsuperscript{503}

Virginia
Several suspicious events surrounding Virginia’s maritime assets have been reported and have primarily focused around the Tidewater area. These incidents include possible surveillance, suspicious photography, and bomb threats.\textsuperscript{504} Many of the noted incidents involved the Jamestown-Scotland Ferry, which is composed of a fleet of four vessels and is the only ferry system in the Commonwealth to operate on a 24-hour basis.\textsuperscript{505}

Intelligence Gaps
1. Have employees or visitors reported any suspicious photography incidents (i.e. including photography of secured areas, photography of critical infrastructure located adjacent to these properties, etc.)?
2. Have employees reported incidents of individuals asking questions about security measures in Virginia facilities?
3. Have Virginia facilities experienced any bomb threats or suspicious package incidents?
4. Have any extremist groups (and/or associates) held gatherings in Virginia and/or been involved in suspicious activity in the proximity of CIKR?
5. Have Virginia facilities experienced any damage or adjacent infrastructure? If so, have perpetrators been identified as being associated with the aforementioned groups?
6. Have any Virginia facilities experienced loss or theft of uniform items, official identification cards or visitors passes?
7. Have any attempts to gain entry to a facility using a fraudulent or stolen identification card been noted in Virginia?
8. Has anyone attempted to gain entry onto a facility using any other nefarious methods to avoid detection?
**Projections**

Although the media attention focused on the suspected surveillance of the Washington State Ferry may have a target hardening approach, the ports infrastructure continues to be a prized attack target. Given Virginia’s military and civilian maritime assets, which include expansive infrastructure in Tidewater as well as inland ports throughout the Commonwealth, threats to ports should not be taken lightly.

**Rail and Mass Transit**

The main emphasis, to date, of terror attacks against Rail and Mass Transportation targets has been more focused on inflicting damage to persons rather than the destruction of hard infrastructure. The open nature of rail transport, along with a wide range of target points, makes attacks against this transport mode very feasible. Characterized by easy access and anonymity, rail and mass transit causes convergences of people vulnerable to both conventional explosive devices and non-conventional attacks using chemical or biological agents.

**Overview of Rail Network in Virginia**

Source: [Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation Map](https://www.virginia.gov/rail/) (click to zoom)
The Surface Transportation ISAC (ST-ISAC) was created by the Association of American Railroads in 2002 at the request of the Secretary of Transportation. This ISAC currently supports 95% of the North American freight railroad infrastructure. In 2007, the Public Transit node joined the ST-ISAC; the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) serves as the U.S. Department of Transportation designated sector coordinator for the U.S. public transit industry. APTA's members serve over 90% of persons using public transportation in the U.S. and Canada.

Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector

The most significant trends of concern for Rail and Mass Transit sector assets remain terrorism tradecraft, including methods to collect information and launch attacks. Rail and Mass Transit is unique because it is the focus of innocuous observation by hobbyists known as “rail buffs.” Some of these hobbyists not only observe trains, but engage in photography, videotaping, and monitoring of communications frequencies. In addition to possible surveillance and sabotage efforts, this sector is also affected by the trend of trainhopping, in which individuals stowaway on non-passenger trains as a form of transportation. This trend, utilized by the Garbage Liberation Front, has been observed in Virginia in 2007.506

Sector List Criteria – Freight Rail

1. Rail tunnels, bridges, or other critical assets without a practical reroute option, a rebuild time over 3 months if all resources are available, or rerouting options that would result in a 75% degradation of service; OR
2. Rail yards that, if disabled, would cause significant disruption to the national economy; OR
3. The total disability (for greater than 72 hours) or destruction of a cyber system that would result in the loss of a signaling system and the inability to monitor assets on a core route.

Sector List Criteria

Mass Transit systems supporting large metropolitan areas with daily ridership over 60,000 passengers.
Potential Threat Group(s)

Mass transit has been a popular target overseas, including attacks in European cities such as London and Madrid, as well as in Asian countries such as India and Japan. At the present time, the majority of domestic threat groups and movements tend to target buildings and physical assets rather than inflict the massive casualties likely with an attack on Rail and Mass Transit sector assets. International groups, such as al-Qa'ida, however, have specifically announced a desire to inflict high human losses, as well as structural and economic damage by attacking this sector. Incidents involving lone wolf or homegrown cells are also possible.

Domestic Incidents

Emergency services personnel monitor train related incidents not only in situations involving potential chemical releases, but also for signs of criminal or terrorist activities. Recent nationwide reporting has included rail tampering incidents involving the removal of rail spikes in an apparent attempt to cause derailment and email bomb threats. In December 2006, an individual allegedly led a discussion with members of a domestic extremist militia group concerning how to decouple rail cars and remove their wheels. During this conversation, the group members discussed decoupling the trains for the purpose of acquiring supplies.

Virginia

Reporting of suspicious incidents involving mass transit assets were received by the VFC from National Capitol Region localities only, despite the prevalence of public transportation in major metropolitan areas throughout the state. It is unclear if this is due to a lack of suspicious activity or “See Something, Say Something” type public awareness campaigns in the region. Most of the reporting from this area involves people engaging in suspicious activity, such as:

- Suspicious person on the Metro with black bags and apparently modified remote control-type devices
- Suspicious person at the Roslyn Metro station potentially testing reactions to unattended baggage
- Suspicious subject videotaping an AMTRAK passenger train at Lorton with professional grade equipment

The VFC also received reporting of suspicious activity regarding assets. These incidents occurred in Chesterfield County, Chesapeake and Newport News, and included:

- Detection of several suspicious devices along the CSX railroad tracks in Newport News; one device was described as a pipe bomb, while another was an incendiary type device
• Group of suspicious individuals trespassing on a CSX train in Ettrick. The individuals may have ties to an ecological direct action group with anarchist sympathies that advocates train hopping and squatting⁵¹³
• Series of potential switch tampering potentially timed to sabotage CSX trains hauling HAZMAT loads on a low-volume line in Chesterfield County.⁵¹⁴
• Incidents of vandalism to CSX train switches in Chesterfield⁵¹⁵
• Suspicious photography incidents and possible surveillance activity on CSX tracks in James City County.⁵¹⁶
• Suspicious fire involving a wood piling next to a Norfolk Southern Railroad Bridge in Chesapeake. The pilings had no navigational lighting or power but were fully engulfed in flames.⁵¹⁷

None of these incidents have been shown to have a terrorism nexus, but indicate the potential for actions of greater consequence.

Intelligence Gaps
1. Have any suspicious individuals inquired about employment with the rail industry?
2. Have there been possible surveillance of tracks or rail facilities?
3. Have any suspicious individuals inquired about access to tracks or rail facilities or asked about security measures?
4. Has there been any authorized access of break ins to rail facilities?
5. Have there been any threats against the rail industry or members?

Projections
Although no intelligence suggests that terrorist or extremist groups are currently planning attacks against Virginia Rail and Mass Transit assets, the VFC anticipates continued reporting of vandalism and potential tampering, with seasonal increases that match good weather and school vacations. As the assets in this sector are spread throughout the Commonwealth, with some vulnerable components located in remote areas, detection of surveillance or sabotage will remain difficult.
Water (Drinking and Waste Systems)

The Water sector is vital to protecting human health and a robust economy in the Commonwealth and in the U.S., necessitating a strategy to protect the Water sector against manmade as well as natural threats. The U.S. currently has roughly 160,000 public drinking water utilities and more than 16,000 wastewater utilities. An estimated 84% of the U.S. population receives potable water from public water systems and more than 75% of the U.S. population uses these wastewater utilities to handle its sanitary sewage. In addition to residential users, approximately 27,000 commercial and industrial facilities rely on publicly owned water systems to treat 32 billion gallons of wastewater daily.

Sector List Criteria

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier Criteria</th>
<th>Tier 1</th>
<th>Tier 2</th>
<th>Tier 3</th>
<th>Tier 4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CWS Population Served (retail + wholesale)</td>
<td>≥ 1 Million</td>
<td>25,000 – 999,999</td>
<td>3,300 – 24,999</td>
<td>&lt;3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest Single Facility On-Site Gaseous Chlorine Storage (average daily volume)</td>
<td>≥ 40 Tons</td>
<td>20 – 39 Tons</td>
<td>1 – 19 Tons</td>
<td>&lt;1 Ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWS Economic Impact (Regional impact, not including VSL)</td>
<td>≥ $100 Billion</td>
<td>$5 – 99.9 Billion</td>
<td>$100 Million – $4.9 Billion</td>
<td>&lt; $100 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Customers Served</td>
<td>Federal Government Defined (e.g., Tier assets from other sectors)</td>
<td>Federal Government Defined (e.g., Tier assets from other sectors)</td>
<td>Two or More of the following:</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Water ISAC is a private, not-for-profit organization authorized by Congress and established by utilities with the fundamental purpose of providing information necessary to secure water systems and ensure continuous utility operations in the face of all hazards. The Water ISAC currently provides security information to water and wastewater utilities that provide services to more than 65% of the American population.518

**Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector**
Current threats to water or wastewater systems are broadly classified into four categories: physical destruction, bio-terrorism, chemical contamination, and cyber attacks. Suspicious incidents, potentially linked to surveillance, security probes, and tampering, have been reported around the U.S.

**Potential Threat Group(s)**
International groups, such as al-Qa’ida, advocate attacks on vital supplies such as water more frequently than domestic groups. As with several other industries, Water sector assets may be attractive to lone wolf types with limited resources. The relatively remote location of some Water sector facilities has made them attractive targets for vandalism for some time; this same factor could also attract single actor or small homegrown groups to probe security efforts as a precursor to a larger event.

**Domestic Incidents**
National incident reporting concerning the Water sector vary widely. Some involve specific, but not significantly credible threats, to facilities, while others reflect concerns about broader trends. One concern that continues to generate reporting is the possible acquisition of and training in SCUBA gear as a precursor to an attack.519 Another item of concern and controversy arose from a local government posting520 on water regulations that contains information considered to be of value in planning Water sector attacks by means of Backflow Valve tampering.521

**Virginia**
Current reporting in Virginia includes two threats of low credibility. The first threat received was an email threatening the water supply received by a resident of Falls Church.522 The second was a threatening letter, mailed from a correctional facility, advising of an impending water contamination attack using anthrax and radiological materials.523 The Virginia Fusion Center has not received significant reporting of vandalism or forced entry into Water sector facilities, but it is not clear if this is due to a lack of occurrence or a lack of reporting.
Intelligence Gaps

1. Have there been any thefts of chemicals from Virginia facilities or attempts by outsiders to purchase chemicals?
2. Have there been any attempts or threats to poison the water supply in Virginia?
3. Have there been any suspicious attempts to elicit information concerning facility operations?
4. Have there been any attempts to test or conduct reconnaissance of security operations?
5. Have there been any suspicious incidents involving potential surveillance, such as taking extensive notes, photographing, videotaping, or mobile surveillance by cars, trucks, motorcycles, boats or small aircraft?
6. Have any persons shown uncommon interest in security measures or personnel, entry points or access controls, or perimeter barriers such as fences or walls?
7. Has any suspicious activity by current or recently separated employees suggested an interest in compromising plant operations?
8. Have there been attempts by foreign nationals to gain access or elicit information from facility personnel?
9. Which groups or movements pose the largest threat to key Virginia facilities?

Projections

Water systems are vulnerable to physical attacks that can compromise the quantity and quality of a community’s drinking water, as well as electronic or cyber attacks that can disrupt a system’s computer operations. In Virginia, there are nine major river basins/watersheds that could be potentially targeted by terrorists; however, the Water sector is not likely to be a priority target because an attack on this infrastructure would not cause spectacular visual effects and large numbers of casualties that would capture media attention. Further, an attack on the water/wastewater infrastructure would not have as significant an economic impact as an attack on other critical infrastructures. The Water sector, however, remains a valid terrorist target because the water sector is one of the seventeen key national infrastructures. In addition, attacks against other critical infrastructures could impact the Water/Wastewater sector.156
CONCLUSION

Although a number of international and domestic terrorist organizations have a presence in Virginia, the activities of these groups have been primarily limited to non-violent activity. There is no intelligence information indicating any specific or credible plans regarding an imminent threat to the Commonwealth from the identified threat groups; however, a majority of these groups are actively recruiting and fundraising in the U.S. The presence of terrorist groups in the Commonwealth poses an inherent threat given a majority of these groups espouse anti-government beliefs, have a propensity for violent attacks, and have openly expressed an interest in attacks against the U.S. and U.S. interests.

Despite a lack of reporting indicating that domestic and international groups are involved in joint operational planning in Virginia, law enforcement and the Intelligence Community should remain aware of the potential threat posed by domestic terrorism groups in the context of global Islamic extremism. As domestic terrorists in the U.S. have greater access to potential targets and weapons within the U.S. and may be less likely to attract suspicion, international terrorist groups may seek to enlist their operational support by capitalizing on mutual anti-U.S. government sentiments.

Although differences in religious and ideological beliefs may pose significant barriers to cooperation, shared animosity, and the fostering of relationships between like-minded groups is cause for concern. Recent incidents of groups within the black separatist movement who have openly supported transnational Islamic extremist causes further serve to highlight a potential threat. Additionally, targeted recruitment efforts of inmates and street gang members by extremist threat groups indicates a possible willingness of these groups to employ violent tactics in future events, which would be of major concern to the Commonwealth.

Further compounding the domestic threat is the recent instances involving radicalized U.S. persons engaging in terrorist planning against U.S. interests. Although there is no available information suggesting an imminent threat to the Commonwealth from U.S.-based homegrown extremists, activities indicative of recruitment, training, radicalization, and surveillance have been reported throughout the state. The difficulty in detecting the threat from these extremists is compounded as these individuals are not typically involved in group activities that would attract attention from law enforcement.

In addition, the increased use of technology, namely the Internet, has provided potential terrorists with radical inspiration, training materials, and financing and is increasingly being utilized by individuals and groups seeking affirmation and identity through the use of violence. The increase of internet availability throughout isolated or developing parts of the world can also serve as a potential link between Virginia and like-minded extremists and radical movements abroad.

Based on the information gathered, the Commonwealth of Virginia could be potentially targeted for terrorist attack because of its location and proximity to Washington, D.C., and its numerous critical
infrastructure, including tourist facilities and soft targets. In addition, the presence of international and domestic terrorist groups, and the amount of extremist activity documented in Virginia suggests additional cause for concern. In order to detect and deter terrorist attacks, it is essential that information regarding suspected terrorists and suspicious activity in Virginia be closely monitored and reported in a timely manner.
Recommendations

In an effort to identify the most viable terrorism threats to the Commonwealth, it is important to determine the extent to which the identified domestic and foreign groups are present in Virginia. It is also important to determine if these groups are actively planning to commit acts of terrorism. In order to determine this, it is advised that the following intelligence areas be addressed:

- Further develop intelligence on members and associates of identified terrorist groups
- Identify business fronts and other sources of financing used by extremist groups
- Determine the operational capabilities, resources, and training available to groups
- Monitor and further develop intelligence regarding terrorist recruiting grounds
- Identify and monitor web forums and social networking sites used by extremists
- Determine means of communication and emerging technology used by threat groups
- Further identify the motivation of threat groups and the possible fostering of relationships between like-minded entities
- Identify evolving tactics and methodology utilized and/or advocated by threat groups
- Closely monitor trend information regarding recruitment of extremists, most notably those individuals and groups seeking affirmation and identity by employing violence
- Identify global terrorism trends and the potential ramifications for the U.S. and U.S. interests in light of existing overseas terrorist activity
- Identify trends regarding homegrown terrorism abroad and apply lessons learned to international and domestic extremist groups

In addition to identifying information relative to the identified threat groups in Virginia, the potential targets and types of terrorism threats should be considered. This information should be further developed to identify capabilities of the identified threat groups and overall threats to the Commonwealth.

- Further identify the types and extent of identified terrorism trends affecting Virginia
- Attempt to further substantiate claims regarding trend activity and a nexus to terrorism
- Identify, monitor, and document the sources and mechanisms of terrorism finance
- Encourage public and private partners to remain alert and report activity indicative of “The Seven Signs of Terrorism”: surveillance, tests of security, suspicious questioning, acquiring supplies, suspicious persons, dry runs, and deploying assets
- Develop and maintain contacts at key infrastructure facilities and soft targets to encourage reporting of suspicious activities, including threats of suspicious transactions
- Identify, make contact, and educate retailers whose goods could be exploited for terrorist operations
• Attempt to identify vulnerable infrastructure and the potential for its exploitation by the identified threat groups
• Monitor global terrorism acts and emerging trend information abroad to determine target threat vulnerability
• Further identify threat information regarding types of terrorist threats that have been referenced by the Intelligence Community
• Identify types of terrorist threats to Virginia which are not specified in the assessment

Gathering information based on these recommendations will allow the Virginia Fusion Center and their law enforcement and homeland security partners the ability to prevent future terrorist attacks in the Commonwealth. Any information regarding these recommendations can be forwarded to the Virginia Fusion Center by calling (804) 674-2196 or by e-mail at vfc@vsp.virginia.gov.
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8 (OS) Associated Press: Possible Al Qaeda Infiltration Worries FBI Chief, March 9, 2005;
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39 (LES) 2009 VFC Threat Assessment Survey
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   (OS) The Sunday Telegraph: Authorities Probe Little-Known Islamic Group’s Alleged Ties to Extremists, August 21, 2006.
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46 (LES) Terrorism Screening Center: Virginia Encounters January 1, 2007 – December 31, 2007
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48 (LES) 2008 VFC Threat Assessment Survey;
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52 (LES) TIPS C070510
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56 (OS) MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base: Lashkar-e-Taiba, February 23, 2008
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105 (LES) FBI IIR 4 201 3171 06

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